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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a valuable source of external finance to complement domestic 
savings, enhance domestic investment and increase employment in developing countries. It can 
potentially promote long-term growth and development through knowledge and technology 
transfers from foreign firms to domestic agents in host countries. With these benefits in mind, 
especially in relation to low-income African countries characterized by underdeveloped domestic 
financial markets, this thesis investigates the determinants of FDI, evaluates how well local firms 
can be integrated in FDI projects to enhance productivity growth and determines whether these 
investments have contributed to increasing productivity growth of host African countries. These 
issues are analysed in three constituent chapters of the thesis.   
 
The first study explores whether FDI from the different group of economies, stratified into the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), non-OECD emerging 
markets and intra-African economies, are driven by market-seeking, natural resource-seeking 
and efficiency-seeking motivations into host African countries. Evidence suggests that market-
seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI are more growth enhancing than natural-resource seeking 
FDI. This study exploits recent bilateral FDI data to examine the underlying motivations and 
determinants of FDI into African economies. In doing so, the study contributes to the empirical 
literature by providing evidence on the specific factors that influence FDI into resource-rich and 
non-resource rich African economies. The study finds that the size of host markets and presence 
of natural resources have important influence on FDI into resource-rich countries, with market 
size determining FDI into non-resource rich countries, while investments from non-OECD 
emerging markets economies are also explained by the presence of lower labour costs. It is also 
evident that there are significant differences in determinants of FDI into African countries, 
between investors from African economies and counterparts from the OECD and non-OECD 
emerging markets. The results show significant differences between the drivers of FDI to South 
Africa and other African countries.   
 
The second study complements the first in analysing the determinants of FDI activity, by 
determining the sectors through which foreign affiliates and local firms are more likely to 
undertake joint activities in FDI projects. This is important in light of the growing need to 
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promote knowledge and technology transfers from FDI in order to boost productivity in host sub-
Saharan African countries. Over the years, FDI in sub-Saharan Africa were mostly undertaken in 
high technology sectors, which are presumably capital-intensive, by joint-venture firms formed 
between transnational corporations and domestic firms. This pattern of investment has called into 
question whether foreign affiliates and local firms have greater propensity to jointly engage in 
FDI projects in capital-intensive activities. Considering this question, the study contributes to the 
empirical literature by determining the sectors through which such integration is more likely to 
occur. In trying to understand this relationship, the analysis used a large survey dataset on 
manufacturing and services firms for 19 sub-Saharan African countries. The survey was 
conducted by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 2010. This 
data allows us to evaluate the integration decisions of firms, considering how physical capital 
intensity of foreign affiliates and skill intensity of the local workforce affect such decisions. The 
results reveal remarkably consistent finding that there is a higher likelihood that these firms will 
integrate production through capital-intensive than labour-intensive activities in sub-Saharan 
Africa.   
  
The third study investigates the growth enhancing effects of FDI into African countries, 
considering whether such impact depends on human capital capacity across countries. This study 
contributes to the empirical literature by exploiting host country heterogeneity in human capital 
capacity in explaining whether there are differences in the effect of FDI on productivity growth 
across countries. To consider such differences, recent country level data on total factor 
productivity growth and human capital stock, which is used as proxy for host country absorptive 
capacity, were used in a panel of 25 countries over the period 1996-2011. The analysis employed 
the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) which allows for host country heterogeneity in 
human capital capacity to determine whether the relationship between FDI and productivity 
growth is nonlinear. The results strongly support the nonlinearity between FDI and productivity 
growth. This suggests that the impact of FDI on productivity growth differs across African 
countries. The heterogeneity is explained by the variation in human capital capacity across these 
economies. The study reveals a minimum threshold of 6.94 average years of schooling for FDI to 
accelerate productivity growth in host African countries. The analysis suggests that FDI will 
raise productivity growth in countries which have attained or exhibited human capital capacity 
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closer to this threshold, when further efforts are applied to enhance such capacity. Countries with 
human capital capacity far below the threshold, however, will not experience productivity gains 
from these investments.  
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1.1 Introduction and Motivation 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is recognized as a catalyst for stimulating growth and 
development, especially in many developing countries that have limited capacity to promote 
domestic investment and finance long-term development (UNCTAD, 2013a). FDI is viewed as 
an integral component of financial globalization (Brahmhatt and Dudush, 1996; Campos and 
Kinoshita, 2010) due partly to potential benefits to host countries.  In recent decades, it has 
grown at a faster pace than trade flows between countries (Blonigen, 2005). Among academics, 
the theoretical arguments on the contribution of FDI to host economies have been extensively 
articulated, with the overall benefits broadly categorized into direct macroeconomic effects and 
indirect effects. Direct macroeconomic effects occur through increases in investment, tax 
revenues, creating employment and increasing foreign exchange receipts; while indirect effects 
or micro level contributions to long-term growth and development occur through technology 
spillovers to domestic firms (Farole and Winkler, 2014; Paus and Gallagher, 2008). In particular, 
FDI can accelerate growth through increases in total factor productivity, and thus overall 
efficiency of resource use in host countries (OECD, 2002).  
 
Over the past few decades, global inward FDI was mostly concentrated in developed countries. 
However, this pattern has changed in recent years, particularly following the global financial 
crisis in 2007/2008 and the successful implementation of structural reforms in some developing 
countries. Inflow of FDI to developing countries surged over the past 25 years, from 17 percent 
of global FDI inflows in 1990 to 55 percent in 2014. The share of these investments is however 
unevenly distributed across developing countries, with Asia receiving the bulk of the flows, an 
average of 65 percent for the period 1990-2014, compared to Latin America and the Caribbean 
with 27 percent and Africa just under 8 percent. Even though Africa‟s share of inward FDI to 
developing countries is quite low, the continent also witnessed significant expansion in FDI 
inflows over the past 25 years, increasing almost 19-fold. These investments can be extremely 
important to the economies that receive them. Africa‟s share of inward FDI flows in gross fixed 
capital formation is relatively high, averaging over 11 percent for the period 1996-2014. The 
share of inward FDI stock in GDP rose significantly, from 13 percent in 1996 to 29 percent in 
   
14 
 
2014, averaging 25 percent over the period.  Across Africa, the distribution of FDI inflows is far 
from uniform, with South Africa receiving 63 percent of all inward FDI flows to sub-Saharan 
Africa from the European Union (EU), between 2001 and 2012; and Nigeria attracting 37 
percent of US FDI flows (Sy et al., 2014). 
 
This thesis provides three up-to- date studies of FDI flows in Africa. Chapter two of the thesis 
primarily focuses on investigating the motivations underpinning FDI from different groups of 
economies, categorized into intra-African, OECD and non-OECD emerging markets economies, 
into resource-rich and resource-poor countries. In trying to understand the motivations for FDI 
into host countries, the literature has focused on four theoretical perspectives: market-seeking, 
resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking (Cleeve, 2008; Dunning, 1993; 
Faeth, 2009). For small developing countries, emphasis is placed mostly on market-seeking, 
resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking considerations (Dunning, 1998; Chen et al., 2015), but it 
has also become clear that foreign investors in most developing countries exhibit different 
characteristics.  
 
Empirical studies have argued that there are differences in FDI motivations and determinants. 
These differences are relative to the nationality of investors and across the different host 
countries (Zhen and Tan, 2011), as well as the levels of economic development and geographic 
location of countries of origin (Zheng, 2009). One would expect differences in investor 
motivations and determinants in Africa, given that most countries have attracted FDI from 
different sources. Yet, despite a large literature exists on the determinants of FDI in Africa (e.g. 
Anyanwu, 2012; Asiedu, 2002, 2006, 2013; Loots and Kabundi, 2012; Morrisset, 2000), there is 
little systematic evaluation of the underlying motivations for FDI inflows. This remains an 
important issue as investments that are mostly driven by efficiency-seeking and market-seeking 
considerations have relatively stronger growth effects than resource-seeking FDI (Chen et al., 
2015) and there are also potential differences in the size of productivity effects of FDI from the 
different groups of economies (Pfeiffer et al., 2014). By investigating these issues, chapter two 
contributes to the debate on FDI determinants, providing clear evidence on the specific factors 
attracting FDI from these source economies into resource-rich and non-resource-rich African 
countries. It further analyses whether there are differences in motivations and determinants of 
FDI between investors from African economies and counterparts from the OECD and non-
   
15 
 
OECD emerging markets, which to our knowledge has not been explored in the empirical 
literature. 
 
 In order to explain such differences in FDI determinants, host countries are first segmented into 
resource and non-resource rich countries and source countries categorized in OECD, non-OECD 
emerging markets and intra-African countries. In this way, chapter two explores source and host 
country heterogeneity in explaining the determinants of FDI across host African countries. This 
analysis is complemented with an estimation strategy that explicitly establishes whether there are 
differences in the determinants of FDI between investors from African economies and OECD, 
and African economies and non-OECD emerging market economies. The study uses an 
unbalanced panel data on bilateral FDI stocks from 72 source economies into 45 host African 
countries over the period 2001-2012. Applying a Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable 
estimation strategy, study finds strong evidence suggesting that intra-African FDI to non-
resource rich countries are mostly driven by market-seeking considerations. This finding 
suggests that the market size of host countries is a relevant determinant of these investments in 
these economies. For FDI to resource rich countries, the results show that the size of host 
markets and natural resources are important drivers of these investments from all different 
groups of economies. Interestingly, while natural resources attract FDI into the extractive 
industries, they also undermine investments in the non-resource sectors of countries that receive 
them. The analysis further reveals that there are significant differences in the determinants of 
FDI between investors from intra-African economies and OECD and non-OECD emerging 
markets economies in resource rich countries. It suggests also that FDI from the OECD and non-
OECD emerging markets into non-resource rich countries are both market-led, while FDI from 
non-OECD economies are also driven by lower cost motives.  
 
While chapter two establishes the motivations and determinants of FDI from the different source 
economies, to better understand the determinants of FDI activity, it is useful to explore how well 
these investments can be integrated in host countries. Answering this question is important given 
that increased participation of local firms in FDI projects will promote knowledge and 
technology transfers from foreign affiliates to domestic firms and thus facilitate spillovers 
(Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999). Along these lines, chapter three ties in closely with the second 
chapter by investigating how the relative input contributions of foreign affiliates and local firms 
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affect ownership decisions of these firms. The study is motivated by theoretical predictions in the 
intra-firm trade literature which point to greater propensity for FDI through intra-firm trade 
flows in capital-intensive industries instead of labour-intensive activities (Antras, 2003). This 
pattern of intra-firm trade is explained by the relative ease with which investments in physical 
capital can be shared between contracting parties compared to investments in labour-inputs 
which are inalienable and characterized by severe hold-up problems. Along these lines, a 
growing body of studies have investigated how the input intensities of foreign firms and input 
supplying firms affect their decision to keep production within firm boundaries (e.g. Antras, 
2003; Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 2013; Antras and Yeaple, 2014). These 
studies all provide evidence that strongly supports these theoretical predictions. From these 
arguments, it follows that local firms are more likely to be integrated in FDI projects through 
capital-intensive sectors than labour intensive sectors. Surprisingly, this issue has greatly been 
neglected in the empirical literature, with most studies focusing on how the relative input 
investments of firms influence intra-firm trade flows and not explicitly investing how these 
inputs affect ownership structure.  
 
Chapter three contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the question of whether 
foreign affiliates and local firms can integrate production in FDI projects through capital 
intensive sectors instead of labour-intensive sectors in sub-Saharan Africa. In these economies, 
the reform measures adopted by most countries have led to greater openness to foreign equity 
ownership than other regions (see World Bank, 2010). One would therefore expect increased 
participation of domestic firms in FDI projects, since such investments are less likely to be 
discouraged by restrictive government policies on foreign ownership. Over the years, foreign 
investments in sub-Saharan Africa were mostly undertaken in high technology sectors by firms 
that are jointly owned by TNCs and domestic firms. These joint-venture firms are more 
productive than wholly-owned foreign firms (UNIDO, 2011). Such a pattern of investment raises 
the question of whether these firms can integrate production in FDI projects through capital-
intensive activities, given that foreign investments in high technology activities are physical 
capital intensive.
1
 Additionally, local managers have had greater control over recruitment of 
                                                          
1
 Note that with recent advancements in Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) and digital services, 
sectors described as physical capital intensive, such as high-tech manufacturing are becoming increasingly less 
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workers for foreign affiliates (UNIDO, 2011). This suggests that the skill intensity of local 
managers or supervisors can proxy the input contribution of domestic firms. To my knowledge, 
there is no research on how input intensity of the foreign affiliates and local firms affect 
ownership decisions of these firms in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
To investigate how input intensity of the foreign affiliates and local firms influence ownership 
decisions of these firms, chapter three uses a large firm-level dataset on manufacturing and 
services firms for 19 African countries in sub-Saharan Africa collected by the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 2010. This data makes it possible to 
comprehensively analyze the underlying relationship, providing evidence from a broader 
perspective of countries. The analysis relies on estimates of the linear probability model, probit 
and fractional response models. The results strongly support the prediction that domestic firms 
are more likely to be integrated through capital-intensive than labour-intensive sectors.  
 
While chapters two and three analyzed the determinants of FDI activity, it is far from clear from 
the literature whether these investments have contributed to enhancing productivity growth in 
host African countries. Chapter four explores the effect of FDI on productivity growth, 
determining whether there are differences in such impact depending on host human capital 
capacity. This research matters to the debate on the FDI-growth nexus, given that human capital 
enhances the capacity of host countries to absorb knowledge and technology from FDI. As some 
African countries have successfully attracted a sizeable amount of FDI in recent years, it is the 
expectation of policymakers that these investments will enhance growth of these economies. 
Such expectations are deeply rooted in the endogenous growth literature which suggests that FDI 
will enhance growth in host countries through technology transfer and spillover effects (see De 
Mello, 1997; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001). This issue is intensely debated in the empirical 
literature, with the positive effect of FDI on economic growth found not to be robust in some 
studies (Adam, 2009; Carkovic and Levine, 2005; Lensink and Morrissey, 2006), while others 
point to the growth-enhancing effect of FDI on economic growth in host countries (Li and Liu, 
2005; Neuhaus, 2005).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
capital intensive as these services become cheaper over time. However, the underlying assumption is still valid for 
most African countries characterized by limited degree of technological development.  
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In trying to understand the growth effects of FDI across countries, there has been research on 
how local conditions affect the capacity of host countries to absorb these investments. The 
research points to little or no growth effect of FDI in the absence of a minimum threshold level 
of development in absorptive capacities. Most studies capture the role of absorptive capacity in 
promoting growth through linear interactions between FDI and human capital capacity (Blonigen 
and Wang, 2005; Borensztein et al., 1998), level of domestic financial markets development 
(Alfaro et al., 2004, 2009; Hermes and Lensink, 2003) and quality of institutions (Durham, 2004; 
Olofsdotter, 1998). A second strand of literature has attempted to deal with the issue of host 
country heterogeneity by splitting countries according to some defined threshold of absorptive 
capacity or level of economic development (e.g. Karunaratne, 2013) or through linear interaction 
between a dummy variable for a group of countries and the variables of interest in the estimation 
(Blonigen and Wang, 2005).  
 
One problem that is overlooked in these studies is the fact that in estimating the growth effect of 
FDI, host country heterogeneity in absorptive capacity is not effectively captured through linear 
interactions between FDI and the measures of absorptive capacity. Such an approach assumes 
that the growth effect of FDI is the same across countries and over time. This is misleading when 
host countries are characterized by considerable differences in absorptive capacity. With such 
potential differences, one would expect that countries with greater capacity can absorb spillovers 
from FDI more than other countries. This is evident in the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between human capital capacity and quality of FDI. Accordingly, when human capital capacity 
is enhanced, the host economy is more likely to attract higher quality FDI, which in turn feeds 
into human capital capacity through training and on-the-job learning activities undertaken by 
MNEs in host countries (see Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003; OECD, 2002). Moreover, studies that 
have considered sub-groups of countries have also ignored the fact that there may be 
considerable heterogeneity in absorptive capacities across countries within groups. This could 
explain the variation in the effect of FDI on growth across countries. Nair-Reichert and 
Weinhold‟s (2001) study supports this view as they find considerable heterogeneity across 
developing countries. It follows from these arguments that the relationship between FDI and 
productivity growth may be nonlinear depending on human capital capacity of host countries.  
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Surprisingly, only a few studies have explored the nonlinearities in the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth, with studies addressing host country heterogeneity through the quality of 
institutions (Brahim and Rachdi, 2014; Jude and Levieuge, 2016) and human capital capacity 
(Kottaridi and Stengos, 2010). Although the study by Kottaridi and Stengos (2010) explores the 
variation in the effect of FDI on economic growth across countries, it does not determine the 
minimum threshold level of human capital capacity that enhances economic growth as non-
parametric techniques were used. Looking at the African continent shows that there is 
considerable variation in human capital capacity across countries, with relatively high average 
years of schooling in South Africa (9.69 years in 2010) compared to Niger (1.88 years).
2
 Given 
the marked differences in such capacity, one would expect the effect of FDI on productivity 
growth to differ across countries. To my knowledge, this issue has not been investigated in the 
empirical literature on African economies.  
 
Chapter four fills the gap identified above. It investigates these issues by first determining 
whether human capital enhances the growth effect of FDI through linear interactions between 
these two correlates of growth based on the 5-year averages of the series on a panel of 25 African 
countries over the period 1996-2011. It then uses a Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) 
model, which allows for host country heterogeneity through variation in human capital capacity, 
to evaluate whether the relationship between FDI and productivity growth is nonlinear and 
conditional on such capacity. This study presents novel contribution to this debate by providing 
evidence supporting the nonlinear effects of FDI and determining the threshold level of human 
capital that enhances the growth effect of FDI. The analysis reveals that host African countries 
need to achieve a threshold level of 6.94 years of average schooling in order to benefit from FDI. 
The finding suggests that FDI increases productivity growth in countries that have attained the 
minimum threshold of human capital, while countries with human capital capacity well below 
the threshold will not realize an increase in productivity growth, unless human capital capacity is 
enhanced closer to this threshold level. In this case, efforts by host countries with human capital 
capacity very close to this threshold level will significantly raise productivity growth if further 
efforts are applied to improve human capital. The study shows that only 7 out of the sample of 
25 countries had achieved this threshold of human capital capacity in 2010. 
                                                          
2
 See Barro and Lee (2013). 




1.2 Organization of Thesis 
 
Following the introduction of the research issues in this chapter, the rest of the thesis is 
structured as follows. Chapter 2 investigates whether FDI from the different source economies is 
influenced by market size, presence of natural resources and lower labour costs in host African 
economies. It further explores the question of whether there are differences in the response of 
foreign investors from the different sources to these factors. These issues are dealt with using 
bilateral FDI stocks from the different source economies into 45 host African countries over the 
period 2001-2012 and employing the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
technique.  
 
Chapter three determines the sectors through which foreign affiliates and local firms are more 
likely to integrate in FDI projects in sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis relies on a survey data of 
manufacturing and services firms, using alternative estimation techniques, particularly fractional 
response models to evaluate this issue.   
 
Chapter four investigates the growth enhancing effect of FDI across African countries, 
determining whether such impact depends on human capital capacity and differs across 
countries. These issues are tackled using the panel smooth transition regression (PSTR) model on 
a panel of 25 African countries over the period 1996-2011. Chapter 5 concludes by offering 




















Since the 2000s, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to low-income countries have increased 
substantially as commodity prices surged in international markets in the face of adequate 
liquidity in the global economy, accompanied by the adoption of market-oriented reforms in 
many countries (Dabla-Norris et al., 2010). However, in recent years, global FDI inflows have 
decreased due to the global financial crisis in 2007/2008. This downward trend has heightened 
competition among developing countries as they seek to attract these investments from different 
sources (Jude and Levieuge, 2016). Policies designed to attract FDI have become an integral part 
of the broader policy priority of developing countries, partly due to potential benefits of these 
investments to host economies (Newman et al., 2015). FDI is particularly important for Africa 
especially in the sub-Saharan African region where most countries are characterized by 
underdeveloped financial markets. Due to this problem, the majority of countries in this region 
have not been able to mobilize sufficient internal resources to meet domestic investment 
requirements. As a result, FDI is considered as an important vehicle for gaining access to foreign 
resources in order to bridge the financing gap and complement domestic investments, thereby 
promoting growth, job creation and alleviating poverty in host countries (UNCTAD, 2013a). In 
light of the perceived benefits of FDI, most African countries have adopted policy reforms in 
order to reduce barrier and attract these investments (Moss et al., 2005). 
 
At the same time, there has been a growing debate about the factors driving FDI to developing 
economies, with the arguments on the African continent largely centered on whether FDI is 
mostly attracted into large and/or resource-rich countries (see UNCTAD, 2013a). These 
arguments have gained prominence in the African discourse in the last decade, especially fueled 
by strong demand for natural-resource extractive commodities by emerging market economies 
such as China and India (see Brautigam and Gallagher, 2014; Broadman, 2007; Brown, 2012). 
To explore the drivers of FDI, the eclectic paradigm of FDI (Dunning, 1979) offers a useful 
framework for explaining FDI based on three types of advantages that multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) have: ownership (O), location (L) and internalization (I) or OLI advantages. Drawing 
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from this framework, the literature distinguishes among four motivations behind FDI in host 
countries: market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset seeking 
(Cleeve, 2008; Dunning, 1993; Faeth, 2009). To fully understand these motivations, an 
alternative strand of theoretical literature on FDI has explored two forms of FDI: horizontal FDI 
and vertical FDI.  In the horizontal model of FDI, which originates from the work by Markusen 
(1984), FDI is mainly driven by market-seeking motivations and desire to avoid trade costs. The 
vertical model of FDI developed by Helpman (1984) suggests that FDI can be explained by 
MNEs desire to take advantage of factor-cost differences. Both of these forms have been 
combined into one theoretical model, known as the knowledge-capital model of FDI (Carr et al, 
2001; Markusen et al, 1996; Markusen, 1997). Such a framework has provided the basis for 
investigating the motivations and determinants of FDI in host countries, as evidenced in many 
empirical studies on FDI (e.g. Baltagi et al, 2008; Blonigen and Wang, 2005; Egger and 
Pfaffermayr, 2004; Lankhuizen, 2014; Martinez et al, 2012). The framework suggests that the 
market size of host countries is a relevant factor driving FDI when these investments are 
dominated by horizontal (market-seeking) motivations while the presence of efficiency-seeking 
FDI is an indication that lower labour costs matter for attracting FDI.    
 
Although there is an extensive empirical literature on how markets, natural resources and policy 
in affect FDI in Africa (e.g. Asiedu, 2002, 2006, 2013; Morisset, 2000; Naude and Krugell, 
2007; Anyanwu, 2012), these studies have not explored the motivations behind these investments 
from different groups of economies. There is suggestive evidence that compared to investments 
from the OECD and non-OECD emerging market economies, there are more intra-African 
investments concentrated in manufacturing and services sectors than in the extractive industries 
(see UNCTAD, 2014a). In addition, intra-African investments are mostly less capital-intensive 
and technology intensive and are relatively more diverse than investments from the OECD (see 
AfDB et al., 2014). This suggests that there are different investment patterns among investors 
from the different source countries. Yet, the question of what drives FDI from the different 
groups of economies into resource and non-resource rich African countries remains an empirical 
issue. Across Africa, there are differences in income levels and economic structures, particularly 
the presence of resource wealth (Leibfritz, 2015). This suggests that the determinants for FDI 
may vary across host countries depending on these characteristics. That said, studies have argued 
that the motivations and determinants of FDI in developing countries could differ among 
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investors because of differences in the nationality of the transnational corporations (TNCs) 
(Zheng and Tan, 2011) and levels of economic development and geographic locations (Zheng, 
2009). However, it remains to be determined whether there are differences in FDI motivations 
and determinants among the different investors in resource and non-resource rich host African 
economies.  
 
This chapter contributes to this debate along two lines. It determines whether intra-African and 
interregional investments are driven by market-seeking, natural resources and efficiency-seeking 
considerations.
3
 Apart from the concentration of intra-African FDI in the manufacturing and 
services sectors, these investments also tend to be concentrated in large and close proximity 
markets to the main drivers of these investments namely, South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Nigeria and Egypt. Although such an investment pattern may reflect the sensitivity of these 
investments to market size and efficiency-seeking objectives, it is not clear what is driving these 
investments to resource and non-resource rich host African countries. This study fills the gap.  
 
Given the different sources of FDI into African economies, the issue of determining the factors 
explaining FDI is critical for understanding the growth potential of these investments, as the 
empirical literature suggests that market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI have stronger 
growth impact than resource-seeking FDI (see Chen et al., 2015). While previous studies have 
investigated the determinants of FDI in the region using aggregate FDI inflows or stocks, this 
study uses relatively disaggregated data on bilateral FDI stocks. The strength of this approach is 
that it avoids heterogeneity bias in FDI determinants by separately determining the drivers of 
FDI from the different groups of economies into resource and non-resource rich African 
countries. This chapter considers source and host country heterogeneity given that foreign 
investments into African economies originate from different sources and there are marked 
differences in income levels and resource endowments across host African countries. Africa is 
host to natural resources such as hydrocarbons, minerals and timber, and particularly rich in 
some of the world‟s precious minerals, notably platinum, manganese and gold in South Africa; 
and diamonds in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa and Botswana (Alden and 
Alves, 2009). Yet, the region has attracted only a limited share of investment inflows to 
developing economies, with an average of just above 8 percent over the period 2000-2014 
                                                          
3
 Interregional FDI comprises investments from the OECD and non-OECD emerging markets economies. 
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compared to an average of 65 percent in Asia and 25 percent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
4
   
 
The study makes a second contribution to the literature by determining whether the motivations 
and determinants of FDI differ among the different groups of investors in African economies. To 
our knowledge, only a few studies have explored a similar issue in developing countries. For 
example, Asiedu (2002) finds that SSA countries behave differently from non-SSA destination 
countries as FDI to the former is not driven by return on investment and better infrastructure. 
These factors, however, matter in explaining FDI in other developing countries.  Zheng and 
Tan‟s (2011) study investigates the differences in FDI motivations and determinants in China 
among investors from the OECD and non-OECD developing countries. Andres et al. (2013) 
investigates the motivations behind FDI from traditional and emerging economies to developed 
and developing host countries. Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013) consider the role of 
institutional distance and natural resources in explaining FDI from developing and developed 
countries. Despite these studies, it remains unclear whether intra-African investors behave 
differently from their counterparts from the OECD and emerging market economies with respect 
to the size of host markets, natural resources and efficiency-seeking objectives in host African 
countries.   Investigating this issue would contribute to deeper understanding of what drives FDI 
to African economies from the different source economies. It will also provide an important 
perspective to the current debate over location factors in the region. The evidence is useful to 
facilitate engagements with different investors in African countries.  
 
To analyze this issue, this study uses bilateral FDI stock data compiled by UNCTAD in 2014, on 
a panel of 45 African countries from 72 source countries over the period 2001-2012. Using a 
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy, the results suggest that market 
size and natural resources are important determinants of FDI in resource-rich countries, and FDI 
into non-resource-rich countries from the different source economies are mostly market-led. The 
analysis further reveals significant differences in the determinants of FDI in resource-rich 
countries between intra-African investors and those from the OECD and non-OECD emerging 
markets economies. 
 
                                                          
4
 Own calculations based on UNTAD statistics. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyses the trends in FDI in Africa. The literature is 
reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the methods and data. The results are analysed in 
Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2.2. FDI in Africa 
 
As noted above, there are differences between resource rich and non-resource rich African 
countries in terms of economic structures. This is an indication that foreign investments from the 
different source economies may be driven by different location factors. In light of these 
differences, this section briefly analyses the trends in FDI stocks across countries and regions to 
assess the drivers of these investments in the continent.
5
   
 
Policy designed to promote FDI in Africa have focused on providing generous incentives with 
limited efforts towards creating the enabling domestic environment in order to attract these 
investment (UNCTAD, 2013a). This has partly contributed to a considerably low share of 
Africa‟s FDI in global FDI compared to other regions in the developing world. During the period 
2001-2013, the continent‟s share in global FDI stock was 3 percent compared to Asia (23 
percent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (12 percent). Foreign investments to the continent 
have been unevenly distributed across countries and the different sub-regions. Figure 2.1 
displays the geographical distribution of FDI stocks across sub-regions. Despite recent political 
upheavals, Northern Africa remains a leading host of foreign investments in the continent. The 
share of the North‟s FDI stock averaged 33.99 percent during the period 2001-2013, followed by 
Southern Africa (28.67 percent), West Africa (18.20 percent), Central Africa (9.86 percent) and 
East Africa (9.28 percent). Recent privatization reforms and policies designed to improve 
efficiency have partly contributed to promoting FDI to North Africa, in addition to investments 
directed to oil exploration in Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco (Loots and Kabundi, 2012). 
Increased FDI to East Africa in recent years have been driven by resource-seeking investments, 
in oil and gas exploration in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique (UNCTAD, 2013b). 
The West African region continued to attract resource-seeking investments during the period 
particularly in the oil sector in Ghana. The Southern region, however, experienced a downturn in 
                                                          
5
 FDI stocks are measured by accumulated values of FDI flows over a period of time. FDI flows capture three components of FDI 
i.e. equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans.  See UNCTAD‟s definitions, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Investment%20and%20Enterprise/FDI_Flows.aspx 
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the share of FDI stock, which is partly explained by disinvestments in Angola induced by 
unfavorable government policy designed to promote local partnerships (UNCTAD, 2014).    
 
 
Figure 2.1: Geographical distribution of FDI across sub-regions (share) 
 
Large and resource rich economies tend to attract much of the foreign investments to the 
continent (UNCTAD, 2013a). During the period 2001-2012, South Africa attracted 63 percent of 
inward FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa from the EU and 17 percent of US inflows, while 
Nigeria accounted for 37 percent of US inflows (Sy et al., 2014). South Africa is the second 
largest economy in Africa and particularly endowed in some of the world‟s most precious 
minerals. Nigeria and Ghana are large resource-rich countries in West Africa, which collectively 
represented 71.65 percent of the stock of FDI in the sub-region over the period 2001-2012. The 
Egyptian economy is the largest in North Africa and remains the leading recipient of FDI to the 
region. Inward FDI to Egypt are driven by its population size and the presence of cheap labour 
costs (UNCTAD, 2014).  
 
Countries of the OECD remain the largest investors in African economies. The stock of FDI 
from three leading investing economies in 2012 (USA, United Kingdom and France) represented 
64 percent of the total FDI stock to the continent (AfDB et al., 2014).  Availability of natural 
resources is an important factor driving the OECD to the continent. Investors from the USA have 





















Source: UNCTAD (2014) statistics
Inward FDI stock by sub-region(%)
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in 2011 (Sy et al., 2014). The share of US investments in FDI stock averaged 46.23 percent in 
Algeria and 33.51 percent in Equatorial Guinea during the period 2001-2012.  Although not a 
resource-rich country, Egypt was a key destination of FDI from the USA to the North African 
region. The share of these investments in the country‟s FDI stock averaged 16.94 percent over 
the period 2007-2012.  Collectively, the United States, Italy, France and Norway contributed a 
share of 59.82 percent of FDI stock in Algeria during the period 2001-2012. South Africa and 
Nigeria were the top recipients of foreign investments from the United Kingdom. The share of 
FDI stock of the UK attracted by Nigeria averaged 14.54 percent during the period 2001-2012.  
France contributed the largest share of FDI stock in Gabon and the Republic of Congo, which 
amounted to 64.5 percent of FDI stock in Gabon during the period 2008-2012 and 23.65 percent 
in the Republic of Congo over the period 2007-2012.  
 
Availability of natural resources remains a key attraction for foreign investors from two 
emerging economies (China & India) (UNCTAD, 2011). Among the top recipients of Chinese 
investments in Africa economies are countries endowed with natural resources including South 
Africa, Nigeria, Sudan, Niger and Democratic Republic of Congo (Brown, 2012). China has 
undertaken significant investments in oil or gas production or exploration in some African 
countries, namely, Gabon, Chad, Democratic republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and 
Tanzania (Brown, 2012). India has invested in the oil industry in Sudan.   
 
Although natural resource-driven constitutes a greater share of investments from the OECD and 
emerging markets, there are suggestions of some efficiency seeking investments to the region. 
Efficiency-seeking has been facilitated by the adoption of preferential schemes granted under 
“the United States‟ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the European Union‟s (EU‟s) 
Everything But Arms (EBA) and China‟s zero-tariff measures for African LDCs (least developed 
countries” (UNCTAD, 2013c). Mauritius is a major recipient of efficiency-seeking FDI, which 
serves as a platform for facilitating interregional FDI to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The country seeks to promote these investments through the signing of bilateral treaties with 
other countries such as Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA) and Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPA) (OECD, 2014). Some non-resource rich African 
countries, such as Mauritius, Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar and Kenya, had attracted 
investments in the clothing and textile industries from garment firms in Asia in order to gain 
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access to the EU markets guaranteed under the multifiber (MFA) agreement which ended in 
2004 (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2007). The investments are less skill-intensive which suggests that 
they could be driven by lower labour costs in host countries. Recent investments by Chinese 
companies in the automotive sector in Kenya have been driven by efficiency-seeking 
considerations (Barton and de Bellefroid, 2015). For example, the Foton manufacturing company 
was setup to assemble vehicles in Kenya in order to avoid payment of 25 percent import duty on 
cars (Juma, 2011).  Foreign investments to Egypt are partly driven by lower labour costs 
(UNCTAD, 2014). Similarly, the garment industry in Madagascar has attracted investments from 
foreign firms in Mauritius, partly to exploit lower labour costs (Fukunishi and Ramiarison, 
2014). 
 
Moving to intra-African FDI, a striking feature of these investments is that they are concentrated 
in the manufacturing and services sectors rather than the extractive industries (UNCTAD, 2014). 
This suggests that intra-African FDI are more likely to be driven by market-seeking and 
efficiency-seeking intents than natural resource-led. This is reflected in the pattern of these 
investments, which are attracted by large markets and close proximity markets or neighbouring 
countries. During the period 2003-2012, intra-African investments were largely driven by 
transnational corporations (TNCs) from South Africa, Mauritius, Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya 
(AfDB et al., 2014).  
  
Market-seeking is primarily the key force driving South Africa‟s outward FDI to other African 
economies.
6
 Much of the investments from South Africa are largely concentrated in member 
States of South African Development Community (SADC). Recently, these investments have 
been extended beyond the borders of the SADC region and targeted markets in West Africa. 
Examples include the Retail Groups such as Shoprite and Woolworths, which have expanded to 
large markets in West Africa such as Nigeria and Ghana. The South African food and beverage 
company (SABMiller) has acquired a significant stake in the food industry in Nigeria 
(Disenyano and Sogoni, 2014). A plausible explanation for the concentration of intra-African 
investments in proximate and large markets is to exploit economies of scale. Intra-African 
investors from other sources include the Dangote Group from Nigeria. The Dangote Group is 
                                                          
6
 Based on survey analysis of 30 large South African firms conducted by TNS Research Surveys and DNA Economics (2012). 
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engaged in building materials and financial services especially in the West African sub-region. 
Companies such as the Comcraft and Sameer Groups from Kenya operate in the service sectors. 
Sameer Groups is active in agriculture, manufacturing, distribution, high-tech, construction, 
transport and finance (UNCTAD, 2014).  
 
Like investments from the OECD and emerging markets, the distribution of intra-African FDI is 
not even across African countries. They tend to be concentrated in large markets and resource 
rich countries. Table 2.1 shows that the two resource rich and the largest economies in Africa 
(South Africa and Nigeria) were the top hosts of intra-African FDI in 2012.
7
 
                                           
                                        
Table 2.1: Intra-African FDI stock (US$ billion) 
Year/Country 2008 2010 2011 2012 
South Africa    163.5 
Nigeria    111.4 
Morocco   44.5  
Mozambique    13.3 
Zambia    12.4 
Tanzania   9.2  
Uganda    7.7 
Ghana   7.1  
Namibia    5.8 
Madagascar   4.9  
Botswana    2.8 
Kenya 2.8    
Mali    2.3 
Lesotho  1.6   
Burkina Faso    1.2 
Senegal    1.2 
Malawi  1.2   
Benin    1.0 
Togo   0.9  
Rwanda   0.8  
Guinea-Bissau   0.1  
      Source: Extracted from UNCTAD (2014). Note: FDI stock values were only reported 
for the respective countries in the years indicated. The missing values reflect positions  
not reported, although these countries may have attracted new FDI.  
 
 
Investors from South Africa are the largest contributors of intra-African FDI to African 
economies. If we consider the geographical distribution in table 2.2, it is clear that these 
investments serve as an important source of foreign capital for SADC member countries. 
Swaziland hosted the largest share of FDI stocks from South African in 2012 (49.06 percent) and 
Zimbabwe (34.83 percent). In the case of Mauritius, a close look at the country‟s distribution of 
                                                          
7 Intra-African investments to Mauritius were not reported since the country serves as an investment platform for interregional 
investors (UNCTAD, 2014).  
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FDI in table 2 reveals that a greater of share these investments in 2012 were held in close 
proximity markets (Seychelles, 32.57 percent) and large markets (Nigeria, 25.04 percent).  
 
Table 2.2: FDI stock from South Africa to selected African countries 

















Botswana 185 6.86 268 9.12 438 12.49 408 11.53 
Ghana 725 9.60 1243 12.33 1340 10.05   
Kenya 194 9.22 222 9.73 241 9.21 309 10.74 
Malawi 159 15.46 181 15.74     
Mozambique 1280 32.42 1309 27.46 1861 22.30 2605 18.62 
Nigeria 0.00 0.00 667 1.11 972 1.40 1944 2.55 
Swaziland 238 29.42 406 41.52 461 50.53 470 49.06 
Tanzania 2330 28.89 1891 21.58 2178 23.47   
Uganda 332 6.60 349 6.26 364 5.63 389 5.07 
Zimbabwe 372 22.57 856 47.18 1199 54.46 906 34.83 
Source: Extracted from UNCTAD (2014). 
 
Table 2.3: FDI stock from Mauritius to selected African countries 
Year/Country 
 

















Botswana 75 2.78 35 1.19 93 2.65 102 2.88 
Madagascar 252 6.38 257 5.86 419 8.53   
Mozambique 288 7.30 974 20.44 597 7.15 810 5.79 
Nigeria 0 0.00 1773 2.94 2333 3.37 19125 25.04 
Seychelles 488 32.65 575 33.71 560 29.27 677 32.57 
Tanzania 379 4.70 434 4.95 650 7.01   
Uganda 295 5.86 388 6.96 493 7.62 499 6.50 
South Africa 460 0.33 483 0.27 1400 0.88 1101 0.67 
Source: Extracted from UNCTAD (2014). 
 
Overall, the trends reveal that the top recipients of FDI from the different source economies are 
large and resource-rich African countries. Efficiency-seeking, however, appears to be a key 
motivation behind FDI to non-resource rich countries.  
 
2.3. Literature Review: Theory and Evidence 
 
Over the past few decades, researchers have devoted considerable attention to explaining the 
factors driving FDI behaviour. There is a large body of literature on the determinants of FDI, 
making it absolutely difficult to undertake a complete review of what drives FDI into host 
countries. The literature suggests that the determinants of FDI can be explained by a combination 
of theories instead of a single theory (Faeth, 2009; Antonakakis and Tondl, 2015).
8
 As noted in 
chapter one, FDI is an important component of financial globalization (Campos and Kinoshita, 
2010). Firms undertake FDI primarily to advance their competitive position, seeking to expand 
                                                          
8
 See Faeth (2009) for comprehensive review of nine (9) theoretical models of the determinants of FD1. 
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markets or for purposes of achieving production efficiency objectives (Luiz and Charalambous, 
2009). In the eclectic paradigm of FDI (Dunning, 1977, 1979), the factors affecting FDI 
behaviour are explained in terms of three advantages that MNEs possess: Ownership (O), 
location (L) and internalization (I) advantages or OLI paradigm. The ownership specific 
advantages depict the competitive advantages that foreign firms possess over domestic firms as 
they invest in host markets. These advantages manifest themselves in firms‟ possession of 
tangible and intangible resources, including technology, which ensures the efficiency of resource 
usage (Dunning, 1988). Some other intangible assets that constitute these ownership advantages 
include patents, technical knowledge, management skills and reputation (Faeth, 2009). The 
ownership advantages of foreign firms, combined with location endowments of source and host 
countries, have an important influence on MNEs activity, determining the extent to which these 
firms engage in foreign production relative to local firms in host countries (see Dunning, 1988).   
 
Location advantages relates to the issue of where the MNE decides to invest in a host market. 
MNEs are motivated to direct their activities to host countries or regions that provide more 
location advantages, such as gaining access to restricted markets, benefiting from lower 
production costs and favourable tax treatments (Faeth, 2009). This suggests that countries that 
offer more of these advantages are more likely to become attractive destinations when MNEs 
undertake FDI. Internalization relates to the question of how MNEs decide to undertake 
production in host markets. It refers to the advantages associated with a multinational entering a 
host market through a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary instead of operating through other modes 
such as exports, licensing or joint ventures (Neary, 2009).  
  
Dunning‟s OLI framework provides an important conceptual mechanism to analyse the 
determinants of FDI, depending on whether the focus of investigation is on firm or host country 
characteristics, or explaining the different forms of FDI (see Faeth, 2009). While the ownership 
and internalization advantages explore firm-specific determinants of FDI, the location 
advantages have a significant influence on inflows of FDI into host countries (Luiz and 
Charalambous, 2009). This framework establishes four motivations behind MNEs activities in 
host countries: market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset seeking 
(Cleeve, 2008; Dunning, 1993; Faeth, 2009). 
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Market-seeking FDI are undertaken to serve host markets and regional markets to ensure that 
foreign customers are easily accessible. This type of FDI is predominantly attracted into large 
markets with greater growth prospects, seeking to produce consumer-oriented goods and 
industrial products. In serving local and regional markets, MNEs of market-seeking FDI type 
replicate production facilities established at home in host markets. This explains why these 
investments are known as horizontal FDI (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). The existence of large 
host markets encourages foreign firms to concentrate manufacturing production in these 
countries in order to take advantage of scale economies and overcome trade costs (Amiti, 1998). 
The size of host market reflects the degree of sophistication and breath of the markets in host 
economies (Sahoo, 2006). A large host market creates greater opportunity for increased sales and 
profitability of multinational firms, and higher market growth raises the prospects for increased 
FDI in the host economy (Sahoo, 2006; Zheng, 2009). Market-seeking FDI is geared towards 
consolidating a firm‟s presence in existing markets or exploit new markets. This could take the 
form of acquisition of domestic assets in order to strengthen the firm‟s competitive advantages in 
specific markets (Cui et al., 2014). 
 
Differences in factor costs between source and host countries such as labour costs can have 
significant influence on firms‟ decision to locate FDI in a country. Efficiency-seeking FDI is 
undertaken to take advantage of differences in availability and costs of factor endowments 
between countries or to exploit economies of scale and scope (Dunning, 1993). Resource-seeking 
FDI serves to ensure that MNEs gain access to resources such as natural resources, raw materials 
or low cost labour. Having access to these resources ensures reliable supply of natural resource 
inputs to the firm which helps to protect its current competitive position (Cui et al., 2014). 
Strategic-asset seeking FDI focuses on protecting or augmenting prevailing ownership specific 
advantages of the firm relative to its competitors instead of exploiting these advantages or assets 
(Dunning, 1998; 2000). To protect such advantages, the firm needs to acquire knowledge-based 
assets outside its operations such as technology, brand names and managerial know-how (see Cui 
et al., 2014), which enhance core competence and strengthen its competitive position. Strategic-
asset seeking FDI are mostly undertaken in the advanced economies and large developing 
countries, given that these investments are driven by strategic considerations in the presence of 
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oligopolistic industries, coupled with availability of knowledge-based assets in these economies 
(Dunning, 1998).  
 
The international trade literature has advanced two strands of models to explain why MNEs 
decide to locate in a foreign market. This literature distinguishes between horizontal or market-
seeking FDI and vertical FDI which relates to efficiency-seeking and resource-seeking FDI. The 
horizontal model of FDI developed by Markusen (1984) suggests that FDI occurs when MNEs 
replicate the production facilities at source country in the host markets or close to customers to 
enhance market opportunities and avoid transport costs and trade barriers. Arguably, domestic 
host markets can be well served when the MNEs produce for these markets. This suggests that 
the size of host markets and market growth are important determinants of horizontal FDI. The 
flow of horizontal FDI into host countries is expected to be greater with restrictive access to host 
markets, such as high transportation costs and tariffs. This model predicts greater bilateral FDI 
when source and host countries are similar in market size and relative skill endowment (Blonigen 
and Wang, 2005; Lankhuizen, 2014; Yeaple, 2003). In relatively small host markets, MNEs 
would prefer to undertake exports instead of FDI, since the fixed costs associated with 
establishing a production facility in host markets are potentially greater than the savings in trade 
costs (Glass, 2008). The horizontal motivation of FDI is associated with the proximity-
concentration hypothesis, which predicts the case of horizontal type MNEs when the benefits 
associated with operating a plant in the domestic host market (reduction in trade costs) outweigh 
the advantages of production scale economies that arise from operating a single plant in the 
source country (Brainard, 1997).  
 
Considering the vertical motivation of FDI developed by Helpman (1984), FDI is predicted to 
occur when there are differences in relative skill endowments between the source and host 
economies. In this case, the MNEs relocate part of the production chain from headquarters to 
domestic host markets in order to exploit relative factor-cost differences between these countries. 
The availability of low labour costs is an important factor driving vertical or efficiency-seeking 
FDI (Antonakakis and Tondl, 2015; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003; Zheng, 2009), which partly 
explains the flow of FDI from developed to developing economies with dissimilarity in relative 
skill endowments. In other words, vertical FDI seeks to explore low cost or relatively abundant 
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unskilled labour locations in order to undertake labour-intensive production activities (Blonigen 
and Piger, 2014; Faeth, 2009). 
 
In order to determine whether MNEs activities are driven by horizontal or vertical motivations in 
host markets, recent works by Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997) have integrated both 
predictions into a unified theoretical model known as the knowledge-capital model of FDI. The 
empirical specification of FDI based on this framework was proposed by Carr et al (2001). It has 
been extensively used in empirical research to analyze the determinants of FDI. The framework 
provides some modification to the standard gravity model, which relates bilateral FDI to be 
positively associated with the market size of host and source countries and negatively predicted 
by a measure of trade costs such as bilateral distance. More specifically, in the knowledge-capital 
model of FDI, horizontal FDI is determined by similarity in market size, relative factor 
endowments and transport costs; while vertical FDI is explained by differences in relative factor 
endowments between source and host countries (Faeth, 2009). Baltagi et al (2007) augmented 
the knowledge-capital model to capture the role of third-country effect in explaining FDI. This 
refers to the view that bilateral FDI is not only determined by host and host country 
characteristics but also those of the third market.  In a similar manner, Bergstrand and Egger 
(2007) included third-country effect in analyzing bilateral trade and FDI relationships.  
 
The gravity model developed by Kleinert and Toubal (2010) provides theoretical explanations 
for the framework of the knowledge-capital model. This model explicitly allows for relative size 
effects in the specification, predicting that bilateral FDI will be greater when the market size of 
host country is large relative to the source country. The model further predicts a positive 
relationship between bilateral FDI and relative factor endowment, which reflects the presence of 
vertical or efficiency-seeking motivation of FDI. 
 
The empirical evidence appears to support this prediction. In China, Zheng and Tan (2011) found 
that the relative market size positively predicted bilateral FDI from both OECD developed and 
non-OECD developing countries. This suggests that these investments are market-seeking. 
Empirical studies based on aggregate FDI into host African countries showed significant positive 
effect of host market size on FDI (Asiedu, 2006; Nude and Krugell, 2007; Anyanwu, 2012; 
Loots and Kabundi, 2012). As noted, the results of these studies are susceptible to heterogeneity 
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bias, due to potential heterogeneity across host countries and among investors from the different 
source economies. From the review, we hypothesize that the larger the markets size of host 
countries relative to source countries, the greater the volume of bilateral FDI from source to host 
countries.  
 
As noted, the knowledge-capital model predicts that vertical FDI is driven by differences in 
relative factor endowment between source and host economies. This suggests that relative skill 
endowment should positively affect bilateral FDI (Blonigen and Wang, 2005; Braconier et al., 
2005; Kleinert and Toubal, 2010; Lankhuizen, 2014). The expected positive relationship is a 
reflection of the fact that unskilled –labour-abundant countries will attract more FDI due to lower 
wages (Blonigen and Piger, 2014). Due to limited data on skill endowment, vertical or 
efficiency-seeking FDI is proxied by the difference in wage costs between the source and host 
country. In the absence of information on labour costs, a body of research has also considered the 
difference in real GDP per capita between the source and host countries as a proxy for vertical 
FDI (Andres et al., 2013; Busse et al., 2010). Across Africa, there is scarce evidence on the 
question of whether intra-African FDI is driven by efficiency-seeking considerations. The trends 
discussed above suggest that intra-African FDI tends to be concentrated in neighbouring markets 
and large markets. These investments may have been facilitated by regional trade agreements 
which promote efficiency-seeking FDI, as well as the need to exploit economies of scale and 
scope in large markets. The trend analysis further suggests that some non-resource rich countries 
have attracted FDI in clothing and textile industry from Asia that, largely employ low cost 
unskilled local workforce. Given these facts, this study hypothesizes that FDI from the different 
groups of economies are driven by efficiency-seeking considerations into domestic host markets.  
 
The empirical literature on the effect of natural resources on FDI in African economies shows 
mixed results. Using the share of fuel and minerals in merchandise exports and a panel of 22 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asiedu (2006) shows that natural resources is a significant 
factor that attracts FDI to host countries. Loots and Kabundi (2012) present the same conclusion 
using a dummy variable for oil exporters and panel of 46 countries over the period 2000-2007. In 
a similar manner, Anyanwu (2012) employs a dummy variable for oil exporters for a sample of 
53 African countries, over the period 1996-2008 and finds strong positive effect of natural 
resources on FDI to African countries.  




Another strand of empirical literature has shown that resource dependence can undermine FDI 
flows. Proponents of the FDI-natural resource curse theory argue that natural resources attract 
FDI but crowd out non-resources FDI; and aggregate FDI in resource -rich countries would be 
lower when the effect of the decrease in non-resource FDI offset the increase in resource FDI 
(Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010). The study used sector level data on outward FDI from the 
Netherlands and found that subsoil assets boost resource FDI but exerts a negative effect on non-
resource FDI. The adverse effect of natural resources and FDI is attributed to a number of 
factors. Natural resource boom leads to currency appreciation and consequent loss of export 
competitiveness, which, in turn, induces crowding out of investment in the non-natural resource 
tradable sectors (Asiedu and Lien, 2011). Volatility in global commodity prices causes 
macroeconomic uncertainty which has a dampening effect on foreign investments in the country. 
Natural resource extraction involves large capital expenditures at the onset of extraction, but 
revenues generated in subsequent operations are minimal and may not provide sufficient 
resources to promote investments in the non-resource sectors.  
 
Evidence on African economies has shown an adverse effect of natural resources on FDI to the 
region, using aggregate FDI (Asiedu, 2013) and bilateral FDI from the USA into African 
countries (Nwaogu and Ryan, 2014). However, these studies have not taken into account 
potential differences in resource seeking motives of MNEs from the different groups of 
economies. There appears to be some differences between investors from the different 
economies in terms of the portfolio of investments directed to African economies. As noted, a 
sizeable proportion of FDI from the OECD and non-OECD emerging markets appears to have 
been directed towards the extractive industries, compared to intra-African FDI which is largely 
concentrated in manufacturing and services sectors. From the discussion, a third hypothesis 
tested is that natural resource endowment is likely to undermine non-resource FDI in host 
resource-rich countries. A related hypothesis explored is that there are differences in the nature 
of natural resource-seeking FDI between investors from African economies and the OECD 
economies and non-OECD emerging market economies.  
 
There are further differences in the pattern of FDI into host African economies between investors 
from African countries and the OECD developed economies. The patterns point to potential 
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differences in market-seeking motivations of FDI. It is argued that intra-African FDI uses 
relatively less sophisticated technology to produce consumer-oriented products and that these 
investments are less capital intensive (see AfDB et al., 2014). This suggests that intra-African 
FDI may be less sensitive to the level of development of host countries, compared to FDI from 
OECD developed economies which produces technology intensive products, and are attracted 
into host countries with higher level of income, educated workforce and good quality 
infrastructure (see Antonakakis and Tondl, 2015). Given this pattern of FDI, we hypothesize that 
the nature of market-seeking FDI from intra-African investors is likely to be different from 
investors from the OECD economies.  
 
Overall, the literature reveals a clear relationship between FDI, relative market size, endowment 
of natural resources and labour costs in host countries. It further suggests that the effect of these 
factors on FDI could be explained by an integrated framework that captures the different 
arguments on these drivers of FDI.  
  





The literature surveyed above suggests that the motivations for FDI, market-seeking, efficiency-
seeking and resource-seeking FDI, are not all explained by one theoretical framework. It is 
therefore useful to consider an empirical specification that integrates all the predictions of the 
underlying motivations of FDI. A gravity-type model is estimated, which has become the 
workhorse of empirical research in analyzing bilateral relationships not only FDI, but trade, 
imports and exports (see Shepherd, 2013). The basic gravity model is akin to Newton‟s Law of 
gravity and relates FDI directly to economic mass (GDP) of the host and source countries and 
inversely to the trade costs between the two countries. As noted, bilateral FDI stock is measured 
by the accumulated value of FDI flows over a period of time. On the other hand, FDI flows 
capture three components of FDI i.e. equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. 
As such, a negative value of FDI suggests that the negative amount of at least one of these 
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components more than offset the positive amounts of the other components.
9
 This is an 
indication that the host economy is facing reverse investments or disinvestments.  
 
Given the definition above, one would argue that FDI stocks are not likely to be explained by 
contemporaneous variables. A gravity-type model with one-period lags of the explanatory 
variables (excluding distance and dummy variables) is estimated. Along these lines, it is 
important to indicate that specifying a gravity model using bilateral FDI stocks allows us to 
capture the time lag effects of the explanatory variables (see Dauti, 2015). In its log-linear form, 
the basic gravity model of bilateral FDI stocks can be expressed as: 
                                                                    (2.1) 
 
Where         is bilateral FDI stock from source country i to host country j at time t;          
and         denote one-period lags of real GDP of host and source countries respectively,      
denotes trade costs proxied by  distance between host and source countries.  
 
Most empirical studies investigating the motivations and determinants of FDI have specifically 
adopted the framework of the knowledge-capital model (Carr et al., 2001), partly due to its 
theoretical predictions (see Blonigen and Wang, 2005). Three alternative specifications of FDI 
have emerged in the empirical literature to explain both horizontal and vertical motivations of 
FDI (see Martinez et al., 2012). In line with this literature, our empirical specification is based on 
the knowledge-capital model along the lines of specifications by Kleinert and Toubal (2010) and 
Baltagi et al. (2008), with some modifications to include natural resources and control variables. 
The estimation equation is specified in log-linear form as: 
                 (                 )       (         )             
                                                     (   )   
               (2.2)                                                         
                                                
 
 Where    (                 ) is the log of the sum of source and host country real GDPs 
lagged by one time period,    (         ) is one-period lag of the log of the relative market size 
of the host and source countries,          is relative factor endowment also lagged by one period 
                                                          
9
 See UNCTAD‟s definitions, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Investment%20and%20Enterprise/FDI_Flows.aspx 
   
39 
 
and      is bilateral distance.     captures country-pair invariant factors not included in the model, 
such as the existence of common official language, common border and colonial links.      is a 
vector of control variables that captures one-period lags of bilateral exchange rates and trade, and 
dummy variables denoting the existence of a ratified bilateral investment treaty (BIT) and 
whether host and source countries belong to regional trade agreements (RTAs). Country-pair 
fixed effect (   ) are included in the specification of the error component to help guard against 
potential omitted variable bias that may arise when bilateral characteristics, such as existence of 
common language and colonial links between countries are not added as explanatory variables 
(Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). Similarly, Baltagi et al. (2014) echo the view that it would be 
appropriate to include the country-pair fixed effects to deal with endogeneity issues when cross-
sections of country- pairs are observed repeatedly over time.  
 
In this framework, FDI increases with the total income of both countries (         
        ) and relative market size, defined as the ratio of host to source countries‟ real GDP 
lagged by one time period (                ⁄ ). Both variables capture horizontal motivations 
of FDI, which occur between large countries of similar size, and the coefficients on these 
variables are expected to be positive (see Baltagi et al., 2008). More FDI is expected from large 
countries and host countries with relatively large markets will receive more FDI (Leibracht and 
Riedl, 2012). It implies also that horizontal FDI takes place between countries of similar factor 
abundance (Yeaple, 2003). Due to limited data on unit labour costs of host countries, relative 
factor endowment (         , measured by the difference in real GDP per capita between source 
and host countries is used as a proxy for relative labour costs (Andre`s et al, 2013). This variable 
captures vertical FDI (Busse, 2010) and therefore used to assess the importance of lower labour 
costs in driving these investments in host countries (efficiency-seeking motives). The vertical 
model of FDI predicts that bilateral FDI increases when there are large differences in relative 
factor endowments (Yeaple, 2003), suggesting that the coefficient on          should be 
positive. The coefficient on geographic distance (     between the host and source country is 
ambiguous as it reflects both export costs and investment and monitoring costs (Carr et al., 
2001). Given these costs, Leibracht and Riedl (2012) argue that the sign depends on whether FDI 
is driven by efficiency-seeking or market-seeking motivations. For market-seeking FDI, which 
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serve as substitute for exports, larger distance is associated with higher bilateral FDI. Since 
efficiency-seeking FDI are export-oriented, a larger bilateral distance can discourage FDI.   
 
Note that the gravity specification in equation (2.2) does not include natural resource 
endowment, which is one of the explanatory variables of interest, since this model only includes 
bilateral characteristics of host and source countries. To capture the effect of natural resources on 
FDI and additional determinants of FDI, an alternative gravity model is estimated, which 
includes country specific fixed effects and time fixed effects as specified in equation (2.3):  
 
                 (                 )       (         )             
                              (   )   
       
      
                  (2.3)                                                          
 
Literature suggests that it is desirable to include country specific fixed effects    and    and time 
fixed effects (    in the estimation of the gravity model, with the latter controlling for business 
cycle effects (Egger, 2000; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003; Matyas, 1997). This specification 
allows for potential endogeneity of bilateral characteristics in equation (2.2) through unobserved 
country-pair fixed effects (     ) and host country-specific factors such as          through 
correlation with unobserved country effects            is a vector of variables that control 
additional determinants of FDI in host countries, such as the quality of institutions, trade 
openness, macroeconomic stability, financial development, surrounding market potential, quality 
of infrastructure and a dummy variable to capture episode of internal armed conflict. In order to 
attest to the differences between intra-African investors and counterparts from OECD and non-
OECD emerging market economies in the determinants of FDI, equation (2.3) is augmented to 
include a dummy variable for investments originating from either OECD or emerging markets, 
and interaction terms between such a dummy variable and relative market size, natural resource 
dependence and relative factor endowments as specified in equation (2.4) as: 
 
                    
        
             
        
            
                                                       (2.4)                                                          
 
 
Where      a dummy variable is coded 1 if FDI originates from the OECD and zero if intra-
African; and       is a vector of the factors of interest (relative economic size, natural resources 
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and relative factor endowments). Next,      is replaced with     where the latter takes a 
value of 1 if the source of FDI is an emerging market economy and zero if intra-African. In a 
similar manner, we determine whether the factors explaining FDI to South Africa (SA) are 
different from the drivers of FDI to other African countries, by replacing the OECD dummy in 
equation (2.4) with SA dummy and interacting with the variables of interest.  
 
As a first step, the estimation equation (2.2) can be estimated using the pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) technique. However, one problem with this approach is dealing with potential 
endogeneity issues, such as distance, which is correlated with unobserved country-pair fixed 
effects    . The resulting parameter estimates are biased if such correlation is ignored. Attempts 
to deal with the problem of unobserved effects have led to different estimation techniques, 
including the estimation of linear panel data models such as random effects and fixed effects, 
which take into account the panel structure of the data. To explain the underlying assumptions of 
these models, consider the linear panel model specification in equation (2.5): 
                                                                                
          (2.5)       
Where    is unobserved country-specific effects and    
  is a vector of explanatory variables. The 
random effects model makes the strong assumption that    is not correlated with the explanatory 
variables    
 .  Such an assumption is unrealistic given the potential correlation of    with natural 
resource dependence. It is well documented in the resource-curse literature that natural resources 
affect the quality of institutions in host countries (see e.g. Blute et al., 2005; Brunnschweiler and 
Blute, 2008), which suggests that    will be correlated with measures of natural resources and 
institutional quality. Such a problem is mitigated by estimating the fixed effects model, which 
assumes that the unobserved country fixed effects    are correlated with the explanatory 
variables. To determine whether the fixed effects or the random effects model should be 
estimated, the Hausman specification test is performed with rejection of the hull hypothesis of 
this test suggesting that the estimates of the fixed effects and not the random effects are 
consistent (Cameroon and Trivedi, 2010).  
 
The fixed effects estimator is akin to the first-differenced model, which implies that using FDI 
stock as dependent variable will generate net inflows through the differences in stocks (see Egger 
and Merlo, 2007). While the fixed effects model provides consistent estimates, the parameters of 
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the time-invariant explanatory variables in the gravity model (e.g. distance) are not estimated. In 
addition, although the fixed effects model tends to mitigate potential endogeneity issues, there 
are however endogeneity concerns even after taking one-period lag of the explanatory variables. 
To address these concerns and the limitations inherent in both the random effects and fixed 
effects models, the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) is 
estimated. The Hausman-Taylor estimation technique addresses the problem of endogeneity by 
allowing some explanatory variables to be endogenous, and ensures the estimation of 
coefficients of both time-variant and time-invariant regressors. It is suitable in estimating 
unbalanced panel data when such data are randomly missing (Baltagi et al., 2014). Following the 
specification of the Hausman-Taylor estimator by Cameron and Trivedi (2010) and Baltagi et al. 
(2014), the Hausman-Taylor gravity model of bilateral FDI stock from equation (2.2) is specified 
as: 
 
                                               (2.6) 
                    
  
Where        is a set of time varying explanatory variables that are uncorrelated with the 
country-pair fixed effects     and the error term     .         is a set of time-varying explanatory 
variables which are potentially correlated with     but not     .     denotes a time-invariant 
exogenous variable and     captures the time-invariant endogenous variables. The Hausman-
Taylor model will yield consistent estimates when the explanatory variables are properly 
separated into exogenous and endogenous variables and the model is over-identified (Baltagi et 
al., 2014). This approach uses an instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique, with a set of 
instruments derived internally from information within the model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 
For identification of the parameters of the model, the approach requires that the number of time-
varying exogenous regressors (        must be at least as large as the number of time-invariant 
endogenous regressors (      (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In order to guard against the problem 
of weak instruments, it is helpful to ensure that there is sufficient correlation between the 
instruments (         and the time-invariant endogenous regressors    . The Sargan-Hansen test 
is performed to test for over-identifying restrictions in the Hausman-Taylor model.  Failure to 
reject the null hypothesis of this test is an indication that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid. 




Possible set of explanatory variables in the vector        that are potentially endogenous due to 
correlation with the country-pair-specific effects (   ) are the sum of real GDPs of source and 
host countries, relative market size, relative factor endowments, as well as dummy variables that 
capture the effects of bilateral investment treaty and regional trade agreements on bilateral FDI 
stocks (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007; Egger, 2004).  The existence of ratified BIT may proxy 
for the quality of institutions in host economies and potentially endogenous (Busse et al., 2010). 
Similarly, bilateral distance is a proxy for cultural similarity between the source and host country 
and affects trade or transaction costs. This variable is correlated with the omitted country-pair-
specific effects and potentially endogenous (    . 
 
If one considers the second estimation equation (2.3), other time-varying host country factors 
included in the vector        are also potentially endogenous through possible correlation with 
country-specific effects   .  For example, the resource curse theory predicts that natural resources 
negatively correlate with the quality of institutions in host economies, implying that natural 
resources and corruption are endogenous explanatory variables. Well-functioning domestic 
financial markets would lower the costs of transactions and thus enhance the efficiency of 
financial resources allocated to investment projects. It also facilitates internal mobilization of 
capital from domestic markets to finance the operations of MNCs, suggesting that countries with 
well-developed financial markets are more likely to attract more FDI. This implies that the ratio 
of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP, which is a proxy for domestic financial markets 
development, is potentially endogenous. Similarly, good quality infrastructure reduces 
transaction costs and enhances the efficiency of FDI (Kinishita and Lu, 2006). The internal 
armed conflict dummy is also considered here as potentially endogenous variable given that 
armed conflict affects commodity prices, which in turn determines the profitability of MNE 
activities and influences their investment decisions (see Lee, 2014). In the case of variables in 
the vector        , they are treated as uncorrelated with the unobserved effects. Possible 




                                                          
10
 Measures of macroeconomic instability (volatility in inflation and real exchange rate) are weakly correlated with 
the time-invariant endogenous distance variable. These variables were not included in the model to avoid the 
problem of weak instruments. As such, the bilateral real exchange rate is used in the estimation of the Hausman-
Taylor models.    
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The gravity model of FDI is often estimated in its natural logarithm form rather than in levels in 
order to deal with the problem of skewed FDI data. This approach reduces the weights of outliers 
and the estimated parameters of the continuous explanatory variables can be easily interpreted as 
elasticities (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2007; Dinga and Dingova, 2011). However, one limitation of this 
approach is that zero and negative FDI stock values are eliminated. Dropping these observations 
from the regression may result in biased estimates, given that zeros may not be random 
observations and could be driven by investment indivisibilities and fixed costs (Dabla-Norris et 
al., 2010). Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) and Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011) 
address the issue of zero trade flows using the Poisson pseudo- maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimator. This approach requires that the dependent variable is non-negative (Santos-Silva and 
Tenereyro, 2011). Our data, however, contains negative FDI stock values, which cannot be 
discarded since these observations could reflect existing institutional environment that 
discourages FDI.
11
 To retain zero and negative observations on the dependent variable, the semi-
log transformation proposed by Levy-Yeyati et al. (2007) is adopted. It takes the form: 
 
           (        (  |   |       (2.7) 
 
The first part of the transformation     (      returns a component equals -1 when FDI stock is 
negative, 0 when it is zero and 1 when greater than zero. This transformation ensures that zero 




The dependent variable is defined in terms of bilateral FDI stocks instead of FDI flows. FDI 
stock variable is measured by accumulated values of FDI flows over a period of time. FDI flows 
comprises three components of FDI i.e. equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company 
loans.
12
 As noted, using FDI stocks allows us to capture the time lag effects of the explanatory 
variables.  The data on bilateral FDI stock is sourced from UNCTAD (2014) database.
13
 Real 
                                                          
11
 Negative values of FDI reflect reverse investments or disinvestments. For example, recent disinvestments in 
Angola were induced by government policy that requires foreign affiliates to team with local partners. The projects, 
however, were not successfully implemented due to lack of local partners (UNCTAD, 2014). 
 
12
 See UNCTAD‟s definitions, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Investment%20and%20Enterprise/FDI_Flows.aspx    
13
 UNCTAD‟s Bilateral FDI Statistics (2014)  is available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx 
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GDP of host and source countries (constant 2005 US$) are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Data on real GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) is also 
sourced from the WDI. Bilateral real exchange rates were calculated using annual nominal 
exchange rates of source and host countries to the US$ and corresponding consumer price 
indices (2005=100) and both series are obtained from the WDI. The level of development of 
domestic financial markets is proxied by the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP 
and sourced from the Global Financial Development (2015) database. Institutional quality is 
proxied by control of corruption index sourced from the Governance Indicators of the World 
Bank (Kauffman Index). Surrounding market potential is constructed using real GDP per capita 
and distance (see appendix A2.1), with the latter obtained from the Centre d‟Etudes Prospectives 
et d‟Informations Internationales (CEPII) database.  
 
Trade openness is obtained as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports in nominal GDP, for 
which data is obtained from the WDI database. Regional trade agreement (RTA) is represented 
by a dummy coded 1, if both host and source countries have free trade agreement or belong to a 
customs union or an economic integration agreement. This variable is constructed using data 
from the World Trade Organization (WTO). Similarly, bilateral investment treaty (BIT) is 
proxied by a dummy reflecting the existence of a ratified treaty between source and host country. 
To construct the variable, data was obtained from the UNCTAD database. 
 
The resource-curse literature distinguishes between measures of natural resource dependence or 
intensity and natural resource abundance. Natural resource dependence is proxied by the ratio of 
resource exports in total exports or GDP, whereas natural resource abundance is measured by 
resource stocks (Brunnschweiler and Blute, 2008). Given that resource stock measures are 
relatively static, this study follows recent literature and considers more dynamic measures of 
natural resource dependence. Two measures of natural resource dependence are used: sum of the 
share of fuel exports, ores and metal exports in total merchandise exports (Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu 
and Lien, 2011; Nwaogu and Ryan, 2014) and the sum of the share oil rents and mineral rents in 
GDP.
14
 Sets of data on the variables are collected from the World Bank‟s WDI. Appendix A 2.1 
provides a summary description of the variables used in the regression. 
                                                          
14
 Oil rents is used in some empirical studies as a measure of natural resources (Poelhekke and Van der Ploeg, 2010; 
Asiedu, 2013). However, due to limited number of oil exporting countries and the diversity in natural resource 




The study uses an unbalanced panel of 46 host countries and the gravity model is estimated over 
the period 2001-2012. To guard against potential heterogeneity bias arising from the differences 
in economic structures between the resource and non-resource rich countries, host countries are 
sub-divided into resource-rich countries (24 members) and non-resource rich countries (21). 
Similarly, source countries are categorized into interregional, OECD and non-OECD emerging 
market economies. This classification yields a sample of 23 OECD and other developed 
economies, 14 non-OECD emerging markets and 33 intra-African source countries with a total 
of 8952 observations. The separation of host countries into resource and non-resource rich in 
sub-Saharan Africa was based on the criterion that resource exports exceeded 25 percent of total 
merchandise exports in 2005-2010 (Thomas and Trevino, 2013). In addition, Mozambique is 
considered as a resource-rich country due to recent exploration of gas deposits in the country. 
Appendix A2.2 shows the different classifications of host African countries and source countries 
from the different groups.  
 
Table 2.4 compares the distribution of inward FDI stock and explanatory variables of interest 
between resource and non-resource rich host African countries over the period 2001-2012.  In 
particular, resource-rich countries received greater volume of FDI than non-resource rich 
countries, averaging US$516.9 million and US$ 409.1 million, respectively, over the review 
period. Similarly, the relative market size of resource rich economies is larger in resource-rich 
than non-resource rich countries. This is prima facie evidence that large and/or resource-rich 
countries may have attracted more FDI than small and/or non-resource rich countries.  
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics for resource and non-resource rich countries (2001-2012) 
Panel A: Resource rich countries      
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bilateral Inward FDI stock (US$ millions) 4,031 516.9 3480 -1527 80439 
Relative market size 4,932 4.125 26.89 0.000 468.7 
Sum real GDP (US$ billions) 4,932 1491 2895 7.406 14454 
Relative factor endowment 4,932 2.521 1.534 0.000 5.599 
Fuel, ore & metals (% merchandise exports) 4,572 52.32 31.49 3.799 99.67 
Oil & mineral rents (% GDP) 4,932 15.01 19.30 0.000 93.11 
Panel B: Non-resource rich countries      
Bilateral Inward FDI stock (US$ millions) 2,465 409.1 2339 -1344 51193 
Relative market size 3,624 0.230 0.808 0.000 11.88 
Sum real GDP (US$ billions) 3,624 1625 3156 2.475 14264 
Relative factor endowment 3,624 2.725 1.581 0.000 6.153 
Fuel, ore & metals (% merchandise exports) 3,396 10.18 13.80 0.000 58.69 
Oil & mineral rents (% GDP) 3,624 1.347 2.860 0.000 14.13 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
endowments across host economies, an alternative measure of natural resource dependence is constructed by 
combining oil rents (% GDP) and mineral rents (% GDP). 




2.5. Results and Discussion 
 
The descriptive analysis above suggests that large and resource rich countries may have attracted 
more FDI than non-resource rich countries. Given such a trend, it is helpful to empirically 
evaluate the role of markets, natural resource endowments and efficiency-seeking considerations 
in driving FDI from the different sources to host countries.  The analysis here uses both static 
panel and dynamic panel estimation techniques. In the case of the static panel data analysis, three 
(3) approaches are employed - fixed effects model (FEM), random effects model (REM) and 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimation techniques. These approaches are widely used in the empirical 
literature to explain the motivations and determinants of FDI.  
 
 As a first step, the determinants of intra-African and interregional FDI are analyzed using the 
full sample of all inward FDI stock to resource and non-resource rich African countries. As 
noted, when determining whether to use the FEM or REM, the Hausman test statistic is used. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis is an indication that the FEM is preferable to the REM. In both 
estimations of intra-African and interregional FDI, the Hausman test statistics strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis that the individual effects are random. Table 2.5 displays the results of the 
estimation of the drivers of both intra-African and interregional FDI. Column (1) of the results in 
table 2.5 shows that relative market size and sum of real GDP of host and source countries 
positively affect bilateral intra-African FDI. However, the coefficient on relative market size is 
not statistically significant. The result does not provide conclusive evidence in support of 
horizontal (market-seeking) motivations of intra-African FDI. Note that the FEM approach does 
not identify time-invariant factors such as distance which are relevant in the empirical estimation 
of gravity models. 
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Table 2.5: Determinants of Intra-African and Interregional FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables FEM-all REM-all HT-all  FEM-all REM-all HT-all  
                                       Intra-African FDI                         Interregional FDI 
       
Lagged log relative market size  0.677 0.059 0.708* 1.647*** 0.704*** 1.595*** 
 (0.483) (0.065) (0.385) (0.275) (0.064) (0.264) 
Lagged log sum real GDP  3.302*** 1.245*** 3.286*** 4.326*** 1.557*** 4.330*** 
 (0.474) (0.123) (0.480) (0.324) (0.113) (0.324) 
Lagged relative factor endowment 0.071 0.057 0.078 -0.082*** 0.007 -0.084*** 
 (0.134) (0.038) (0.118) (0.019) (0.005) (0.019) 
Regional trade agreement dummy -0.584 0.241 -0.598    
 (0.378) (0.338) (0.373)    
Bilateral investment treaty dummy 0.633*** 1.345*** 0.746*** 0.460** 0.654*** 0.451** 
 (0.105) (0.318) (0.256) (0.216) (0.167) (0.217) 
Lagged trade openness  -0.013** -0.003 -0.013*** -0.002 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log distance   -0.595*** -1.180  -0.160 4.250*** 
  (0.201) (0.809)  (0.198) (1.639) 
Landlocked  0.527 2.572***  0.067 0.075 
  (0.356) (0.994)  (0.231) (0.689) 
Constant -78.504*** -23.906*** -68.930*** -107.274*** -36.202*** -144.594*** 
 (11.746) (3.737) (14.764) (8.666) (3.190) (17.919) 
       
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 4,396 4,396 4,396 
R-squared 0.140   0.124   
Number of country-pairs 163 163 163 550 550 550 
Hausman test 77.39***   246.45***   
Overidentifying restrictions test (p-value)   0.89   0.14 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-Taylor 
model: Lagged log relative market size, lagged log sum real GDP and lagged relative factor endowment. Time-varying exogenous regressors: 
lagged trade openness, bilateral investment treaty and regional trade agreement dummies. Time-invariant endogenous regressor is log distance 
and time-invariant exogenous regressor is landlocked dummy.  
 
 
While the REM reports such estimates, it makes the strong assumption that the country fixed 
effects are not correlated with the explaining variables, which is problematic. Estimation of the 
Hausman-Taylor model avoids the problems inherent in both the REM and the FEM. To estimate 
the parameter estimates of the Hausman-Taylor model, one needs to ascertain whether there is 
sufficient correlation between the time-invariant endogenous variable (log distance) and potential 
time-varying exogenous variables. This is done by analyzing the statistical significance of the 
correlations between the log of distance and all the explanatory variables, since potential time-
varying endogenous explanatory variables may otherwise turn out to be exogenous, as 
determined by the test of over-identifying restrictions. Appendix A2.3 presents such correlations, 
which shows that the distance variable is strongly correlated with all independent variables, 
except the ratio of domestic credit to GDP and internal armed conflict dummy.  
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Given the reported association between distance and the explanatory variables, a further step in 
analyzing the parameter estimates of the Hausman-Taylor model is to evaluate whether the 
orthogonality condition is satisfied using the Sargan-Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions. 
It tests for validity of the instruments and in both specifications of intra-African and interregional 
FDI, the null hypothesis is not rejected suggesting that that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid.   
 
Looking at the estimates of the Hausman-Taylor model for intra-African FDI, column (3) of the 
results in table 2.5 shows that relative market size and sum of real GDP of host and source 
countries have the expected positive signs and are statistically significant at 10 percent and 1 
percent, respectively. This is evidence suggesting that the market size of host countries is an 
important factor determining intra-African FDI. The evidence supports the view that the size of 
host market should be large enough to ensure that MNEs offset the fixed costs of setting-up 
production in the domestic host markets (Blonigen and Wang, 2005). The same is true 
qualitatively for the estimates of interregional FDI reported in column (6) of the results in table 
2.5 based on the Hausman-Taylor estimation strategy. The results do not reject the hypothesis 
that FDI to African countries are driven by market-seeking considerations. The presence of 
positive and significant coefficients on relative market size and sum of host and source real GDP 
is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Martinez et al., 2012 for the European Union). Large 
markets offer more profitable investment opportunities compared to smaller markets. The larger 
the markets the more sales are generated by MNEs. This subsequently attracts other firms to 
invest in the host economy. 
 
While our result on markets agrees with the findings of previous studies which used aggregate 
data on FDI flows (Asiedu, 2006; Anyanwu, 2012; Loots and Kabundi, 2012), it differs from 
these studies in that disaggregated bilateral FDI is used in the estimation. The results show that 
relative factor endowment is not statistically significant with respect to intra-African FDI 
(column 3) while it is negatively associated with interregional FDI (column 6). This latter result 
further reinforces the fact that interregional FDI is market-seeking.  
 
Although separating source countries into intra-African and interregional groups is a useful 
approach to analyzing the determinants, combining the sample of host countries may be prone to 
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heterogeneity bias and obscure the underlying relationships, given the differences in levels of 
income and economic structures across African countries. To avoid such heterogeneity bias, host 
African countries are categorized into resource and non-resource rich countries. This allows us to 
analyze the factors driving FDI from the different source economies into these specific groups of 
host countries. Breaking the sample down by resource and non-resource rich countries and 
extending the model to include additional control variables (equation 3) without time fixed 













Table 2.6: Determinants of Intra-African FDI to resource rich (RR) and non-resource rich (NRR) countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables HT-all HT-all HT-RR HT-RR HT-NRR 
      
Lagged log relative market size 0.537*** 0.418** 0.431** 0.485** 1.468*** 
 (0.203) (0.197) (0.210) (0.210) (0.510) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 3.750*** 3.599*** 3.526*** 3.658*** 3.535*** 
 (0.591) (0.617) (0.744) (0.735) (0.895) 
Lagged relative factor endowment 0.070 0.067 0.275* 0.266* -0.101 
 (0.136) (0.140) (0.155) (0.146) (0.276) 
Lagged oil and mineral rents -0.083**   -0.088***  
 (0.033)   (0.034)  
Lagged fuel, ores & metal exports  -0.007 -0.007   
  (0.008) (0.009)   
Bilateral Investment treaty dummy  0.438* 0.673*** 0.791** 0.516 -0.004 
 (0.256) (0.225) (0.346) (0.416) (0.505) 
Regional trade agreement dummy -0.803** -0.682* -0.068 -0.467 -0.265 
 (0.369) (0.397) (0.179) (0.373) (0.538) 
Lagged trade openness  -0.008** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Lagged log bilateral exchange rate 0.226** 0.219** 0.211** 0.223*** 0.022 
 (0.093) (0.100) (0.088) (0.079) (0.177) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Lagged surrounding market potential 0.012 0.009 0.014 0.020 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.044) 
Lagged domestic credit to GDP ratio -0.006* -0.003 -0.003 -0.008** 0.014 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) 
Lagged control of corruption index -0.354 -0.197 -0.173 -0.341 -0.653 
 (0.245) (0.275) (0.320) (0.295) (0.510) 
Internal armed conflict dummy 0.228 0.176 0.333** 0.381 0.092 
 (0.229) (0.134) (0.160) (0.368) (0.241) 
Landlocked dummy 0.830 0.559 1.700 1.746* 2.852 
 (0.809) (0.842) (1.070) (1.019) (1.886) 
Log distance -2.069*** -2.214*** -1.357*** -1.318** -2.038* 
 (0.614) (0.648) (0.526) (0.536) (1.135) 
Constant -71.593*** -66.458*** -73.223*** -76.942*** -67.403*** 
 (15.402) (16.283) (18.160) (17.062) (23.659) 
      
Observations 1,134 1,104 786 806 328 
Number of country-pairs 163 160 102 104 59 
Over-identifying restrictions test (p-value) 0.49 0.62 0.78 0.46 0.18 
Time fixed effects No No No No No 
 Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in 
Hausman-Taylor model: Lagged log sum real GDP, lagged relative factor endowment, fuel, ores & metals exports, oil and minerals rents, lagged 
surrounding market potential, lagged domestic credit to GDP, lagged control of corruption index and internal armed conflict dummy. Time- 
varying exogenous regressors: lagged relative market size, lagged trade openness, lagged log bilateral exchange rate, lagged electricity 
infrastructure index, bilateral investment treaty and regional trade agreement dummies. Time-invariant endogenous regressor is log distance and 
time-invariant exogenous regressor is landlocked dummy.  
 
The results provide remarkable evidence in support of market-seeking motivations for intra-
African FDI in both resource and non-resource rich African countries. As is clear from table 2.6, 
the Hausman-Taylor model shows that relative market size and sum of host and source countries 
real GDP positively affect intra-African FDI to both resource-rich and non-resource rich 
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countries respectively. This finding suggests that large markets encourage bilateral FDI to these 
economies. Such a market-seeking motivation for intra-African FDI is likely, given that the 
observed pattern of these investments are mostly concentrated in manufacturing and services 
sectors of host African economies. In recent years, TNCs from the leading source on intra-
African FDI, South Africa, have expanded activities beyond the SADC sub-region to large 
markets in West African markets particularly Nigeria and Ghana. The impact of market size on 
intra-African FDI is economically more significant in non-resource rich countries than resource 
rich countries. It shows that one percent increase in the relative market size of non-resource rich 
countries increases bilateral FDI by 1.47 percent in non-resource rich countries (column 5), 
compared to less than proportionate increase (0.49 percent) in bilateral FDI into resource-rich 
countries (column 4), ceteris paribus.  
 
A look at the result displayed in columns (3) and (4) of table 2.6 provides evidence supporting 
that intra-African FDI has been driven by efficiency-seeking objectives, as the coefficient on 
relative factor endowment positively affects intra-African FDI in resource rich countries 
although at the 10 percent level. This suggests that intraregional FDI are driven by lower cost 
considerations in host countries. As discussed previously, intra-African FDI are concentrated in 
neighbouring countries of the major source countries, and in large markets in order to take 
advantage of economies of scale.  
 
Moving to the results of natural resource dependence, column (4) shows that the coefficient on 
share of oil and mineral rents in GDP is significantly negative. This outcome is consistent with 
the FDI-resource curse hypothesis, suggesting that natural resources promote resource FDI but 
undermines FDI in the non-resource sectors (Poelhekke and van der Pleg, 2010). The results are 
consistent with recent evidence on the adverse effects of natural resources in African economies 
(Asiedu, 2013; Nwaogu and Ryan, 2014). As surveyed in the literature, the mechanisms through 
which natural resources could exert an adverse effect on FDI are well documented, including 
loss of competitiveness through appreciation of the local currency, macroeconomic instability 
induced by adverse movements in global commodity prices and limited investments in the 
extractive industries in subsequent periods following initial investments. Nonetheless, few 
studies on African economies using aggregate FDI found that natural resources positively 
influence FDI to African countries (Anyanwu, 2012; Asiedu, 2006; Loots and Kabundi, 2012). 
   
53 
 
However, the coefficients on fuel, ores and metal exports in columns (2 and 3) show a negative 
sign but not statistically significant.   
 
Taking a sensitivity analysis of the determinants of intra-African FDI, the alternative 
specification in equation (2.3) is estimated with time fixed effects. The results are presented in 
table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7: Determinants of Intra-African FDI to resource and non-resource rich countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables HT-all HT-RR HT-NRR HT-RR HT-NRR 
      
Lagged log relative market size 0.537*** 0.485** 1.468*** 0.396** 0.805** 
 (0.203) (0.210) (0.510) (0.185) (0.387) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 3.750*** 3.658*** 3.535*** 3.254*** 2.111*** 
 (0.591) (0.735) (0.895) (0.802) (0.769) 
Lagged relative factor endowment 0.070 0.266* -0.101 0.251* -0.100 
 (0.136) (0.146) (0.276) (0.150) (0.298) 
Lagged oil and mineral exports -0.083** -0.088***  -0.084**  
 (0.033) (0.034)  (0.036)  
Bilateral investment treaty dummy 0.438* 0.516 -0.004 0.445 -0.070 
 (0.256) (0.416) (0.505) (0.451) (0.487) 
Regional trade agreement dummy -0.803** -0.467 -0.265 -0.424 -0.197 
 (0.369) (0.373) (0.538) (0.342) (0.521) 
Lagged log trade openness  -0.008** -0.007 -0.010 -0.012** -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Lagged log bilateral exchange rate 0.226** 0.223*** 0.022 0.189** 0.066 
 (0.093) (0.079) (0.177) (0.078) (0.151) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Lagged surrounding market potential 0.012 0.020 0.014 0.019 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.044) (0.015) (0.044) 
Lagged domestic credit to GDP -0.006* -0.008** 0.014 -0.009** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.004) (0.024) 
Lagged control of corruption index -0.354 -0.341 -0.653 -0.218 -0.594 
 (0.245) (0.295) (0.510) (0.344) (0.547) 
Internal armed conflict dummy 0.228 0.381 0.092 0.313 0.049 
 (0.229) (0.368) (0.241) (0.371) (0.293) 
Landlocked dummy 0.830 1.746* 2.852 1.530 1.147 
 (0.809) (1.019) (1.886) (1.001) (1.360) 
Log distance -2.069*** -1.318** -2.038* -1.275*** -1.370 
 (0.614) (0.536) (1.135) (0.483) (0.912) 
Constant -71.593*** -76.942*** -67.403*** -67.142*** -37.027* 
 (15.402) (17.062) (23.659) (19.001) (19.416) 
Observations 1,134 806 328 806 328 
Number of country-pairs 163 104 59 104 59 
Over-identifying restrictions test (p-value) 0.49 0.46 0.18 0.47 0.24 
Time fixed effects No  No  No  Yes  Yes  
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-
Taylor model: Lagged log sum real GDP, lagged relative factor endowment, oil and minerals rents, lagged surrounding market potential, lagged 
domestic credit to GDP, lagged control of corruption index,  internal armed conflict dummy and time dummies. Time- varying exogenous 
regressors: lagged relative market size, lagged trade openness, lagged log bilateral exchange rate, lagged electricity infrastructure index, bilateral 
investment treaty and regional trade agreement dummies. Time-invariant endogenous regressor is log distance and time-invariant exogenous 
regressor is landlocked dummy.  
 
 




 As seen from columns (2) and (4) of this table, the results of intra-African FDI are remarkably 
consistent qualitatively when additional control variables are included without and with time 
fixed effects respectively. The coefficients on relative market size and sum of real GDP show 
statistically significant and positive effects on bilateral FDI stock for resource rich countries. 
This further confirms that intra-African FDI are driven by the size of host economies. In a 
similar manner, column (3) and (5) indicate that the size of host markets is a relevant factor 
attracting intra-African FDI to non-resource rich countries.  
 
Turning to the effect of relative factor endowment on bilateral FDI to resource rich countries, the 
coefficient shows a positive sign and it is statistically significant (column 4). This suggests that 
bilateral FDI is encouraged by lower labour costs in resource rich countries. Consistent with the 
previous estimates (column 2), oil and mineral rents (% of GDP) negatively predicts intra-
African FDI in resource rich countries even after controlling for business cycle effects (column 
4).  Although intra-African FDI is perceived to be mostly channeled into manufacturing and 
services sectors, this result is likely given the resource-seeking investments undertaken by TNCs 
from South Africa, such as Anglo Ashanti and Exxaro Resources. These TNCs have directed 
investments to extractive industries in Ghana, Mali, Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of 
Congo (see Disenyano and Sogoni, 2014). 
 
As for the control variables, the coefficient on the landlocked dummy is quite large although 
marginally significant at the 10 percent level for resource-rich countries when time fixed effects 
are not captured (column 2 of table 2.7). This finding is difficult to interpret but a plausible 
explanation could be that intra-African FDI serves as an important source of foreign capital in 
landlocked countries, especially when investors are more concerned about natural resources 
availability than the associated costs of investing in these countries. The results on the distance 
variable are consistent with the predictions in the gravity model that distance impedes bilateral 
FDI (for resource-rich countries). This finding provides support for the trends analysis that intra-
African FDI are concentrated in neighbouring countries and large markets, possibly reflecting 
the sensitivity of these investments to transport costs. It is worth noting that resource-seeking 
FDI in host African countries are primarily export-oriented, which suggests that long distance 
could impede these investments.   




One of the problems with combining data on interregional FDI (as shown in table 2.5) is that it 
may mask important differences between the OECD and emerging markets economies, since the 
motivations and determinants of FDI from these sources may differ due to differences in 
nationality of investors as well as levels of income and geographic locations of source countries. 
To guard against such heterogeneity bias and disentangle the effects of market size, relative 
factor endowment and natural resource dependence on bilateral FDI from OECD countries and 
non-OECD emerging market economies, interregional investments are further separated into 
these groups of economies.  Table 2.8 presents estimates of the determinants of non-OECD 
emerging markets FDI in resource and non-resource rich African countries. Focusing on the 
parameters of the Hausman-Taylor estimation in columns (2-5), the coefficients on relative 
market size and sum of host and source country real GDP show remarkably positive sign and 
statistically significant for resource rich countries (columns 3 and 4), in line with those reported 
in column (2) when these source economies are aggregated. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Zheng and Tan (2011), which indicate that FDI from OECD developed economies and 
non-OECD developing economies to China are market-seeking. Similarly, the results show 
strong support for market-seeking motivations of FDI from non-OECD to non-resource rich 
countries. This is confirmed in column (5), which clearly indicates significant positive 
coefficients of relative market size and sum of real GDP on FDI to non-resource rich countries. 
 
 Moving to relative factor endowment, the coefficients in columns (3 and 4) show negative signs 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level respectively. This variable 
captures the market size differentials between source and host countries, differences in relative 
factor endowments and also reflects the differences in consumer tastes between these countries 
(see Dauti, 2015). The result indicates that bilateral FDI is encouraged when host and source 
countries are similar in relative factor endowment. This is consistent with market-seeking 
motivations of FDI. However, there are noticeable differences in the results of relative factor 
endowment between resource rich and non-resource rich countries, with the coefficient on this 
variable showing that relative factor endowments positively affect FDI from non-OECD 
emerging markets to non-resource rich countries although significant at 10 percent level (column 
5). This signals that these investments may have been encouraged by lower cost motives in non-
resource rich countries. As the trend analysis suggests, a number of countries especially non-
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resource rich African economies, have attracted efficiency-seeking investments, such as the 
garment industry in Madagascar.  
 
Table 2.8: Determinants of non-OECD emerging markets FDI to resource and non-resource rich countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables FEM-all HT-all HT-RR HT-RR HT-NRR 
      
Lagged log relative market size 1.418** 1.543*** 1.306** 1.709*** 2.341*** 
 (0.654) (0.463) (0.615) (0.608) (0.850) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 5.045*** 4.911*** 5.075*** 5.308*** 3.450*** 
 (0.537) (0.439) (0.635) (0.596) (0.558) 
Lagged relative factor endowment -0.055** -0.047* -0.071*** -0.062** 0.070* 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.041) 
Lagged fuel, ores & metals exports -0.012**  -0.013*   
 (0.006)  (0.007)   
Lagged oil and mineral exports  -0.050**  -0.060***  
  (0.021)  (0.022)  
Lagged surrounding market potential -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.013** 0.135*** 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.043) 
Bilateral investment treaty dummy -0.740 -0.927** -0.948** -1.517*** 0.255 
 (0.557) (0.456) (0.443) (0.507) (0.807) 
Lagged log trade openness -0.022*** -0.004 -0.020*** -0.001 -0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Lagged log bilateral exchange rate -0.171 0.095 0.136 0.255* 1.483** 
 (0.389) (0.154) (0.160) (0.145) (0.741) 
Lagged domestic credit to GDP -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 0.028 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) 
Lagged control of corruption index -1.476*** -1.573*** -1.441*** -1.727*** -0.695 
 (0.338) (0.363) (0.354) (0.363) (0.685) 
Internal armed conflict dummy 0.132 0.120 0.151 0.110 -0.032 
 (0.158) (0.147) (0.216) (0.186) (0.225) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Landlocked dummy  1.279 2.421* 1.843* 7.244* 
  (1.143) (1.338) (1.089) (4.119) 
Log distance  -13.669* -14.436*** -9.248* 40.753*** 
  (6.980) (5.358) (5.404) (15.494) 
Constant -126.268*** -0.539 1.614 -50.651 -447.827*** 
 (12.844) (63.814) (51.446) (52.957) (138.482) 
      
Observations 1,090 1,190 680 730 460 
R-squared 0.244     
Number of country-pairs 145 155 82 87 68 
Hausman test 148.03***     
Over-identifying restrictions test (p-value)  0.21 0.33 0.10 0.10 
Time fixed effects No  No No No  No 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-Taylor 
model: Lagged log sum real GDP, lagged relative factor endowment, lagged oil and minerals rents, lagged fuel, ores & metals exports, lagged 
domestic credit to GDP, lagged control of corruption index and internal armed conflict dummy. Lagged log bilateral exchange rate is endogenous 
in column (5). Time- varying exogenous regressors: lagged relative market size, lagged surrounding market potential, lagged trade openness, 
lagged log bilateral exchange rate, lagged electricity infrastructure index and bilateral investment treaty. Time-invariant endogenous regressor is 
log distance and time-invariant exogenous regressor is landlocked dummy. 
 
With respect to the effect of natural resource dependence on bilateral FDI, it is clear in columns 
(3 and 4) that this variable negatively affects bilateral FDI from non-OECD emerging markets 
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economies. This is evidence in support of the adverse effects of natural resources in African 
economies. The finding agrees with suggestive evidence that two of the leading investors from 
non-OECD economies, China and India, have significantly invested in the extractive industries 
in African economies. 
  
In trying to further check for robustness of the determinants of FDI from non-OECD emerging 
markets, equation (2.3) is estimated with time effects. Table 2.9 presents remarkable evidence in 
support of market-seeking motivations for non-OECD FDI in both resource and non-resource 
rich African countries.  
 
Table 2.9: Determinants of non-OECD emerging markets FDI to resource and non-resource rich countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables HT-RR HT-NRR HT-RR HT-RR HT-NRR 
      
Lagged log relative market size 1.709*** 2.341*** 1.208* 1.878*** 1.976*** 
 (0.608) (0.850) (0.641) (0.639) (0.708) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 5.308*** 3.450*** 5.489*** 6.539*** 2.690** 
 (0.596) (0.558) (1.330) (1.279) (1.343) 
Lagged relative factor endowment -0.062** 0.070* -0.073*** -0.074** 0.078** 
 (0.029) (0.041) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) 
Lagged fuel, ores & metals exports   -0.007   
   (0.006)   
Lagged oil and mineral exports -0.060***   -0.066***  
 (0.022)   (0.023)  
Lagged surrounding market potential -0.013** 0.135*** -0.008 -0.013* 0.095*** 
 (0.006) (0.043) (0.013) (0.007) (0.035) 
Bilateral investment treaty dummy -1.517*** 0.255 -1.113** -1.583*** 0.250 
 (0.507) (0.807) (0.493) (0.540) (0.913) 
Lagged log trade openness -0.001 -0.011* -0.019*** 0.004 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Lagged log bilateral exchange rate 0.255* 1.483** 0.077 0.221 1.926** 
 (0.145) (0.741) (0.180) (0.167) (0.774) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index -0.001 0.002* -0.000 -0.001 0.003* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged domestic credit to GDP -0.014 0.028 -0.007 -0.009 0.033 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) 
Lagged control of corruption index -1.727*** -0.695 -1.282*** -1.861*** -0.770 
 (0.363) (0.685) (0.337) (0.368) (0.687) 
Internal armed conflict dummy 0.110 -0.032 0.446** 0.318* 0.180 
 (0.186) (0.225) (0.227) (0.192) (0.260) 
Landlocked dummy 1.843* 7.244* 2.853* 2.700* 6.680 
 (1.089) (4.119) (1.713) (1.640) (4.402) 
Log distance -9.248* 40.753*** -18.449** -15.758** 41.762** 
 (5.404) (15.494) (7.688) (7.577) (16.647) 
    (0.429) (0.972) 
Constant -50.651 -447.827*** 25.711 -25.078 -436.480*** 
 (52.957) (138.482) (54.868) (56.582) (150.587) 
Observations 730 460 680 730 460 
Number of country-pairs 87 68 82 87 68 
Over-identifying restrictions test (p-value) 0.10 0.10 0.61 0.29 0.16 
Time fixed effects No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-Taylor 
model: Lagged log sum real GDP, lagged relative factor endowment, lagged oil and minerals rents, lagged fuel, ores & metals exports, lagged 
domestic credit to GDP, lagged control of corruption index and internal armed conflict dummy. Lagged log bilateral exchange rate is endogenous 
in columns (2) and (5). Time- varying exogenous regressors: lagged relative market size, lagged surrounding market potential, lagged trade 
openness, lagged log bilateral exchange rate, lagged electricity infrastructure index and bilateral investment treaty. Time-invariant endogenous 
regressor is log distance and time-invariant exogenous regressor is landlocked dummy. 




As shown in columns (3) and (4) of table 2.9, non-OECD FDI is positively predicted by relative 
market size and qualitatively similar to the estimates without time fixed effects (columns 1). This 
reinforces the above analysis that these investments are market-led to resource rich countries. 
The finding suggests that the inclusion of time fixed effects does not change the qualitative 
relationship between bilateral FDI stocks and economic size of host countries. A number of 
empirical studies have estimated gravity models with time fixed effects to capture business cycle 
effects (see e.g. Egger, 2000; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003; Matyas, 1997).  In a similar manner, 
column (5) indicates that the size of host markets is a relevant factor attracting non-OECD FDI 
to non-resource rich countries. While the significant and negative sign on the coefficient of 
relative factor endowment reaffirms the market-seeking nature of these investments in resource 
rich countries (columns 3 and 4), the coefficient is strongly positive (column 5) as previously 
indicated (column 2). This confirms that these investments are encouraged by lower labour costs 
in non-resource rich countries. However, measures of natural resource dependence show 
contrasting results, with oil and mineral rents (% of GDP) negatively predicting non-OECD 
emerging markets FDI (column 4), while the coefficient on fuel, ore and mineral rents (% of 
merchandise exports) in column (3) is not statistically significant.   
 
Looking at the control variables, we observe strong positive coefficient of distance on bilateral 
FDI to non-resource rich countries. This finding offers further support for the market-seeking 
nature of FDI in these economies, since bilateral FDI is encouraged when there is large distance 
between source and host countries. The coefficient on control of corruption index, which is a 
proxy for the quality of institutions in host countries, shows a strong negative effect on bilateral 
FDI to resource rich countries (columns 3 and 4 of table 2.9). This finding suggests that foreign 
investors may not be deterred by the level of corruption in host markets. The result supports the 
suggestive evidence that foreign investors from some emerging market economies, notably 
China, India and Malaysia, have invested in African countries with some of the worst quality of 
institutions in the world (see Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 2013). 
 
A similar analysis is undertaken for investments from OECD economies to resource and non-
resource rich African countries.  Columns (3 and 4) of table 2.10 show strong support for the 
market-seeking motivations of FDI from OECD economies to resource rich African countries. It 
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is seen that relative market size and sum of host and source countries real GDP positively 
influences bilateral FDI from OECD economies. The same holds for bilateral FDI to non-
resource rich countries, suggesting that these investments are driven by marketing seeking 
considerations in both resource and non-resource rich countries.  
 
Table 2.10: Determinants of OECD FDI to resource and non-resource rich countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables FEM-all HT-all HT-RR HT-RR HT-NRR 
      
Lagged log relative market size 2.661*** 2.718*** 3.100*** 2.875*** 2.182*** 
 (0.455) (0.439) (0.637) (0.501) (0.827) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 4.199*** 3.825*** 3.132*** 3.208*** 3.608** 
 (0.991) (0.925) (0.942) (1.113) (1.797) 
Lagged relative factor endowment -0.106*** -0.091*** -0.087** -0.103** -0.064* 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) 
Lagged fuel, ores & metals exports   -0.005*   
   (0.003)   
Lagged oil and mineral exports -0.033*** -0.033***  -0.033***  
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.010)  
Lagged surrounding market potential -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.028** -0.020*** 0.065** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.033) 
Bilateral investment treaty dummy 0.402* 0.394 0.650* 0.898*** -0.305 
 (0.241) (0.241) (0.343) (0.332) (0.276) 
Lagged log trade openness 0.001 0.001 -0.015*** -0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Lagged log bilateral exchange rate -0.404* -0.422** -0.853*** -0.655*** -0.348 
 (0.209) (0.207) (0.257) (0.223) (0.425) 
Lagged domestic credit to GDP 0.001 0.002 0.010** 0.006 -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) 
Lagged control of corruption index -0.376* -0.390* -0.143 -0.181 -0.431 
 (0.219) (0.218) (0.281) (0.263) (0.364) 
Internal armed conflict dummy 0.033 0.036 0.103 0.121 -0.072 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.145) (0.153) (0.234) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Landlocked dummy  13.052 7.192*** 9.225* -12.272 
  (9.430) (2.626) (4.909) (16.630) 
Log distance  -36.728 -8.871 -23.759 34.940 
  (30.801) (6.388) (18.088) (42.904) 
Constant -99.766*** 229.606 5.934 134.459 -388.251 
 (26.783) (273.424) (59.490) (166.527) (371.135) 
      
Observations 3,206 3,206 1,635 1,854 1,352 
R-squared 0.105     
Number of country-pairs 395 395 197 220 175 
Hausman test 146.22***     
Over-identifying restrictions test (p-value)  0.29 0.19 0.29 0.39 
Time fixed effects No  No  No  No  No 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-Taylor 
model: lagged relative market size, lagged log sum real GDP, lagged oil and minerals rents, lagged fuel, ores & metals exports, lagged domestic 
credit to GDP, lagged control of corruption index, lagged log bilateral exchange rate, lagged electricity infrastructure index, bilateral investment 
treaty and internal armed conflict dummy. Time- varying exogenous regressors: lagged relative factor endowment, lagged surrounding market 
potential and lagged trade openness. Time-invariant endogenous regressor is log distance and time-invariant exogenous regressor is landlocked  
 
As seen from columns (3 and 4), the coefficients on relative factor endowment show a negative 
sign and statistically significant, supporting the market-seeking motivation for OECD 
investments. This outcome reflects the preferences of OECD investors for relatively more 
developed markets with higher GDP per capita for specific products and services, and enhanced 
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human capital capacity and higher quality infrastructure in host economies in order to produce 
relatively more technologically intensive products (see Antonakakis and Tondl, 2015). The 
finding partly supports the large inflow of FDI to South Africa from the EU over the period 
2001-2012, given the country‟s relatively high real GDP per capita, better quality infrastructure 
and human capital capacity than other countries in the region. As concerns the estimates of the 
non-resource rich economies in column (5), the coefficient on relative factor endowment also 
shows market-seeking motivations of bilateral FDI from the OECD countries to non-resource 
rich African countries.  
 
One needs to also explore empirically the behaviour of foreign investors from the OECD with 
respect to resource wealth. The coefficients on the measures of natural resource dependence 
reported in columns (3) and (4) show statistically significant and crowding-out impact on non-
resource seeking FDI. In another exercise of robustness checks on the determinants of bilateral 
FDI from the OECD, equation 2.3 is estimated by allowing for time fixed effects as presented in 
table 2.11. As shown in columns (3 and 4), the relative market size remains strongly positive, 
revealing that host resource rich countries are attractive destinations for FDI from the OECD. 
Similarly, column (5) shows strong positive coefficient on relative market size, suggesting that 
OECD investments are flowing to large non-resource rich countries.  The result in column (4) 
further shows a clear negative link between natural resource dependence and bilateral FDI from 




















Table 2.11: Determinants of OECD FDI to resource and non-resource rich countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables HT-RR HT-NRR HT-RR HT-RR HT-NRR 
Lagged log relative market size 2.875*** 2.182*** 2.069*** 2.333*** 1.268** 
 (0.501) (0.827) (0.676) (0.558) (0.567) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 3.208*** 3.608** 0.368 1.360 -1.144 
 (1.113) (1.797) (1.700) (1.655) (1.863) 
Lagged relative factor endowment -0.103** -0.064* -0.097** -0.144*** -0.071** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.048) (0.034) 
Lagged fuel, ores & metals exports   -0.005   
   (0.003)   
Lagged oil and mineral exports -0.033***   -0.033***  
 (0.010)   (0.010)  
Lagged surrounding market potential -0.020*** 0.065** -0.016 -0.021*** 0.049** 
 (0.005) (0.033) (0.011) (0.005) (0.020) 
Lagged log trade openness -0.003 0.002 -0.021*** -0.003 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bilateral investment treaty dummy 0.898*** -0.305 0.532* 0.729** -0.273 
 (0.332) (0.276) (0.321) (0.329) (0.318) 
Lagged log bilateral exchange rate -0.655*** -0.348 -0.733*** -0.472* -0.357** 
 (0.223) (0.425) (0.269) (0.246) (0.162) 
Lagged domestic credit to GDP 0.006 -0.012 0.005 0.002 -0.025 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) 
Lagged control of corruption index -0.181 -0.431 0.118 -0.070 -0.561 
 (0.263) (0.364) (0.262) (0.265) (0.351) 
Internal armed conflict dummy 0.121 -0.072 0.131 0.115 -0.036 
 (0.153) (0.234) (0.149) (0.159) (0.249) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index 0.001* 0.000 0.001** 0.001* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Landlocked dummy 9.225* -12.272 4.559* 6.145 -0.217 
 (4.909) (16.630) (2.446) (3.921) (1.294) 
Log distance -23.759 34.940 -4.160 -13.769 -1.452 
 (18.088) (42.904) (5.633) (14.525) (2.150) 
Constant 134.459 -388.251 38.121 98.127 55.110 
 (166.527) (371.135) (56.179) (134.988) (60.516) 
Observations 1,854 1,352 1,635 1,854 1,352 
Number of country-pairs 220 175 197 220 175 
Over-identifying restrictions test (p-value) 0.29 0.39 0.45 0.12 0.43 
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-Taylor 
model: lagged relative market size, lagged log sum real GDP, lagged oil and minerals rents, lagged fuel, ores & metals exports, lagged domestic 
credit to GDP, lagged control of corruption index, lagged log bilateral exchange rate, lagged electricity infrastructure index, bilateral investment 
treaty and internal armed conflict dummy. Time- varying exogenous regressors: lagged relative factor endowment, lagged surrounding market 
potential and lagged trade openness. The over-identifying restrictions test suggests that bilateral investment treaty, lagged log bilateral real 
exchange rate and lagged electricity infrastructure index are also exogenous in column (5). Time-invariant endogenous regressor is log distance 
and time-invariant exogenous regressor is landlocked dummy. 
 
 
Having determined how market size, resource-seeking and efficiency seeking considerations 
influence foreign investments from the different source economies, it is particularly interesting to 
determine whether there are differences in FDI behaviour between investors from intra-African 
economies and the OECD and non-OECD emerging market economies. As suggested in the 
literature, there are potential differences among investors from the different groups of economies 
due to differences in nationality, income levels and geographic location of source countries. The 
determinants of FDI can also differ across resource and non-resource rich countries because of 
differences in income and resource wealth across African countries. Along these lines, the 
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analysis above points to likely differences in FDI behaviour between intra-African investors and 
those from emerging markets and the OECD countries. While large markets and the presence of 
natural resources are important determinants of FDI from the different sources into resource rich 
economies, further evidence shows that intra-African investments are driven by efficiency-
seeking objectives. Looking at FDI into non-resource rich countries, the analysis suggests that 
FDI from the different sources are mostly attracted into destinations with large markets, while 
the availability of cheap labour increases the attractiveness of non-OECD emerging markets FDI 
to non-resource rich economies.   
 
To analyze these differences, we derive the marginal effects of relative market size, relative 
factor endowments and natural resource dependence separately from estimating equation (2.8):  
 
                             (                 (                          
                                                                      
            
            (2.8)                        
                 
Where     is a dummy variable coded 1, if FDI originates from emerging markets and zero if 
intra-African country, and     denotes a vector of control variables. The inclusion of the 
interaction terms implies that the marginal effects of the variables of interest depend on the 
respective coefficients without the interaction terms and coefficients on the interaction terms. For 
example, the marginal effect of one percent change in relative market size on FDI from intra-
African and emerging markets is given by: 
       
        
           
 
Meaningful conclusions about the differences between the groups of investors can be drawn 
from determining whether the estimated marginal effects are statistically different from zero 
(Brambor et al., 2006). Accordingly, the marginal effects of relative market size, natural 
resources and relative factor endowments are displayed table 2.12. As can be seen in column (2) 
for resource rich countries, there are significant difference between investors from non-OECD 
and Intra-African economies regarding natural resource availability in host countries. The 
combined coefficient (-0.055) is strongly negative, indicating the adverse effect of natural 
resource dependence on FDI as analyzed above. This difference is expected given that intra-
African FDI are mostly in manufacturing and services sectors, whereas investors from the non-
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OECD emerging markets have significant investments in extractive industries. The same 
explanation can be said for the significant differences in FDI behaviour between intra-African 
and OECD source countries with respect to the presence of natural resources (column 4). 
  
Table 2.12: Differences between Intra-African and Interregional FDI (marginal effects) 
 EME=0 EME=1 OECD=0 OECD=1 
Variable Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients 
Panel A: Resource Rich Countries     
























Panel B: Non-Resource rich countries 


















Note: Standard errors in parenthesis „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
The analysis further reveals significant differences in the influence of relative market size 
between intra-African and OECD FDI into both resource and non-resource-rich countries. The 
coefficient on relative market size in column (4) indicates an overall strong positive effect of 
relative market size on bilateral FDI from these source economies. Such differences could be 
explained by the fact that market-seeking FDI from the OECD are mostly attracted into 
destinations with relatively more developed markets, higher human capacity and better 
infrastructure for sustained demand for products, with technology that allows some of these 
goods to be produced locally. A typical example is the automobile industry in South Africa 
which assembles cars from some OECD countries. On the contrary, market-seeking FDI driven 
by intra-African investors is more oriented towards providing less technology intensive 
consumer products and services across African countries. This is evident in the expansion of 
retail groups such as Shoprite and Woolworths beyond South Africa to neighbouring countries 
and large markets in West Africa.  
 
Regarding the effect of relative factor endowments on bilateral FDI, it is shown in column (2) of 
table 2.12 for non-OECD emerging markets to resource rich countries and column (4) of OECD 
FDI to both resource and non-resource rich countries  that there are significant differences 
between FDI from intra-African and these sources. The results reveal an overall strong negative 
coefficient for relative factor endowment variable. This finding is in line with the Linder 
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hypothesis, which suggests that firms reveal a bias in FDI by directing such investments to host 
markets with income levels similar to their home markets (see Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 
2013; Fajgelbaum et al., 2015). Detailed results on the differences between the groups of 
investors are reported in appendix A2.4 and A2.5.   
     
As indicated in the trend analysis, South Africa is a leading destination of FDI to African 
economies. A useful extension of the analysis is to consider whether the factors driving FDI to 
South Africa are different from other host African countries. We analyze these differences with 
respect to the influences of relative market size, relative factor endowment and natural resources 
on bilateral FDI from the different source economies using equation 2.9: 
 
                            (                 (                         
                                                                    
             
            (2.9)       
where SA is a dummy variable coded 1 for South Africa and 0 for all other host African 
countries. To evaluate the marginal effects of relative market size, natural resources and relative 
factor endowments, the different sources of FDI are considered as presented in table 2.13. It is 
clear from column (2) that there are significant differences between FDI to South Africa and 
other African countries with respect to natural resources. The results reveal an overall significant 
negative influence on bilateral FDI to these countries. The significant difference is attributed to 
the differences in the nature of FDI from South Africa and other leading sources of these 
investments such as Kenya and Nigeria. It is worth noting that foreign investments from other 
African countries are mostly concentrated in producing consumer goods and services, while 
investors from South Africa have also invested in the extractive sectors of other African 
countries.    
  





Table 2.13: Differences between FDI to South Africa and other African countries (marginal effects) 
 Intra-African countries Non-OECD emerging 
markets economies 
OECD countries 
Variables SA=0 SA=1 SA=0 SA=1 SA=0 SA=1 
 Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 




















Lagged oil and 



























Note: Standard errors in parenthesis „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ denote significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
Results in column (6) show a significant difference between FDI from the OECD to South Africa 
and other African countries. The combined coefficient (4.392) suggests a strong positive effect 
of relative market size on these investments. As analyzed above, such a difference may be 
attributed to the fact that OECD FDI is directed towards well-developed host markets with 
enhanced skills capacity and infrastructure to ensure a sustainable demand for goods and 
services. It is seen also from column (4) that there is a significant difference between FDI to 
South Africa and other African countries originating from non-OECD emerging markets. The 
overall coefficient on relative factor endowment is strongly negative, which further reinforces 
the argument that foreign firms undertake investments in host markets with per capita GDP 




2.5.1 Dynamic Model Estimation 
      
 One of the estimation issues arising from the static panel data models analyzed above is that the 
persistent effects of FDI have not been captured, through the inclusion of the lagged FDI 
dependent variable as an additional explanatory variable. Such persistence arises mainly from 
two sources: lagged FDI which explains the slow adjustment of FDI over time and the time 
invariant country-pair effects (Egger and Merlo, 2007). A useful extension of the static panel 
data analysis to capture such persistence is to estimate a dynamic panel data model of bilateral 
FDI stocks, which in its logarithm form is specified in equation (2.10): 
                                          
      ,                      (2.10) 
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  is a     vector of the explanatory variables and   is a     vector of parameters to be 
estimated and   is the adjustment coefficient. The explanatory variables in the vector     
  may be 
correlated with the unobserved country specific effects    . Equation (2.10) is characterized by 
the problem of endogeneity, induced by adding the lagged FDI variable. As such, the OLS 
estimation of this equation will produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. 
 
 As noted above, using the fixed effects model to estimate equation (2.10) in which the 
dependent variable is FDI stock translates into using net FDI flows. While the estimation of the 
fixed effects model eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity effects    in equation (2.10), it also 
produces biased estimates through correlation between the differenced lagged dependent variable 
and the error process. These limitations are addressed in the empirical literature through the 
estimation of dynamic panel data models. Specifically, two approaches are widely used in 
analyzing FDI: the first differenced generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Arelano 
and Bond, 1991) and the system GMM approach (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 
1998).  
 
The difference GMM approach involves first differencing the series and then applying the lagged 
values of the endogenous variables as instruments (see Asiedu, 2013). The estimation of the first-
differenced GMM is, however, confronted with potential problems of weak instruments and 
correlation between the differenced lagged dependent variable and the error term. There is 
consensus in the literature that the lagged levels of the endogenous variables are not appropriate 
instruments for the first differenced variables. Attempts to address these problems have led to the 
estimation of the system GMM. This approach alleviates these problems by including additional 
moment conditions. However, the system GMM relies on very restrictive assumptions, which are 
not tenable especially when bilateral FDI stock is used as the dependent variable. The system 
GMM assumes that the dependent variable is characterized by a stationary mean process at the 
start of the period and the explanatory variables (in levels) are not correlated with the disturbance 
term (see Egger and Merlo, 2007). As noted, some of the host country characteristics are more 
likely to be correlated with the unobserved country specific effects    . Similarly, taking bilateral 
FDI stock as the dependent variable, is not likely to exhibit a stationary process at the initial time 
period, since stocks are derived as accumulated FDI flows over a period of time. Along these 
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lines, the first-differenced GMM model is estimated, while the relevant tests of second order 
serial correlation and validity of the instruments are conducted to determine whether the model is 
correctly formulated. Table 2.14 presents the parameter estimates of the first differenced-GMM 
model and associated diagnostic statistics using the two-step approach.  
 
Table 2.14: First difference GMM using two-step estimation 
 (1) (2) 
Variables   
   
Lagged FDI stock 0.611*** 0.624*** 
 (0.032) (0.035) 
Log relative market size 0.585** 0.919*** 
 (0.253) (0.274) 
Log sum real GDP 1.278*** 1.763*** 
 (0.307) (0.369) 
Relative factor endowment -0.009 -0.014 
 (0.016) (0.020) 
Oil and mineral rents -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Surrounding market potential -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Trade openness  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Ratio of domestic credit to GDP -0.016*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Control of corruption index -0.261* -0.429*** 
 (0.137) (0.154) 
Volatility in bilateral real exchange rate 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Electricity infrastructure index 0.086** 0.071 
 (0.036) (0.068) 
Bilateral investment treaty dummy  0.574 0.656 
 (0.418) (0.412) 
Observations 4,481 4,481 
Wald test (    1083.62 1223.45 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
AR (1) test -6.72 -6.73 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) test 0.48 0.70 
p-value 0.631 0.482 
J-test-  (     576.58  
p-value 0.169  
J-test-  (      582.96 
p-value  0.109 
Number of country-pairs 687 687 
Time effects No  Yes 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 
1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Endogenous regressors: one-period lagged dependent 
variable, log of relative market size, log sum of real GDP, relative factor endowment, oil and mineral rents, trade openness, 
domestic credit to the private sector to GDP, control of corruption index and bilateral investment treaty dummy. 
Exogenous variables: volatility in bilateral real exchange rate, electricity infrastructure index, surrounding market potential 
and time dummies. AR (1) and AR (2) test for 1st and 2nd order serial correlation respectively. The p-values of the Hansen-J 
test are used to test for over-identifying restrictions in the estimation.  
 
 
In estimating the first differenced GMM, a set of explanatory variables are treated as endogenous 
such as one-period lagged dependent variable, log of relative market size, log sum of real GDP, 
relative factor endowment, oil and mineral rents, trade openness, domestic credit to the private 
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sector to GDP, control of corruption index and bilateral investment treaty dummy as potentially 
endogenous. On the other hand, volatility in bilateral real exchange rate, electricity infrastructure 
index, surrounding market potential and time dummies are treated as exogenous variables. As 
can be seen from columns (1) and (2), the Wald test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the 
explanatory variables are not jointly significant. The tests for serial correlation suggest the 
presence of first order serial correlation as expected, but the absence of second order serial 
correlation. In order words, the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no second order 
serial correlation. Similarly, the probability value of the Hansen-J test confirms the validity of 
the instruments. In both models displayed in columns (1) and (2), the Hansen‟s test of over-
identifying restrictions cannot reject the hull hypothesis that the instruments are valid. These 
diagnostic tests suggest that the estimated models are well formulated. 
 
Looking at the parameter estimates in both columns (1) and (2) of table 2.14, the coefficients on 
the first lagged FDI variable has the expected positive sign and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. The result underscores the importance of the persistent effects of FDI in estimating 
gravity models involving FDI stock. This finding confirms that the GMM estimator is a useful 
strategy to analyze the drivers of these investments in host markets. The result implies that FDI 
in the previous year plays a significant role in influencing decisions of potential investors. One 
could partly attribute these persistent effects to sunk costs of FDI. Firms investing in African 
countries often incur large initial capital outlay, especially in the exploration and extraction of 
minerals and these investments persist for years. The findings are consistent with previous 
studies on bilateral FDI (see e.g. Egger and Merlo, 2007; Dauti, 2015).  
 
The estimates of the difference GMM for our variables of interest, that is, relative market size 
and oil and mineral rents (% of GDP) in both columns (1) and (2), are remarkably consistent 
qualitatively with those of  the static panel data model (Hausman-Taylor model) analyzed above. 
The coefficient of relative market size and sum of real GDP of host and source countries are 
strongly positive as expected, supporting the hypothesis that FDI into host African markets are 
market-seeking. Similarly, the estimates on oil and minerals variable provide support for the 
hypothesis that natural resources have an adverse effect on FDI to host resource rich countries. 
However, the coefficient on relative factor endowment is not statistically significant in both 
models, estimated without and with time fixed effects (columns 1 and 2 respectively).  




To shed light on the specifications of the model, the results of the first-differenced GMM 
estimation are compared with those obtained from the Hausman-Taylor model analyzed above. 
As can be seen from these results, the estimation of the first-differenced GMM model does not 
materially change the results of the Hausman-Taylor model analyzed above. This is an indication 
that the Hausman-Taylor models analyzed above are not likely to have been misspecified (see 
Plosser et al, 1982).  However, it is important to note that the results of the first-differenced 
GMM estimation are only based on the full sample of bilateral FDI from the different source 
economies to host African countries. The sample was not disaggregated further into the three 
sub-groups - intra-African, non-OECD and OECD countries- due to the limited observations for 




Turning to the control variables in columns (1) and (2) of table 2.14, the results surprisingly 
display strong negative impact of the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP) 
variable on bilateral FDI to African economies. One may attribute this finding to the 
underdeveloped nature of the financial sector in most African economies such that some source 
countries have invested in banks to facilitate investments in the region. This is clearly the case 
with respect to China‟s investment in Standard Bank of South Africa to promote its investments 
in the African continent. The result is in line with previous studies (e.g. Anyanwu, 2012). In a 
similar way, the coefficient on control of corruption is strongly negative. The implication of this 
finding is already discussed above.  
 
As for exchange rate volatility, proxied by the standard deviation of bilateral real exchange rate, 
the results clearly reveal a positive and statistically significant impact on bilateral FDI. This 
finding could be explained by the market-seeking nature of FDI in host markets, to the extent 
that volatility in the exchange rate encourages these investments. The remaining control 
variables, trade openness, surrounding market potential, electricity infrastructure index and 
bilateral investment treaty dummy are not significant.  
 
                                                          
15
 To conduct the tests for autocorrelation and validity of the instruments, it is useful to ensure that the ratio of the 
cross section sample size (number of country-pairs) to the number of instruments is at least 1. The assumptions 
underlying these tests are violated when this requirement is not met (see Asiedu, 2013).   
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Overall, the results are consistent with the hypotheses of the study. In both static panel and 
dynamic panel estimation techniques, relative market size showed the expected strong positive 
impact on bilateral FDI from the different groups of economies. Countries with natural resource 
endowments were attractive destinations of resource-seeking FDI from the different groups of 
investors, although these investments undermine non-resource seeking-FDI in host economies. 
The results further reveal significant differences in the nature of market-seeking and resource-
seeking FDI between investors from African economies and the OECD. The results also show 
significant differences in resource-seeking FDI between intra-African investors and those from 
non-OECD emerging market economies. The existence of low labour costs is an important factor 
driving non-OECD FDI into non-resource rich countries. The results further demonstrate 
significant differences between the drivers of FDI to South Africa and other African countries.  
These findings suggest that there is heterogeneity in the motivations and determinants of FDI 
among investors from the different groups of economies into host African countries.  
 
2.6. Conclusion  
 
This study has investigated whether FDI from the different groups of economies, categorized 
into the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), non-OECD 
emerging markets and intra-African economies are driven by market-seeking, resource-seeking 
and efficiency-seeking objectives into African countries. Previous studies have looked at the 
determinants of FDI into African countries using aggregate data on inward FDI stocks or flows, 
and have not considered the heterogeneous nature of these investments. There is also hardly any 
empirical evidence on whether there are differences in the determinants of FDI into host African 
countries among investors from the different source countries. By exploiting recent data on 
bilateral FDI stock (UNCTAD, 2014), this study has tackled the issue of source and host country 
heterogeneity in explaining the determinants of FDI into resource rich and non-resource rich 
African countries.  
 
This study contributes to the empirical literature by providing evidence on the specific factors 
that influence FDI from the different groups of economies into resource-rich and non-resource 
rich African countries. It further attests to the differences in the determinants of FDI between 
intra-African investors and those from the OECD and non-OECD emerging markets. In the same 
way, we determine whether there are significant differences between the factors driving FDI to 
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South Africa and other African countries. These issues were interrogated in order to determine 
which investments are most likely to be market-seeking and efficiency-seeking, which arguably 
generate stronger growth impact than resource-seeking FDI in host countries. In spite of its 
diversity in resource endowments, the African continent has received only a limited share of 
global FDI inflows in the past few decades, compared to Asia and Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the developing world.  
 
The analysis has shown that market size of host countries and availability of natural resources 
are important factors attracting FDI from intra-African, OECD and non-OECD emerging 
markets economies into resource rich African countries. It further suggests that FDI from OECD 
and non-OECD emerging markets economies are mostly encouraged by the market size of host 
non-resource rich countries, as well as lower labour costs for non-OECD emerging markets 
economies, while FDI from intra-African countries are explained by large markets in these 
economies. Although the presence of natural resources attracts resource-seeking FDI in the 
extractive industries, the analysis demonstrates that these investments tend to undermine non-
resource seeking FDI. The study further reveals significant differences in determinants of FDI 
between intra-African and non-OECD emerging markets‟ investors regarding the presence of 
natural resources in resource-rich countries and market size in non-resource rich countries. The 
result provide support that there are significant differences between intra-African and OECD 
investors in terms of market size and availability of natural resources in resource-rich countries 
and markets size in non-resource rich countries. The results further show significant differences 
between South Africa and other African countries in the drivers of FDI to these countries.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that FDI from the different groups of economies can be enhanced 
through policy measures that encourage market-seeking FDI into both resource rich and resource 
poor countries. Along these lines, host countries can encourage market-seeking FDI through the 
implementation of measures such as targeted economic incentives that facilitate FDI into 
manufacturing and high productivity services sectors. Also, policies designed to encourage 
market-determined wages can also boost non-OECD FDI into non-resource rich countries.  
  
It is important to note that the analysis is based on FDI stock data disaggregated at the bilateral 
level and not sectoral level due to unavailability of such data at the time of analysis. It would be 
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helpful in future research to consider the factors driving FDI to various sectors when data 











Physical Capital, Skill Intensity and Ownership Structure in FDI projects 
 
 3.1 Introduction  
 
 
What drives foreign direct investment (FDI) activity has been a central question of great 
importance to academics and policymakers. The growing interest in understanding these 
determinants is evidenced by the burgeoning literature on firms‟ ownership of productive assets, 
which explains why firms undertake production of some goods in-house, such as intermediate 
inputs than through market transactions (see e.g. Alfaro et al, 2015; Antras, 2003; Antras, 2013; 
Antras and Chor, 2013; Antras and Helpman, 2004; Antras and Yeaple, 2014). As multinationals 
invest abroad, they have to make important decisions regarding their ownership structure, 
determining whether to establish subsidiaries through wholly-owned foreign affiliates or joint 
venture ownership with domestic firms in host countries (Raff et al., 2009). This is so because 
such ownership decisions have an important influence on the incentive of parties to devote 
resources to FDI projects (Asiedu and Esfhani, 2001) and the extent of knowledge and 
technology transfer from foreign affiliates to local agents. Joint ventures with local firms have 
been advocated as an important ownership structure that enhances technology diffusion in host 
countries, as increased participation of local agents in FDI projects will enable multinationals to 
reveal their proprietary knowledge, thereby facilitating spillovers (Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 
1999).
16
 Given the importance of joint ventures to host countries, establishing how the relative 
input investments of foreign and local firms affect their ownership decisions is helpful for 
understanding the sectors through which host countries can leverage FDI to boost productivity 
growth.  
 
In trying to understand how relative input contributions of foreign firms and input supplying 
firms affect trade flows, most empirical studies have tackled this issue using the framework of 
property rights theory of the firm, to determine which goods are more likely to be traded within 
the boundaries of the firm rather than through market transactions. Pioneered by Antras (2003), 
                                                          
16
 Another strand of literature has emphasized that domestic firms benefit from superior foreign technology through 
licensing (see Nguyen et al, 2014).  
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this strand of literature on intra-firm trade flows suggests that there is greater propensity for 
foreign producing firms and input supplying firms to integrate through capital-intensive 
industries than labour-intensive production. This is so given that investments in physical capital 
are more easily shared than investments in human capital which are inalienable (see Antras, 
2003). Given the features of these investments, there is reduced incentive for the parties to invest 
in human capital as they attempt to avoid potential holdup problem. Along these lines, this 
literature predicts that the firms will engage in vertically integrated production, when the 
contribution of headquarter firm through physical capital is more important than human capital 
investment undertaken by input supplying firm. On the other hand, outsourcing relationship will 
exist when human capital is relatively more important than physical capital investments. One 
would, therefore, argue that there is greater likelihood of integration in FDI projects that more 
intensively use physical capital of the headquarter firm than human capital provided by domestic 
firms.   
 
While there is overwhelming evidence suggesting that FDI through intra-firm trade flows is 
mostly undertaken in capital-intensive industries (e.g. Antras, 2003; Antras and Yeaple, 2014; 
Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 2013), these studies have not explicitly 
investigated how relative input investments of foreign and local firms affect foreign equity 
ownership. Most empirical studies have largely explored the role of host country institutions and 
other characteristics in explaining ownership structure of firms (see e.g. Asiedu and Esfahani, 
2001; Driffield et al., 2014; Grande and Teixeira, 2012; Meyer et al., 2009). One of the few 
empirical studies, Lee (2014) has examined how the skill intensity of Korean workers influences 
the ownership structure of Korean affiliates.  
  
This study focuses on a different research issue, determining the sectors through which foreign 
subsidiaries can integrate local firms in FDI projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Given this objective, 
the study makes a distinctive contribution to the debate by investigating the question of whether 
these firms are more likely to integrate in capital-intensive activities than labour-intensive 
activities in these economies. Investigating these issues is particularly relevant to the debate on 
ownership decisions of firms for a region that has received few spillovers from FDI and little 
attention in the empirical literature on the integrating decisions of these firms. Partly due to 
structural reforms undertaken by most countries in recent years, the sub-Saharan Africa is now 
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relatively more open to foreign equity ownership than other regions of the world (see World 
Bank, 2010). One would, therefore, expect that local firms will actively participate in FDI 
projects following the removal of most barriers to FDI in host economies. Consequently, recent 
years have seen an increase in FDI in high technology sectors, particularly driven by joint 
ventures between domestic firms and transnational corporations (UNIDO, 2011). It is also 
evident that foreign affiliates use physical capital more intensively that human capital, compared 
to domestic firms with local managers having absolute control over recruitment decisions in 
these enterprises (UNIDO, 2011). This presupposes that physical capital can proxy the input 
investment of foreign affiliates in FDI projects while domestic firms contribute through human 
capital. Given these facts, one may hypothesize that there is greater likelihood of integration of 
local firms in FDI projects through capital intensive sectors. Due partly to relatively 
underdeveloped financial markets, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have had to rely largely 
on foreign capital injections through FDI to boost domestic investment. One can also argue that 
local firms have better knowledge of the market conditions in host countries. This explains why 
local managers largely control matters of recruitment. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
empirical work that has investigated how input investments influence ownership decisions of 
foreign subsidiaries and local firms in sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
In order to explain this relationship, the study uses a rich large firm-level data on 19 countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa region, which was collected by the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) in 2010. The analysis is restricted to manufacturing and services firms. 
This allows us to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the integrating decisions of firms in 
non-resource extractive industries. Applying different estimation techniques, particularly the 
fractional logit and probit models, the results provide strong evidence suggesting that foreign 
affiliates and local firms are more likely to integrate in capital-intensive sectors and less likely in 
labour-intensive sectors.  
 
The next section reviews the literature on equity ownership and the intensity of inputs of foreign 
firms and local partners. The model explaining the theoretical predictions of the underlying 
relationship is derived in section 3. The empirical results are analyzed in section 4 and section 5 
provides a summary of the chapter.  
 
   
76 
 
   3.2 Literature Review 
 
The question of why some activities are undertaken within the boundaries of firm and others 
through market transactions has been a major research issue in economics literature (see 
Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007; Kohler and Smolka, 2015). A 
seminal work on firm boundaries (Coase, 1937) argues that there are efficiency gains arising 
from the coordination of production activities within the firm rather than through market 
transactions. This paper suggests that transactions will be coordinated within the firm when it 
becomes less costly to undertake these transactions than through the market mechanism. 
Following Coase (1937), there has been growing literature on different approaches to the 
internalization decision of multinational firms. Two leading theories of vertical integration in the 
literature on firm boundaries are the transaction cost theory and property rights theory 
(Acemoglu et al., 2010; Antras, 2015; Du et al., 2012). These theories provide insights into the 
transaction costs arising from contractual frictions between parties and how these costs can be 
mitigated depending on the organizational modes. In this section, we review the relevant 
literature on these theories while focusing largely on the property rights theory.  
 
The transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1971, 1979; Klein et al., 1978) suggests that the 
presence of incomplete contracts and asset specificity affect the decisions of parties to engage 
into long-term contracts and their choice between keeping activities within the firm or through 
market transactions. This theory claims that an important source of transaction cost is the hold-
up problem, as each party attempts to take advantage of the sunk costs or specific nature of 
investments that characterize the relationship. Generally, it is practically impossible for the 
parties to write long-term contracts that cover all contingencies arising from a relationship. When 
contracts are incomplete, there is a potential hold-up problem arising from the parties to 
undertake investments in assets that are specific to a relationship. This generates quasi-rents and, 
as a result, each of the parties has greater incentive to leverage these rents (Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007).
17
 Specifically, the presence of ex post quasi-rents increases the incentives of the parties to 
engage in optimistic behavior. This affects the execution of long-term contracts. As a result, 
                                                          
17
 Ex post quasi-rents implies that the value of the relationship- specific investments is greater in the relationship 
than outside the relationship (Whinston, 2003).  
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there are potential hold-up inefficiencies arising from such transactions, partly due to potential 
underinvestment in the specific assets of the relationship.  
 
One could explain the hold-up problems arising from a relationship-specific investment using an 
example of a final good producer and an input supplying firm (see e.g. Aghion and Holden, 
2011; Antras, 2003; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Johnson and Houston, 2000). Assume that 
the input supplier makes specific investments in the relationship, specialized intermediate inputs 
are produced which are subsequently delivered to a final good producer. The foreign producer 
can renegotiate contracts for concessions regarding the price or quantity of the inputs produced 
by the supplying firm. It follows that the input supplying firm is exposed to a holdup problem 
once the specific investments are sunk into producing the specialized inputs. The input supplying 
firm therefore faces a relatively weak bargaining power following its relationship-specific 
investments (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). Anticipating such a problem, the supplier of the 
intermediate input will be less incentivized to make asset-specific investments in order to 
produce the efficient quantity of these inputs. Similarly, the buyer is exposed to potential hold-up 
problem when the cost of switching to a new supplier is very high (Johnson and Houston, 2000).  
 
To mitigate the hold-up problem, the transaction cost theory suggests that the supplying firm 
should be vertically integrated into the foreign firm. Such an integration decision allows each 
contracting parties claims to the quasi-rents generated from their investments in specific assets. 
This theory predicts that vertical integration is more likely when there is greater asset specificity 
and costly holdup problem, and vertical integration enhances investments undertaken by the 
contracting parties (Acemoglu et al., 2010). While the transaction cost theory enhances our 
understanding on transaction costs from market transactions in the presence of incomplete 
contracts, the theory is, however, silent on the nature of such costs within the firm. This raises 
further questions on the costs of vertical integration and how hold-up inefficiencies are 
mitigated.     
 
Building on the premises of contract incompleteness and relationship-specific investments of the 
transaction cost theory, the property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990) claims that the allocation of ownership rights of asset can mitigate hold-up inefficiencies 
in a relationship. In the theoretical analysis, Grossman and Hart (1986) emphasize the costs and 
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benefits of vertical integration as ownership rights of assets changes ex-ante investment 
incentives of the contracting parties. This theory predicts that it is optimal to allocate asset 
ownership to the party making relationship-specific investments that are more important to 
generating the surplus from the relationship. With such an ownership structure, the owner 
making more productive investments (final-good producer) is more incentivized to undertake 
these investments and has relatively strong bargaining power in all contingencies. In contrast, the 
supplying firm has insufficient incentive to make similar investments and relatively lower 
bargaining power, resulting in underinvestment and consequently generating a lower surplus in 
the relationship. This suggests that there are opposite effects of the relative input investments of 
foreign producers and input suppliers on integration decisions. The net benefits of vertical 
integration, therefore, depend on the relative importance of the investments of the foreign 
producer and input supplier to generate the surplus from the relationship (Acemoglu et al., 2010). 
These predications imply that vertical integration does not necessarily eliminate holdup 
inefficiencies in the context of the property rights theory. This brings to mind a further question 
on the mechanisms through which these inefficiencies are mitigated.   
 
In explaining how the holdup inefficiencies can be reduced, Antras (2003) proposes a model in 
which cost sharing with the final good producer alleviates the holdup problem facing the input 
supplying. This framework suggests that the problem is mitigated by allowing the final good 
producer to contribute to the relationship-specific investments of the supplying firm. Although 
such a cost- sharing investment also exposes the producer to potential holdup problem, Antras 
(2003) argues that such a problem is mitigated by assigning ownership rights of assets to the 
producer when cost sharing is sufficiently large. In this sense, the input supplying firm will be 
vertically integrated into production. Conversely, it is optimal to outsource when the contribution 
of the producer to the specific investments of the supplying firm is minimal. This suggests that 
the supplying firm has greater ownership rights of the assets. Other studies suggest that the 
allocation of ownership in a joint venture provides incentives to the contracting parties and 
encourage relationship-specific investments (e.g. Cui, 2010).  
 
The predictions of Antras (2003) are directly related to the relationship being investigated on 
FDI projects in sub-Saharan Africa. It is useful to start from the premise that non-contractible 
investments in physical capital capture the relative contribution of foreign producers and the 
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local partner through education and training of the local workforce. It is also plausible to assume 
that a foreign producer incurs additional investment costs through its contribution to education 
and training of the local workforce. Because investments in physical capital are arguably more 
important than labour services in the sub-Saharan African context and given that investment-
sharing is costly, it is optimal to allocate the residual ownership rights to the foreign producer. 
This implies that the foreign producer has greater incentive to invest in physical capital under 
vertical integration, while the local producer is more incentivized to invest in the local workforce 
under nonintegration or arm‟s length transactions.  It follows then that foreign affiliates are more 
likely to engage in integrated production when there is greater physical capital intensity and 
lower the skill intensity of the local workforce. 
 
There are few studies that have considered an integrated approach that combines physical capital 
and knowledge capital in explaining lateral integration decisions (e.g. Chen et al., 2012; 
Markusen and Xie, 2014). It is predicted in these works that knowledge-capital intensive firms 
undertake FDI and physical capital-intensive firms choose outsourcing. These predictions are 
relevant for investigating the underlying relationship in this study. The theoretical analysis of this 
study assumes that the owner of physical assets also owns knowledge capital of the firm. This 
implies that foreign affiliates can protect proprietary knowledge through vertically integrated 
production.  
 
The empirical studies on the application of the property rights theory in explaining FDI 
determinants can be broadly grouped into studies that have examined the behaviour of FDI 
through intra-firm trade flows (e.g. Antras, 2003; Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 
2013; Antras and Yeaple, 2014) and few studies that have explicitly considered FDI through 
backward integration (Acemoglu et al., 2010) and equity ownership (Lee, 2014). In Antras 
(2003), vertical integration is proxied by the share of intra-firm imports in total US imports. The 
results of this study show that physical capital intensity, proxied by the ratio of capital stock to 
employment, is positively correlated with the share of intra-firm imports. There is however no 
statistically significant relationship between human capital intensity (proxy for relationship-
specific investments of supplying firm) and intra-firm imports. Applying Antras‟ (2003) 
framework, a number of studies have investigated the role of headquarter intensities, proxied by 
physical capital intensity, skill intensity and R&D intensity in determining firms‟ integration 
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versus outsourcing decisions (e.g. Antras and Yeaple, 2014; Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Nunn 
and Trefler, 2013).  These studies find that intra-firm trade is larger when headquarter intensity is 
high.   
 
 In a similar vein, Acemoglu et al. (2010) consider a sample of UK manufacturing firms to 
determine how the relative importance of the technology intensities of foreign producers and 
input suppliers affect their decision to engage in backward vertical integration.  The study finds 
that the likelihood of vertical integration increases in the technology intensity of the producer 
and decreases with the technology intensity of the supplier. Studies that have considered the role 
of skill-workers in determining ownership structure of FDI are rare. One of the few studies on 
the role of headquarter intensity in determining ownership structure (Lee, 2014) uses the share of 
Korean workers transferred from the parent to the affiliate as proxy for headquarter intangible 
assets. The study shows that equity ownership increases with the share of Korean affiliates. 
Capital intensity is found to be negatively associated with ownership share, which is attributed to 
the relative importance of the contribution of the local partner to physical capital intensity of the 
affiliates.  
 
One potential problem with investigating the relative input contributions of the parties in 
determining integration decisions of firms is the issue of measuring relationship-specific 
investments or non-contractibility of these inputs. Recent literature emphasizes the importance of 
non-contractibility of headquarter inputs in investigating the underlying relationships (e.g. 
Antras, 2013; Antras and Yeaple, 2014; Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 2013). In 
this strand of literature, the standard measure of physical capital intensity of headquarter, proxied 
by total capital stock to total employment (Antras, 2003), is an imperfect proxy for headquarter 
intensity. Total capital stock comprises investments that are easily contractible and are therefore 
not relationship-specific, such as capital expenditures on structure or non-specialized equipment 
(e.g. automobiles and computers) which are valuable outside the relationship. This suggests that 
investments in machinery or specialized equipment are more relationship-specific and a better 
proxy for non-contractibility of headquarter input in testing the predictions of the property rights 
theory. The empirical evidence supports these predictions as it reveals a significant and positive 
relationship between machinery or equipment intensity and intra-firm trade, while non-
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specialized investments show a negative association (Antras and Yeaple, 2014; Fernandes and 
Tang, 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 2013).   
 
To conclude, the literature shows a clear relationship between FDI and the relative input 
investment contributions of foreign affiliates and local firms. This study tests the hypothesis that 
local firms are more likely to be integrated in capital-intensive production and less likely in 




The following framework is concerned with modelling the relationship between equity 
ownership and the relative input contributions of foreign affiliates and local firms in FDI 
projects. This framework closely follows Cui (2010) with one modification. In Cui (2010), which 
is an extension of Antras and Helpman (2004), the final-good variety is produced using 
relationship-specific inputs of the headquarter and manufactured components of supplying firms. 
Given the relatively limited industrial capacities of most sub-Saharan African countries, this 
study follows Antras (2003) and argues that local firms can contribute through labour services.  
In this framework, the foreign affiliate undertakes relationship-specific investments in physical 
capital and local firms through education and training of the local workforce.   
 
To develop the model, this framework further assumes a world with two countries, North and 
South, which is populated by a unit of consumers with identical preferences represented by: 
                                                               
 
 
∑   
  
   ,          (3.1) 
where    denotes consumption of a homogenous good and    is an index of aggregate 
consumption in j industries, which is specified as a CES function: 
                                                                [∫  (  
   ]
 
 ⁄              (3.2)                            
 Within a given industry, the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be high between industries 
(inter-industry) such that      There are location advantages associated with producing in the 
South, with wages in the South assumed to be lower than those in the North (        These 
wages are considered to be fixed in both countries. With fixed allocation of labour in both 
countries, total labour income would also be fixed. This yields an inverse demand function from 
utility maximization as shown in equation (3.3): 
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                                                                    (     
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         (3.3) 
There are two agents: foreign producer (N) and local agent or partner (A). Assume that a location 
decision has been taken by the foreign producer to produce the good in the host country (South). 
Following the literature on firm heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003; Antras and Helpman, 2004), the 
framework assumes that only the most productive foreign firms can cover the fixed costs of 
investing in the South. Suppose that the firm-specific productivity parameter is  , below which 
the foreign firms cannot cover the fixed costs. The contribution of the firms through physical 
capital investments can either be undertaken by the foreign firm or local agent or both. For 
simplicity, assume those investments are undertaken by the foreign producer who also initially 
owns the knowledge in producing the good. The technology takes the following form: 
                                                     (    (
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where    is the intensity of physical capital, which denotes the relative contribution of 
investments of foreign affiliates in physical capital to labour services, and      the relative 
input intensity of local firms (labour inputs). Revenue (R) generated from the product is obtained 
from equations 3.3 and 3.4 as: 
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The foreign producer decides on the organizational form, that is, whether to engage in FDI 
through the integration of local firms in production or outsourcing (non-integration). When 
outsourcing is considered, the foreign firm and local firm exist as separate entities with the 
foreign firm producing with its inputs   (   and the local firm producing using own labour 
services   (  . Antras and Helpman (2004) argue that the fixed organizational cost of vertical 
integration is greater than outsourcing. This is partly attributed to organizational costs associated 
with supervision of production by managerial staff. Letting V and   denote integrated 
production and outsourcing respectively, the organizational costs can be ranked as      .  
  
In Cui‟s (2010) theoretical analysis, the integrating firm can either be solely owned by foreign 
affiliates or through joint venture ownership. In the case of wholly-owned foreign affiliate, the 
foreign producer owns both    (   and   (  . Production of the final good is completely 
controlled by the foreign producer and the local partner can be fired when there is no agreement. 
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The foreign producer is, however, exposed to an output loss of       (Cui, 2010). This loss 
arises from the fact that the foreign producer cannot effectively use labour inputs   (   in the 
absence of the local agent (Antras and Yeaple, 2014). Let    denote sole ownership under 
integrated production and   (            be the revenue generated when there is an agreement 
between the contracting parties. If the foreign producer and local producer break up, the foreign 
producer can only sell a proportion   of the output   (  , that is,      (  . Given the CES 
preferences and constant markup   ⁄ , revenue accruing to the foreign producer amounts 
to     (   (Nunn and Trefler, 2013). In the ex-post bargaining, the share of revenue received by 
each contracting party comprises the ex-post surplus from the relationship and their outside 
option (Antras and Yeaple, 2014; Cui, 2010). In this context, the foreign producer will receive an 
outside option    
   (   and ex-post surplus from the relationship of (  (      
   (  )  
(     
    (   while the outside option of the local producer is zero.  
 
In the case of joint ventures, the inputs   (   and   (   are collectively owned by the foreign 
producer and local partner. The parties can liquidate the physical assets of the integrating firm in 
the outside asset market when the relationship ends and the revenue generated is distributed 
according to their equity share. Assume that the equity share of the foreign producer is    and the 
local partner    . If the foreign producer and local partner break up, the human assets of the 
parties will no longer be accessible to both parties. Consequently, the output loss is assumed to 
be greater in a joint venture than in the wholly-owned enterprise (                is revenue 
from the sale of physical assets in the outside market, expressed as a share of the output 
produced.  
 
Following the above propositions, the share of revenue (   accruing to the foreign producer 
under integrated production, comprising the ex-post surplus and the outside option is: 
 
                                                         (    (   
   [  (   
 ]     (3.6)         
        
When   (             . For     or 1,        . In the case of outsourcing, the outside 
option is zero and the revenue from the relationship is   (   such as the resulting revenue is the 
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value of    (  (         (   (Nunn and Trefler, 2013). Denoting       , the share of 
the revenue from outsourcing, it implies that      .  
 
From the property rights theory, the contracts between the foreign producer and local partners 
are assumed to be incomplete. The assumption of contract incompleteness introduces a distortion 
in the relationship. It suggests that the contracting parties cannot choose optimal levels of 
investment in their respective inputs, given that they are exposed to a holdup problem. The 
model further assumes that there is a large number of identical local partners engaged in 
production. Each of the local partners makes a lump-sum transfer T (participation fee) to the 
foreign producer upon entering the market. Competition among local partners ensures continuous 
adjustment in T so that the local partners can break-even (Antras, 2003). The participation fee T 
is non-negative or negative, implying that the local partner is not cash constrained (Cui, 2010).  
 
Given that the foreign producer cannot write enforceable contracts ex-ante, the parties have to 
bargain over the surplus of the relationship. This ex-post bargaining is assumed to follow a 
generalized Nash Bargaining, with the owner of the integrating firm (final-good producer) 
receiving a fraction of the surplus   [   ]. The foreign producer and local partner choose non-
contractible relationship-specific investments    (   and   (   independently such that the foreign 
producer uses own inputs   (   to maximize    (    
  (   and the local partner uses labour 
services   (   to maximize (      (    
  (  . Combining the profit expressions of the 
parties and using equation (3.5) yields total operating profit as: 
                                                 
(    (    ⁄   (    ⁄     
             (3.7) 
where    {   [    (     (   ]} [




(     
   
]
 (    ⁄
   (3.8) 
 
When the foreign producer chooses integrated production, the total profit from equation (3.7) is:  
                                                 
(    (    ⁄   (    ⁄     
        (3.9) 
 
Following standard derivations in the literature, the optimal fraction of the foreign producer‟s 
revenue which maximizes    in order to maximize profit is: 
                                                       
 (   
 (        √ (    (     (       
    
    (3.10) 
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 It follows from equation (3.10) that   
  increases in the investment contribution of the foreign 
producer     i.e. 
   
 
  
   and decreases in the local partner‟s investment contributions,    . In 
reality, the foreign producer observes adjustment in    through his equity share    (    . From 
equation (3.10), the foreign producer is only able to achieve the first-best share of revenue (  
    
if             . Given the prior assumption that           and using equation (3.6), 
the optimal equity share is derived in Cui (2010) as: 
                                            (  





        
  
   
(     
                              
  
  
   
(     
        
  
   
(     
  
       
  
   
(     
                            
    (3.11) 
 
It follows from equations (3.10) and (3.11) that the foreign producer will hold a greater equity 
share when these investments are relatively more important than the local partner in generating 
the surplus of the relationship. From equation (3.11), the foreign producer will choose sole 
ownership when the relative intensity of physical capital   is greater and close to 1. This 
suggests that ownership of physical assets and labour inputs should be assigned to the final 
producer when   is very high. In contrast, when labour services are more relevant to production 
of the final good (  is very low), it is optimal to assign ownership rights of assets to the local 
partner (outsourcing). Finally, joint venture ownership arises when    (  
 (    lies between zero 
and unity. Equation (3.11), therefore, provides the basis for empirical investigation of the 
relationship between equity ownership and the relative contribution of the investments of the 
foreign producers and local partners. This model allows us to determine which sectors are 
foreign and local firms more likely to integrate activities in FDI projects.  
 
3.4. Estimation Strategy 
  
This section describes the estimation strategy used in analyzing the relationship between equity 
ownership and the input contributions of foreign affiliates and local firms in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The theoretical framework derived in the previous section predicts opposing effects of physical 
capital intensity and skill intensity of the local workforce on the integration decisions of firms. 
To obtain an empirical model explaining this relationship, this study follows the standard 
approach in the literature, replacing the unobserved optimal equity share      (  
 (    specified 
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in equation (3.11) with a dummy variable (V) for integrated production. As a first step in 
establishing this relationship, a baseline specification is considered with the dependent variable, 
foreign equity ownership, measured as a dummy variable coded 1 if foreign firms choose either 
wholly-owned foreign affiliate or joint venture entity, and 0 for non-integration or locally owned 
firms.
18
 An integrated production structure confers appropriate incentives to the contracting 
parties and, therefore, generates a higher variable profit for the parties (Cui, 2010). This implies 
from equation (11) that the optimal equity share is   (     (  . Following the literature, the 
estimation strategy for integrated production is derived by adding a zero-mean random error term 
  to both sides of the inequality:   (       
 (      or    
 (     (         (see 
Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). If       follows a cumulative distribution function  (  , the 
probability of choosing integrated production is: 
                                        [ ]      [   ]   (        (3.12) 
Given that the dependent variable in equation (3.12) is an indicator variable, the underlying 
relationship can be estimated using a linear probability model and probit/logit approaches: 
                                        [   ]   (                 )          (3.13)   
 Where       is physical capital intensity for firm   in sector   and host country  ,        denotes 
the skill intensity of the local workforce, and      is a vector of control variables, such as other 
proxies for headquarter intensity (skill intensity of the foreign firms and research and 
development (R&D) intensity), and firm characteristics such as age and productivity.   
 
The literature uses physical capital intensity and human-capital intensity as proxies for the 
relationship-specific investment contributions of final-good producers and supplier firms, 
respectively (Antras, 2003). From equation (3.10), it follows that the decision to choose 
integrated production is greater when there is a higher intensity of headquarter services   and 
lower skill intensity of the local workforce.  
 
                                                          
18
 The classification of FDI into wholly-owned foreign affiliates and joint venture ownership is based on the 
approach adopted by UNIDO (2011), which defines wholly-owned foreign firms as those entities with foreign 
equity ownership exceeding 90 percent and joint venture ownership lying between 10 percent and 90 percent. 
Locally owned firms are those that have not attracted FDI i.e. zero foreign equity ownership.   
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In the intra-firm trade literature, physical capital intensity is measured as physical capital per 
employee (Antras, 2013; Bernard et al., 2010; Antras and Yeaple, 2014; Fernandes and Tang, 
2012). Following this literature, physical capital intensity is proxied by the ratio of fixed assets to 
total full time employees and total assets (current plus fixed assets) to total full time employees. 
There are generally two measures of skill intensity considered in the literature. For the first 
measure, skill intensity is proxied by the share of non-production workers in total employment 
(Berman et al., 1994).  Head and Ries (2002) use the share of the wage bill of high-skilled 
workers and log of average wage of the firm as measures of skill intensity. Depending on data 
availability, the empirical literature on intra-firm trade use both measures of skill intensity, with 
some studies considering Berman et al.‟s (1994) measure (Antras, 2003; Bernard et al, 2010) 
while others have used the measure developed by Head and Ries (2002) (e.g. Fernandes and 
Tang, 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 2013). In some specifications, human capital-intensity of the 
supplier firms is proxied by the ratio of non-production workers to production workers (Antras, 
2003) and ratio of non-production workers to total employment (Antras and Chor, 2013). 
However, these measures capture both the effects of headquarter skill intensity and the skill 
intensity of the local workforce on foreign equity ownership. Our data allows us to separately 
explore how human capital capacity of the local firms influences foreign equity ownership. 
Following Berman et al. (1994), the skill intensity of the local workforce is measured as the ratio 
of local staff employed in technical, managerial or supervisory positions to total full time 
employment.  
 
To control for the effects of other factors on the decision to choose integrated production, the 
specification in equation (3.13) includes other headquarter services such as foreign skill intensity 
and research and development (R&D) intensity. These variables are used as proxies for 
managerial inputs and R&D inputs of headquarter respectively (Nunn and Trefler, 2013). R&D 
intensity is proxied by the ratio of R&D expenditures over total sales. Foreign skill intensity is 
measured by the share of foreign technical and managerial/supervisory level staff in total full 
time employment. Similarly, to capture the characteristics of firms, some commonly used control 
variables are included in the model, such as productivity and the age of the firm.  The age of the 
firm captures the international experience of the subsidiary and is measured by the number of 
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years since the firm was established (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). Productivity is defined as total 
sales in the previous year divided by total number of full time employees in the previous year.   
 
3.5 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
The study uses firm-level survey data, Africa Investor Survey (2010), collected by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) on both local and foreign firms 
operating in 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The survey covers all private and public for-
profit firms with more than 10 employees, operating mainly in manufacturing and services 
sectors, but also in agriculture, mining and construction sectors (UNIDO, 2011). The data used 
covers manufacturing and services firms only, while agriculture, fishing, mining and quarrying 
sectors are excluded. It was collected based on a stratified sampling technique, using information 
on three dimensions or strata: sector, size and ownership. The enumerators collected firm 
information through face-to-face interviews with managers or top-level-management staff. The 
dataset provides information on the variables of interest, ownership structure of firms, 
employment composition and fixed assets, as well as control variables such as productivity and 
firm age, etc. Specifically, on employment composition, the dataset contains information on total 
number of full time employees, total number technical and managerial/ supervisory staff and the 
number of foreign staff employed in these positions. The data categorizes ownership structure of 
firms into wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, joint ventures and wholly-owned local firms. The 
total number of firms contained in the database is 6,492 firms. However, the data was restricted 
to cover manufacturing and services firms only, while omitting sectors such as agriculture and 
fishing, mining and quarrying. This reduces the sample size to 6133 firms, out of which 81 
percent are domestically owned firms, 12 percent wholly-owned foreign affiliates and joint 
venture firms slightly above 6 percent. 
  
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables considered in the 
regression. It is clear that the skill intensity of the firms‟ workforce is considerably low. On 
average, 16 percent of the local workforce of firms is skilled labour and 1.5 percent is foreign 
skilled workforce. The standard deviation of 0.71 and 0.19 for local and foreign skill intensity 
respectively suggest that there is reasonable variation in skill composition across firms. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Foreign ownership share (%) 19.605 1.935 
Local skill intensity (%)  16.210 0.712 
Foreign skill intensity (%)  1.529 0.191 
Physical capital intensity (US$/L) 93409.7 17761.43 
Ratio of R&D over sales (%) 4.219 1.823 
Firm productivity (US$/L) 77861.29     14502.68 
Firm age (years) 18.507 0.863 
 
The above literature review shows that physical capital intensity should be positively associated 
with foreign equity ownership and skill intensity of the local workforce negatively correlated 
with foreign equity ownership. To get some insights into the direction of the effect of the relative 
investment contributions of foreign affiliates and local firms on the integration decisions of 
firms, the correlations between the variables are analyzed. The correlations are displayed in table 
3.2. A look at these correlations suggests strong negative association between skill intensity of 
local workforce and ownership share of foreign affiliates. There is a strong positive association 
between foreign ownership share and headquarter intensity (foreign skill intensity and physical 
capital intensity). From these correlations, it is helpful to investigate empirically whether the 
underlying relationship between equity ownership and input contributions holds for sub-Saharan 
Africa countries. This is analyzed in the next section. 
 
Table 3.2: Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7          
1. Ownership 1       
2. Local skill intensity  -0.11* 1      
3. Foreign skill intensity 0.39* -0.10* 1     
4. Capital intensity 0.04* 0.01 0.01 1    
5. R&D intensity 0.00* 0.01 -0.02 0.00 1   
6. Firm productivity 0.10* -0.02 0.05* -0.00 -0.00 1  
7. Firm age -0.04* 0.00 -0.07* 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 1 
Note: „*‟ denotes significant at the 5 percent.  
 
To understand the analysis, it is helpful to present some stylized facts regarding foreign equity 
ownership and the input intensities of foreign affiliates and local firms. As noted, physical capital 
intensity is used as a proxy for relative investment contribution of foreign affiliates, while skill 
intensity of the local workforce is a proxy for investment contribution of local firms. Table 3.3 
presents country-level distribution of foreign equity ownership and physical capital intensity and 
skill intensity of the local workforce of firms. 
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Skill intensity of 
local workforce (%) 
Burkina Faso 12 25,689 25 
Burundi 21 31,260 28 
Cameroon 37 47,781 27 
Cape Verde 23 38,768 16 
Ethiopia 19 44,764 17 
Ghana 38 370,676 16 
Kenya 33 152,423 24 
Lesotho 40 6,562 16 
Madagascar 45 20,967 24 
Malawi 28 70,232 21 
Mali 25 117,213 22 
Mozambique 36 11,932 18 
Niger 11 160,270 33 
Nigeria 15 47,717 22 
Rwanda 35 30,348 23 
Senegal 31 128,080 28 
Tanzania 28 156,402 17 
Uganda 45 1,656,151 22 
Zambia 27 32,333 15 
Source: Own calculations based on UNIDO (2010). Foreign ownership-percentage of country sample of FDI 
projects wholly foreign owned; physical capital intensity and skill intensity of local workforce represent 
country sample averages of all firms surveyed.   
 
 As can be seen from column (2) of this table, foreign affiliates in Uganda had the highest share 
of foreign equity ownership (jointly with Madagascar) and had used physical capital more 
intensively than firms in other countries (column 3). Physical capital intensity is proxied by the 
ratio of total fixed assets to total number of full time employees (L).  
 
Looking at the sector level composition of FDI across large sector groups of 2-digit ISIC 
(International Standard Industrial Classification Rev. 3), table 3.4 shows the three leading capital 
intensive investments as high-technology manufacturing, electricity, gas and water and 
construction services (column 3). Column (4) indicates relatively low intensity in the use of local 
skilled workforce in high technology manufacturing compared to electricity, gas and water and 
construction services sectors. This pattern of input usage tends to suggest that more physical 
capital intensive foreign affiliates use local skill workforce less intensively. This is in line with 
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the opposing effects of the relative input contributions of these firms as predicted in the 
theoretical model derived above.   
 
Table 3.4: Foreign ownership and input intensities of firms across sectors 




Skill intensity of  
local workforce (%) 
Manufacturing (Low-tech) 26 64,777.21 15   
Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 34 45,128.60 14  
Manufacturing (High-tech) 36 2,804,621.00 16  
Electricity, gas and water supply 27 1,039,875.00 27  
Construction 28 370,726.20 25  
Wholesale trade and Vehicle trade 35 30,069.05 21  
Retail trade 28 17,562.23 21  
Hotels and restaurants 29 63,450.50 16  
Transport 29 44,200.45 26  
Post and telecommunications 44 87,565.45 44  
Financial institutions 35 89,699.62 37  
Real estate, consulting, IT 30 35,164.71 39  
Public admin, education, health etc. 19 164,464.70 27  
Source: Own calculations based on UNIDO (2010) 
 
Table 3.5 displays the sectoral distribution of ownership structure of foreign affiliates, physical 
capital intensity and skill intensity of local workforce of all enterprises surveyed in selected 
sectors in the respective countries. Data on the remaining countries surveyed are shown in 
appendix A3.1. The analysis demonstrates that physical capital intensity of FDI projects in sub-
Saharan Africa is mostly explained by investments in the manufacturing sector, which are 
broadly categorized as low-technology intensity, medium-technology and high technology 
intensity manufacturing. There is wide variation in physical capital intensity across sectors in 
these countries. It can be seen from appendix A3:1 that firms in Uganda use physical capital 
more intensively in high-tech manufacturing (column 4, US$28,500,000 per employee) 
compared to firms in Rwanda (US$6,946 per employee).  
 
In a similar manner, there is considerable heterogeneity across sectors in each country, with 
Ghana for instance, revealing physical capital intensity of US$5,721,698 per employee in the 
construction sector compared to US69,492 in the electricity, gas and water supply sector and a 
combined capital intensity of US$344,502 per employee in the manufacturing sector ( column 4 
of table 3.5). While such difference may be partly explained by the nature of investments in the 
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respective sectors, it would be useful to capture such heterogeneity through the inclusion of 
sector and country dummies in the estimations.             
 
Table 3.5: Foreign ownership and input intensities of firms across sectors 





Skill intensity of 
local workforce (%) 
Burkina Faso Manufacturing (Low-tech) 15 46,254 13 
Burkina Faso  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 33 31,641 10 
Burkina Faso  Manufacturing (High-tech) 0 27,428 24 
Burkina Faso  Electricity, gas and water supply 0 3,125 0 
Burkina Faso  Construction 0 14,615 30 
Burundi  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 16 12,457 21 
Burundi  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 51 55,929 19 
Burundi  Manufacturing (High-tech) 61 718,253 13 
Burundi  Electricity, gas and water supply 0 21,139 0 
Burundi  Construction 12 20,942 31 
Cameroon  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 29 45,398 18 
Cameroon  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 32 67,811 15 
Cameroon  Manufacturing (High-tech) 47 25,828 38 
Cameroon  Electricity, gas and water supply 20 37,050 36 
Cameroon  Construction 22 20,955 35 
Cape Verde  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 19 23,321 13 
Cape Verde  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 27 27,558 15 
Cape Verde  Manufacturing (High-tech) 17 40,856 9 
Cape Verde  Electricity, gas and water supply 50 421,530 11 
Cape Verde  Construction 20 19,599 16 
Ethiopia  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 15 19,670 12 
Ethiopia  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 19 43,548 15 
Ethiopia  Manufacturing (High-tech) 29 27,635 13 
Ethiopia  Electricity, gas and water supply 70 32,844 7 
Ethiopia  Construction 23 98,850 21 
Ghana  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 26 17,751 15 
Ghana  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 42 20,884 10 
Ghana  Manufacturing (High-tech) 35 305,867 15 
Ghana  Electricity, gas and water supply 0 69,492 22 
Ghana  Construction 32 5,721,698 19 
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3.6 Empirical Analysis 
 
This section investigates whether foreign affiliates can integrate local firms through capital-
intensive industries in sub-Saharan Africa.  In the descriptive analysis above, foreign affiliates 
that intensively use physical capital tend to also use local skilled workforce less intensively. This 
is a striking pattern of investment that calls for further investigation empirically to determine 
whether such a relationship exists in sub-Saharan Africa. As a first step to testing this hypothesis, 
a baseline model of the underlying relationships in equation (3.14) is estimated using the linear 
probability model (LPM):   
                                        [   ]   (            )           (3.14) 
where       denotes physical capital intensity and        is the skill intensity of the local 
workforce.  
 
Columns (1-3) of table 3.6 present results of the linear probability model showing the 
relationship between physical capital and human capital intensity of local firms and integrated 
production. In column (1), human capital intensity is proxied by the log of the ratio of 
nonproduction workers to production workers. Physical capital intensity of headquarter firms is 
measured as the log of the ratio of total assets to total number of employees. For columns (2-3), 
alternative measures are employed, with skill intensity of local firms denoted by the log of the 
ratio of non-production workers to total number of full time employees, and physical capital 
intensity proxied by the log of the ratio of fixed assets to total number of full time employees. 
The coefficients on the measures of physical capital intensity show the expected positive sign 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This is evidence suggesting that the likelihood 
of integrating local firms in FDI projects is higher in capital intensive sectors in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This finding is an indication that foreign affiliates' investments in physical capital are 
more important than the skill intensity of the local workforce in driving FDI projects in sub-
Saharan Africa. In other words, the headquarter firm will choose to integrate production, either 
through wholly-owned foreign affiliates or joint venture ownership in capital intensive sectors, 
when their input contribution to generating the surplus from the relationship is more important 
than the human capital investment of local firms. In column (1) of table 3.6, the coefficient on 
physical capital intensity shows that increasing this variable by 1 percent is associated with a 
0.061 percentage point increase in the probability of integrating in FDI projects.  




Table 3.6: Results of linear probability model (LPM) and probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




Log nonproduction to production workers  -0.049***     
 (0.015)     
Log nonproduction workers to employment  -0.078*** -0.069*** -0.077*** -0.068*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Log total assets to employment 0.061*** 0.061***  0.062***  
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.009)  
Log fixed assets to employment   0.051***  0.051*** 
   (0.009)  (0.009) 
Constant -0.397*** -0.460*** -0.312***   
 (0.082) (0.089) (0.086)   
Observations 2,293 2,293 2,293 2,293 2,293 
R-squared 0.054 0.054 0.042   
F(2, 269) 28.46*** 29.62*** 19.07*** 22.11*** 17.04*** 
Time fixed effects No  No  No  No  No  
Notes: “***”and ”**” denotes significant at 1 and 5% respectively. Dependent variable: dummy 1 wholly-owned foreign subsidiary or joint 
venture   ownership, 0 otherwise. LPM means linear probability model. Standard errors are in parentheses and adjusted for cluster effects.  
 
As can be seen from columns (1-3), the coefficient on human capital intensity has the expected 
negative sign and is strongly significant. Intuitively, this result indicates that it will be optimal 
for foreign affiliates to outsource from local firms when the contribution of local firms through 
human capital is relatively more important than physical capital investment of foreign affiliates. 
The evidence agrees with the stylized facts that suggest that foreign affiliates are more capital 
intensive and less intensive in human capital. This outcome is an indication that local firms are 
less likely to be integrated in FDI projects through labour-intensive activities. Results on the 
opposing effects of physical capital intensity and human capital intensity on the probability of 
integration support the hypothesis of this chapter. These findings are qualitatively similar to 
empirical evidence on intra-firm trade, which suggests that the bulk of these trade flows occur 
through capital intensive industries (Antras, 2003; Antras and Yeaple, 2014; Fernandes and 
Tang, 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 2013) while labour-intensive goods are outsourced. In a similar 
manner, Acemoglu et al. (2010) found positive association between R&D intensity of the foreign 
producing firm and vertical integration, while R&D intensity of input supplying firms was 
negatively associated with vertical integration for a sample of firms in the UK manufacturing 
sector.  
 
One potential problem with the linear probability model estimation is that it can generate 
predicted probabilities beyond the (     range (Wooldridge, 2009). To avoid this problem, the 
specification in equation (3.14) is estimated using the probit estimation technique, with the 
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resulting marginal effects of these variables reported in columns (4-5) of table 3.6. The direction 
of the effects of physical capital and human capital intensity are essentially the same as the 
results of the linear probability model.  However, it is important to mention that unlike the linear 
probability model, the effect of these variables on the probability of choosing integrated 
production depends not only on the magnitudes of the respective coefficients, but on all the 
coefficients and values of the independent variables. This suggests that the relationship is not 
constant, but could possibly change for particular values of physical capital and human capital 




To evaluate the robustness of the above findings, this section deals with several issues arising 
from the estimation of the baseline model. One issue arising from the estimates of the linear 
probability model and the probit model is potential omitted variable bias problem due to the 
omission of firm, industry and host country characteristics. To minimize this problem, equation 
(3.14) is augmented by including additional control variables such as firm age, labour 
productivity and R&D intensity as specified in equation (3.15).  
 
        (                                                 )        (3.15)          
where        denotes a fractional response dependent variable [   ] to capture the different 
equity share of firms. 
 
One may also be concerned about potential endogeneity issues due to reverse causality between 
foreign equity ownership and human capital. The quality of human capital in the host economy 
has an important influence in attracting FDI. These investments in turn play an important role in 
human capital formation, as foreign affiliates influence the demand and supply of skilled labour 
in host countries (Teixeira and Tavares-Lehmann, 2014). A second source of endogeneity arises 
from the inclusion of firm productivity variable, as the literature on firm heterogeneity argues 
that the most productive firm are more likely to undertake FDI, since they are more likely to 
cover the fixed costs of investing in host countries (see Antras and Helpman, 2004; Melitz, 
2003). As a result, the endogeneity problem is mitigated through the inclusion of industry and 
country fixed effects in the estimation as specified in equation (3.15). The inclusion of country 
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fixed effects also controls for the effects of host factors, such as market size, labour costs, 
institutional and infrastructure quality, government policy on foreign equity ownership 
restriction as well as unobserved country specific effects. These factors determine the relative 
attractiveness of host countries or bargaining power of local partners in FDI projects (Asiedu and 
Esfahani, 2001). In a similar manner, sector fixed effects dummies control for unobserved sector 
specific characteristics in the estimation (Defever and Toubal, 2013). Productivity variable is 
measured by total sales in total number of employees. In relation to this, the issue of endogeneity 
is further mitigated by considering this variable as reported in the year preceding the survey 
period.  
 
Another concern with the estimation of the linear probability and probit model is that the firms‟ 
integration decision is modelled as an indicator variable representing both wholly-owned foreign 
affiliates and joint venture firms. One may argue that such a categorization will not capture the 
true nature of foreign equity ownership in the region, since these governance structures are 
different. From equation (3.15), the dependent variable, foreign equity ownership, is bound 
between zero and one (          ). Given the bounded nature of       , the linear 
probability model is not appropriate, because it cannot guarantee that the predicted values of 
        will lie within the unit interval (see Defever and Toubal, 2013; Gallani et al, 2015; 
Ramalho et al, 2011). This is particularly the case when observations are clustered at the 
boundaries of zero or one. In a similar manner, the logit, probit or Tobit models are also not 
suitable, since they rely on restrictive distributional assumptions and also use ad hoc 
transformations for observations at the boundaries (Gallani et al, 2015). This problem is clearly 
evident in the data given that a significant proportion of local firms have not received FDI. In 
order to deal with these issues, foreign equity ownership modelled in equation (3.15) is 
represented as a fractional response variable, denoting 0 for domestically owned firms (non-
integration), 1 for wholly-owned foreign integrating firms and between 0 and 1 for joint venture 
ownership shares. This model is estimated using the fractional logit estimation technique (see 
Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
The data indicates that over 80 percent of the observations on foreign equity ownership are either 
0 or 1. This suggests a strong binary case. As such, the results of the fractional response models 
can be interpreted in terms of likelihood (Defever and Toubal, 2013). As a first step in 
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interpreting this relationship, the average marginal effects of the variables are computed. These 
are reported in table 3.7 using the different measures of physical capital and human capital 
intensity. A look at the marginal effects of physical capital intensity and skill intensity of the 
local workforce shows that these estimates have the opposing effects as predicted. In all cases, 
the results indicate a positive and significant marginal effect on physical capital intensity. This 
suggests a greater likelihood of firms integrating in FDI projects in capital-intensive sectors. The 
results are qualitatively the same as the estimates of the linear probability model and the probit 
model estimations. In column (4) of table 3.7, the estimates on physical capital intensity indicate 
that an increase in this variable by 1 percent increases the probability to integrate in capital-
intensive sectors by 0.041 percentage points.   
 
 Similarly, across all the estimations in table 3.7, the average marginal effects on the measures of 
human capital intensity reveal that there is a lower likelihood of firms integrating in labour-
intensive industries in sub-Saharan Africa. To some extent, these results are qualitatively similar 
to Lee (2014) for a sample of Korean affiliates. For Lee (2004), headquarter intensity is proxied 
by the share of Korean workers, which was found to be positively associated with the ownership 
share of Korean affiliates. This finding is qualitatively the same as the strongly positive 
association between foreign equity ownership and physical capital intensity of headquarter firm 
shown in this chapter. In a similar manner, Lee (2014) showed strongly negative association 
between the share of inputs sourced locally (proxy for the relative input contribution of the local 
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Table 3.7: Average marginal effects of fractional logit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables     
Log nonproduction to production workers -0.049***    
 (0.009)    
Log nonproduction workers to employment  -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.062*** 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Log total assets to employment 0.016** 0.017** 0.056***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)  
Log fixed assets to employment    0.041*** 
    (0.006) 
Log R&D intensity -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log labour productivity 0.073*** 0.073***   
 (0.009) (0.008)   
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,390 2,390 2,390 2,390 
Wald test (    501.13 504.79 502.55 431.21 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.09 
Log pseudolikelihood -1338.25 -1335.89 -1374.60 -1389.45 
                 Note: Dependent variable-foreign equity share. “***”, “**” denote significant at 1 and 5% respectively. Standard errors are in    
                 parentheses and clustered at firm level.   
 
One may also argue that the measures of human capital intensity of local firms may mask 
headquarter skill intensity, which is a proxy for the managerial inputs of foreign subsidiaries. To 
disentangle these effects, human capital intensity is further decomposed into the skill intensity of 
foreign affiliates and the local workforce. Table 3.8 reports the average marginal effects of the 
variables after decomposing human capital intensity variable. As can be seen across the 
specifications in columns (2 and 3), the average marginal effects are remarkably consistent with 
the estimates in column (1) in the qualitative terms. This is further evidence in support of our 
argument that there is greater propensity to integrate local firms in physical capital intensive 










                                                          
19
 The following transformation on R&D intensity is used in order to maintain firms with zero observations-log (R& 
D) intensity=log (0.001+R&D expenditures/total sales). A similar transformation is also done on foreign skill 
intensity and skill intensity of the local work to avoid dropping these firms from the estimations.  
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Table 3.8: Average marginal effects of fractional logit model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable    
Log nonproduction workers to employment -0.070***   
 (0.014)   
Log foreign skill intensity  0.100*** 0.101*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Log local skill intensity  -0.014** -0.013** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Log total assets to employment 0.056*** 0.019***  
 (0.006) (0.005)  
Log fixed assets to employment   0.012** 
   (0.005) 
Log R&D intensity -0.005 -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm age -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sector fixed effects         Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,390 2,390 2,390 
Wald test (    502.55 940.81 945.42 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.30 0.30 
Log pseudolikelihood -1374.60 -1072.56 -1075.92 
Note: Dependent variable-foreign equity share. “***”, “**”, „*‟ denote significant at 1, 5 and 10 % respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and clustered at firm level.   
 
A useful approach to understanding the direction of the relationship between equity ownership, 
physical capital intensity and skill intensity of the local workforce is to also consider the 
predictive margins of the fractional probit model. In order to plot the predictive margins of 
physical capital intensity and skill intensity of the local workforce, we allow for 10 standard 
deviations in the log of each variable below the mean as the starting point and 10 standard 
deviation increase in each variable, while the other explanatory variables are evaluated at their 
mean values. The plots clearly confirm the opposing effects of physical capital intensity and the 
skill intensity of the local workforce, thereby supporting the hypothesis of this study. Figure 3.1 
shows a positive relationship between physical capital intensity and foreign ownership. This 
further confirms a higher probability of integration in capital-intensive sectors. Conversely, 
figure 3.2 suggests a lower likelihood of integration in labour-intensive activities.   
 








Figure 3.2: Predictive margins of skill intensity 
 
One may also be concerned about the appropriateness of the ratio of total assets to total full time 
employees as a proxy for the relationship-specific investments of foreign producers. Recent 
literature on intra-firm trade argues that the measures of physical capital intensity may not be 
perfect measures of headquarter physical capital intensity, given that these expenditure 
components (such as automobiles, computers) are fairly easily contractible and, therefore, not 
purely relationship-specific (see Antras, 2013; Antras, 2015; Antras and Yeaple, 2014; 
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Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Nunn and Trefler, 2013). However, our dataset comprises not only 
manufacturing firms for which investments in machinery and specialized equipment are more 
relationship-specific, but also different services sectors such as construction, trade, consulting 
and information, communications and technology (ICT). This suggests that while investments in 
computers and automobiles are not relationship-specific in the manufacturing sectors, they could 
well be useful in different services sectors. The data does not allow for separation of fixed assets 
in these specific components as reported in the year of the survey. Nevertheless, we utilize the 
information on these components as reported in the year preceding the survey date.  
  
In trying to further check for robustness of the results, the analysis includes specific components 
of capital expenditure, such as those on machinery and equipment, transport equipment and 
information, communication and technology (ICT). The intensity of machinery and equipment is 
proxied by the log of the ratio of capital expenditure on machinery and equipment to total 
number of full time employees. Similarly, the intensity of ICT and transport components is 
measured by the log of the ratio of capital expenditures of these components per employee (see 
Antras, 2015).  
 
Table 3.9 reports the average marginal effects of the fractional logit models explaining the 
relationship between foreign equity share and the relationship-specific investments of firms. As 
seen from this table, the results of our variables of interest are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in previous estimations. Columns (2) and (5), show that the average marginal effects of 
machinery and equipment are positive and statistically significant. This supports the prediction 
that investments in machinery and equipment are relationship-specific. This is evidence 
indicating that there is a higher likelihood that foreign affiliates and local firms can integrate in 
sectors that intensively use equipment and machinery. These investments are most likely to be 
undertaken in manufacturing and construction sectors. The direction of the effect of machinery 
and equipment on foreign equity ownership agrees with the empirical literature on intra-firm 
trade flows (e.g. Antras, 2015; Antras and Yeaple, 2014; Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Nunn and 
Trefler, 2013). Looking at column (3) also reveals strong positive average marginal effects of 
transport intensity. This is inconsistent with some empirical studies that show a negative effect 
for automobile intensity (e.g. Antras and Yeaple, 2014; Nunn and Trefler, 2013). A reason for 
this may be because the analysis here uses both manufacturing and services sectors, including 
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trade (wholesale and retail) and transportation sectors in which these investments are extremely 




                             
Table 3.9: Average marginal effects of fractional logit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables      
      
Log foreign skill intensity 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log local skill intensity -0.013** -0.016*** -0.014** -0.020*** -0.016* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Log fixed assets to employment 0.012**     
 (0.005)     
Log machinery & equipment intensity  0.015***   0.013* 
  (0.004)   (0.007) 
Log transport intensity   0.020***  0.024*** 
   (0.004)  (0.006) 
Log ICT intensity    0.000 -0.011 
    (0.005) (0.007) 
Log R&D intensity -0.005* -0.003 -0.006* -0.003 -0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Firm age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sector fixed effects Yes No No No Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,390 2,158 1,790 1,559 1,358 
Wald test (    945.42 715.07 612.28 490.53 519.50 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.29 
Log pseudolikelihood -1075.92 -1004.18 -840.29 -763.05 -642.53 
    Dependent variable-foreign equity share; „***‟, “**” and “*” denote significant at 5 and 10% respectively.  
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.   
 
                     





                                                          
20 A similar analysis on the different ownership structure was carried out using the multinomial logit model. 
Literature suggests that the reliability of the estimates of this model hinges on the test of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. This assumption implies that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing 
between two alternatives is independent of the third alternative. The analysis shows strong rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the IIA holds using the suest test. This suggests a violation of the assumption and that the results of 
the model are not valid. A second problem is that data used in this analysis (UNIDO, 2010) does not support the 
estimation of a multinomial nested logit model as alternative estimation technique. Also, estimation of the 
multinomial probit model requires further restrictions on the error variance matrix which otherwise will lead to 
imprecise parameter estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). The estimates of the multinomial probit model are 
qualitatively similar to the multinomial logit model. Given these limitations, the analysis was restricted to the 
fractional response models which accurately capture the different ownership structures of firms. 
 





This paper has empirically investigated how input investments of foreign subsidiaries and local 
firms affect their decision to integrate in FDI projects in sub-Saharan Africa. The consideration 
of such relative input investments in explaining foreign equity ownership has allowed us to 
determine the sectors through which local firms are more likely to be integrated in FDI projects 
in order to boost productivity growth. Specifically, this study has explored the question of 
whether foreign subsidiaries and local firms have greater propensity to integrate production in 
capital-intensive industries than labour intensive activities. While the intra-firm trade literature 
has shown unequivocal support for integrated production in capital intensive industries, none of 
the previous studies has explicitly considered whether such integration is more likely in FDI 
projects that use physical capital more intensively than labour inputs in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Focus was on sub-Saharan Africa where recent reforms have encouraged investments in high 
technology sectors which are capital-intensive in nature, with the bulk of these investments 
undertaken by joint ventures between local firms and transnational corporations (TNCs).  
 
This study contributes to this literature by providing evidence on the sectors through which 
foreign affiliates and local firms can jointly undertake production in sub-Saharan Africa in order 
to promote knowledge and technology transfers to local firms. The results show remarkable 
support for the theoretical predictions. It reveals that foreign affiliates are more likely to integrate 
local firms in capital-intensive activities and less likely in labour-intensive activities. The results 
are robust to the use of alternative estimation techniques and different measures of physical 
capital and human capital intensity.  
 
In this study, foreign equity ownership was not separated in backward and forward integration 
decisions due to data limitations. It would be interesting in future research to examine how input 
contributions of these firms affect these ownership decisions separately.  A second caveat of this 
study is that there are potential endogeneity issues arising from feedback causality between 
foreign equity ownership and human capital intensity. Although this problem is mitigated 
through the inclusion of industry and country fixed effects, it would be helpful to explore the 
dynamics in the underlying relationship using panel data analysis, as it allows for proper 
treatment of this endogeneity problem.  
  










Recent decades have witnessed a growing debate over the contribution of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to growth and development in developing countries. This issue remains 
controversial in both the academic literature and policy discussions. FDI is perceived to offer 
valuable contributions to growth and development of a host country through a macro channel, 
such as increasing investment, employment, foreign exchange receipts and tax revenues; and 
micro level through the transfer of knowledge and technology to recipient countries (Farole and 
Winkler, 2014; Paus and Gallagher, 2008). In specific terms, FDI enhances growth by increasing 
total factor productivity and improving the overall efficiency of resource use in host countries 
(OECD, 2002). Given these potential contributions to host economies, examining whether FDI 
positively affects productivity growth has become a priority research issue, especially in 
developing countries.  
 
In the endogenous growth literature, FDI has a greater potential to promote long-run growth 
through knowledge and technology spillovers to host countries (de Mello, 1997; Nair-Reichert 
and Weinhold, 2001). While there is a large body of studies on growth effect of FDI, the 
empirical literature is inconclusive. Most studies did not show any robust positive relationship 
between FDI and economic growth (e.g. Adam, 2009; Carkovic and Levine, 2005; Lensink and 
Morrissey, 2006), while others support the growth-enhancing effect of these investments (Li and 
Liu, 2005; Neuhaus, 2005; Olofsdotter, 1998). Given the conflicting findings, the debate has 
focused on establishing whether host country heterogeneity could explain differences in the 
growth effect of FDI across countries (e.g. Brahim and Rachdi, 2014; Jude and Levieuge, 2015; 
Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001). Such heterogeneity is reflected in the differences in the 
capacities of host countries to absorb FDI. The basic argument underlying the absorptive 
capacity view is that FDI tends to generate smaller or no growth effect in host developing 
countries, unless these countries have attained a certain  minimum level of development in 
human capital capacity (Borenzstein et al., 1998), domestic financial markets development 
(Alfaro et al., 2004, 2009; Hermes and Lensink, 2003), quality of institutions (Durham, 2004; 
   
105 
 
Brahim and Rachdi, 2014; Jude and Levieuge, 2015) and trade policies (Balasubramanyam et al, 
1996).  
 
While the findings of most studies have supported the thesis that human capital capacity 
enhances the growth effect of FDI (e.g. Borenzstein et al, 1998; Li and Liu, 2005), none of these 
studies has addressed the question of whether the effect of FDI on productivity growth could be 
heterogeneous depending on differences in human capital capacity across countries. Such a 
heterogeneous relationship is expected, given that there is reciprocal externality between human 
capital capacity and FDI. One would expect that countries that have enhanced their human 
capital capacity to attract higher quality or more technology intensive FDI, which, in turn, 
enhances the local workforce through learning and skills development initiatives (see Blomstrom 
and Kokko, 2003; OECD, 2002). At the opposite, countries with lower level of human capital 
will attract low technology intensity investments, which ultimately will have limited impact on 
local skills development. Given such relationship, it is expected that the relationship between 
FDI and productivity growth is most likely to be nonlinear and conditional on human capital 
capacity across countries. Few studies have recently confirmed the nonlinear relationship 
between FDI and economic growth, with host country heterogeneity explored through quality of 
institutions (Brahim and Rachdi, 2014; Jude and Levieuge, 2015) and human capital capacity 
(Kottaridi and Stengos, 2010). However, the study by Kottaridi and Stengos (2010) employed 
non-parametric techniques and, therefore, did not determine the threshold level of human capital 
capacity that should enhance the growth effect of FDI in recipient countries.  
 
This paper argues that the effect of FDI on productivity growth is not homogeneous as assumed 
in previous studies, but nonlinear and depends on the human capital capacity of host countries. 
Human capital stock raises total factor productivity growth by enhancing domestic innovation 
and accelerating the pace of technological catch-up process from leading countries (Benhabib 
and Spiegel, 1994). Given the limited technology capacity in most developing countries, FDI can 
promote technology change through knowledge and technology transfers, with such transfers 
enhanced by the stock of human capital of recipient countries.  
 
A distinctive feature of this study is consideration of host country heterogeneity in human capital 
capacity to determine whether the effect of FDI on productivity growth is conditional upon such 
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capacity. In this way, this study contributes to the empirical literature by determining the 
minimum threshold of human capital capacity that accelerates the effect of FDI on productivity 
growth in African countries and evaluating whether there is heterogeneity in the growth 
enhancing effects of these investments. To achieve these objectives, this study uses a nonlinear 
approach, the PSTR introduced by Gonzalez et al. (2005) and Fok et al. (2005), which allows for 
host country heterogeneity in the stock of human capital.  The estimation of such a nonlinear 
model enables us to exploit the variation in human capital absorptive capacity across countries. 
As such, it provides a useful approach to resolving the conflicting results in the empirical 
literature (see Alfaro, 2015; Alfaro et al., 2009). Although most studies have looked at the FDI-
economic growth nexus, this study considers the relationship between FDI and total factor 
productivity growth. The focus on productivity growth is motivated by arguments suggesting 
that FDI accelerates growth by raising total factor productivity (OECD, 2002) and that total 
factor productivity is relatively more important than factor endowments in explaining the 
differences in income across countries (see e.g. Alfaro et al., 2009; Easterly & Levine, 2001; 
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997). 
 
While FDI is perceived to have generated few linkages and spillovers in host sub-Saharan 
African countries (Morrissey, 2012), there is suggestive evidence that in recent years, African 
economies have significantly benefited from FDI, in terms of contribution to value added and 
wages, more than other regions in the world (UNCTAD, 2012). At the same time, there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the human capacity, as evidenced by wide differences in 
educational attainment across African countries. For example, the average years of total 
schooling in South Africa was 9.69 years in 2010 and 1.88 years in Niger (Barro and Lee, 2013). 
Given such marked differences in capacity, one would expect that the growth-enhancing effect of 
FDI may differ across countries. To the best of my knowledge, none of the empirical studies on 
productivity growth in African economies (see e.g. Abdychev et al., 2015; Loko, and Diouf, 
2009; Sacerdoti et al., 1998; Senbeta, 2009) have looked at these issues.  
 
To conduct the analysis, this study uses recent country level data on total factor productivity 
growth and human capital stock for a panel of 25 African countries spanning 1996-2011 
(Feenstra et al., 2015). The data allows us to comprehensively analyze the role of human capital 
in promoting the growth effect of FDI for a relatively large number of countries in Africa. The 
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period captures increase in FDI in the mid-1990s following the adoption of economic 
liberalization policies in most African countries in the early 1990s. The analysis reveals that the 
effect of FDI on productivity growth is conditional on human capital capacity and such effects 
are heterogeneous across African countries. In other words, it relies on host countries‟ achieving 
a minimum threshold level of 6.94 years of average schooling.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explores the trends in FDI, human 
capital and productivity growth in Africa. Section 4.3 reviews the literature on FDI growth, 
while the empirical model and estimation strategy are described in section 4.4. Section 4.5 
analyses the regression results and section 4.6 concludes the chapter.   
 
4.2 FDI, Human Capital and Growth in Africa 
 
Since the early 1990s, several African countries have adopted wide ranging policies to improve 
resource allocation and enhance productivity growth. The SSA sub-region, for example, have 
implemented policies designed to improve overall economic management, quality of institutions 
and increase investments by both public and private sectors (see IMF, 2013). Partly as a result of 
these policy reforms, there was a 75 percent increase in median per capita GDP in sub-Saharan 
African economies during the period 2000-2013. In particular, a group of countries that were 
categorized as non-resource rich economies during the period 1995-2010, notably Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, showed significant turnaround in 
economic performance, with real GDP growth and real per capita GDP averaging 5 percent and 3 
percent respectively during the period (IMF, 2013).  
 
While most countries in the region have received increased inflows of FDI, these investments 
have not been evenly distributed across countries in Africa. There are also considerable 
differences in human capital capacity across African economies. Table 4.1 shows the distribution 
of FDI, human capital and productivity growth in selected African countries over the period 
1996-2011. As can be seen in column (3), the share of inward FDI stock in GDP is significantly 
higher in Tunisia, averaging 59.4 percent over the period 1996-2011 and considerably low in 
Burundi (3 percent). Similarly, as shown in column (4), average human capital stock was highest 
in Botswana (2.7) during the review period compared to 1.2 in Niger and Mozambique. Given 
this variation, it is possible that the effect of FDI on productivity growth could differ across 
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countries, since countries have different capacity to absorb knowledge and technology spillovers 
from FDI.   
 






Average human capital 
stock (Composite index) 
Burundi 1.1 2.9 1.5 
Benin 1.0 6.9 1.6 
Botswana 1.0 22.3 2.7 
Central African Republic 1.0 15.2 1.6 
Ivory Coast 1.0 24.5 1.7 
Cameroon 1.0 16.4 2.0 
Egypt 1.1 28.2 2.2 
Gabon 1.0 4.6 2.4 
Kenya 1.0 5.8 2.1 
Lesotho 1.0 33.2 2.1 
Morocco 1.0 33.8 1.8 
Mozambique 1.0 32.1 1.2 
Mauritania 1.0 35.3 1.7 
Mauritius 1.0 16.6 2.4 
Namibia 1.0 43.4 2.1 
Niger 1.0 13.3 1.2 
Rwanda 1.0 4.3 1.6 
Senegal 1.0 8.0 1.8 
Sierra Leone 0.9 23.9 1.5 
Swaziland 1.0 30.1 2.4 
Togo 1.1 15.1 1.9 
Tunisia 1.0 59.4 2.2 
Tanzania 0.9 22.6 1.9 
South Africa 1.0 31.9 2.6 
Zimbabwe 1.3 18.0 2.4 
  Sources: Feenstra et al. (2015), UNCTAD statistics and Barro and Lee (2013).   
The ongoing structural reforms will contribute to enhancing competitiveness, thereby creating an 
enabling environment to attract FDI and increase productivity growth in African countries. 
According to the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 2010-2011, top competitive countries in 
Africa are Tunisia, South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, Morocco, Botswana, Rwanda and Egypt 
(Sala-I-Martin et al., 2010).
21
 Countries, such as Mauritius, Tunisia and South Africa, are at the 
                                                          
21
 Competitiveness is defined as “… the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of 
productivity of a country” (Sala-I-Martin et al., 2010 p.4). The overall ranking of each country is based on a 
weighted average of 12 structural factors: (1) quality of institutions (2) Infrastructure quality (3) Macroeconomic 
environment (4) Health and primary education (5) Quality of higher education and training (6) Goods market 
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efficiency-driven stage of development. This implies that these countries need to adopt more 
efficient production processes to improve the quality of local products in order to enhance their 
competitiveness (Sala-I-Martin et al., 2010). This further suggests that human capital capacity 
plays an important role in the adoption of technology from FDI to ensure that they remain 
competitive. Botswana and Egypt are in transition from factor-driven to efficiency-driven stage 
of development, while the bulk of the countries in table 4.1 are at the factor-driven stage of 
development. This reveals that these countries compete on the basis of factor endowments, such 
as the presence of natural resources and unskilled labour. Countries in this category include 
Burundi, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal 
and Tanzania. 
 
In order to assess the relative attractiveness of host countries to foreign investments, it is helpful 
to consider three (3) indices on FDI: attraction, potential and contribution indices. The FDI 
attraction index assesses the extent of success of host countries in attracting FDI relative to their 
market size, whereas the FDI potential index evaluates the relative attractiveness of host 
countries to FDI based on the underlying determinants of FDI. Specifically, the FDI potential 
index is based on an equal weighted score of the indicators of four key determinants of FDI-
market attractiveness, availability of low-cost labour and skills, presence of natural resources and 
enabling infrastructure (UNCTAD, 2012).  
 
Table 4.2 compares the performance of the countries in attracting FDI over a three-year period 
using the FDI potential index. A careful look at the pattern suggests that there are considerable 
differences in the attractiveness of the host countries to FDI. Similarly, there are wide differences 
across host countries regarding the extent to which they have succeeded in attracting FDI. 
Clearly, South Africa shows significant investment potential, but tends to have attracted 
investments below potential. Several countries in the sample have received FDI in line with their 
respective investment potential, while Niger and Mozambique have attracted significant 
investments above expectations, in spite of their relatively low investment potential. This is 
partly explained by recent exploration and extraction of Uranium and Gas deposits, respectively.  
Other SSA countries have attracted FDI below expectations, including Gabon, Kenya, Senegal, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
efficiency (7) Labour market efficiency (8) Financial market development (Technological readiness (10) Market size 
(11) Business sophistication and (9) Technological innovation.   
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Namibia and Tanzania. Among the North African countries, Egypt and Tunisia were attractive 
destinations for foreign investors during the review period, and have shown stronger FDI 
performance, while Morocco has received FDI below expectations.  
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d‟Ivoire, Lesotho, Mauritania, 
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The third index, FDI contribution index, is helpful for qualitatively assessing the extent to which 
foreign affiliates may have contributed to host countries. This index captures a number of 
indicators, such as value added, wages and salaries, employment, exports, research and 
development (R & D) activities, domestic capital formation and tax receipts (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Table 4.3 presents the contribution of FDI across the various regions in the world. A look at 
column (5) shows that foreign affiliates in African economies have significant impact on wages 
and salaries in host economies, as they offer higher wage premium over those paid in host 
countries. This ratio, together with the relatively higher capital expenditures, as shown in column 
(7), point to the fact that foreign affiliates in African economies engage in capital-intensive 
production processes (UNCTAD, 2012).  
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Table 4.3: FDI contribution index by region, 2009 








Developed countries  12.7 7.5 19.3 13.9 14.6 24.2 10.5 
Developing countries 12.2 7.9 17.3 14.6 15.4 24.1 11.6 
Africa 21.7 7.3   21.7 37.2 18.4 
East & South-East Asia 10.5 9.9 30.9 7.7 8.9 22.5 6.2 
South Asia 10.3 6.1   16.0  3.8 
West Asia 16.8 5.5 1.9  15.0  3.8 
Latin America & Caribbean  15.9 6.0 17.9 18.9 16.0 35.0 14.8 
Transition economies 21.7 3.0   11.2 15.4 25.7 
Source: UNCTAD (2012) 
 
4.3. Literature Review 
 
Two strands of theoretical literature, neoclassical and endogenous growth theories, provide the 
basis for explaining the positive effect of FDI on productivity and economic growth (De Mello, 
1997; Ilhan, 2007; Li and Liu, 2005; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001). In the neoclassical 
growth theory, FDI raises growth through increases in the volume of investment and/or its 
efficiency (Li and Liu, 2005; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001). As developing countries are 
characterized by lower initial level of capital stock, increased inflow of foreign capital through 
FDI will increase the marginal productivity of investment and promote economic growth. 
However, due to the onset of diminishing returns to physical capital inputs, as assumed in the 
traditional neoclassical Solow (1956) model, increased inflow of FDI will affect the level of 
income in the long-run, while the growth rate of the economy is unaffected (De Mello, 1997). As 
such, the neoclassical framework is not helpful for understanding the mechanisms through which 
FDI contributes to long-term growth, since growth in the long-run is perceived to be determined 
by an exogenous technological change. Given these limitations, there is an extensive literature 
within the endogenous growth theory on the channels through which FDI enhances technology 
progress that determines long-run economic growth of recipient countries.  
 
One would broadly classify the theoretical underpinnings of the endogenous growth literature 
into two sets of arguments. The first relates to those models explaining growth through positive 
externalities arising from capital accumulation-physical and human capital (e.g. Romer, 1986). 
The second strand of theory emphasizes the role of technological progress through innovation 
and technological diffusion in determining long-run economic growth (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-
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Martin, 2004; Borenzstein et al., 1998; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990). The 
endogenous growth theory generally assumes constant or increasing returns to reproducible 
factors due to knowledge accumulation (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). It suggests that there are 
spillover effects generated through investment in human capital which mitigate diminishing 
returns to capital accumulation. Apart from investment in human capital, this literature 
emphasizes the importance of investments in innovation as critical factors determining long-term 
growth of countries. In developing countries, however, there is limited capacity for sustainable 
investments in R&D activities and knowledge. FDI is, therefore, perceived as providing valuable 
source of capital to promote domestic investment and technological progress in host countries. In 
the endogenous growth framework, diminishing returns to capital accumulation is offset by 
constant/increasing returns to human capital and technology. This theory thus provides a useful 
framework for analyzing long-run growth effects of FDI through transfer of technology 
externalities or spillover effects (see De Mello, 1997; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001).  
 
There are various channels through which FDI can potentially improve productivity in host 
countries via spillovers to local firms, including capital accumulation, vertical linkages between 
foreign and local firms, labour turnover, demonstration and competition effect (see Hermes and 
Lensink, 2003; Kinoshita, 1999; Farole and Winkler, 2014). FDI contributes to technological 
progress through a capital accumulation channel via the transfer of technology embodied in 
intermediate inputs or capital goods imported into host countries by foreign affiliates 
(Borensztein et al., 1998; De Mello, 1997; Li and Liu, 2005). This allows for a range of 
intermediate inputs to be used in domestic production, which enhances productivity through 
increased division of labour in recipient countries (Feenstra and Markusen, 1994). There are 
potential productivity gains to local firms through the supply chain effect via backward and 
forward linkages, which occur through transactions between foreign subsidiaries and local input 
suppliers and customers (Farole and Winkler, 2014; Kinoshita, 1999). When local firms are 
directly engaged with foreign affiliates, technology spillovers may occur through imitation or 
reverse-engineering. Increased imitation of technology reduces the technology gap between 
countries, thereby enhancing domestic capacity to absorb FDI with advanced technologies. 
Similar knowledge spillovers may arise through labour turnover from foreign subsidiaries to 
local firms. Foreign affiliate can contribute to enhancing the capacity of the local workforce 
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through training, acquisition of management skills and exposure to new technology, and 
movement of labour from foreign affiliates to local firms can facilitates such spillovers (see 
Dasgupta, 2012; Farole and Winkler, 2014; Fosfuri et al., 2001).  
  
The empirical literature based on aggregate data reveals mixed evidence on the growth-
enhancing effects of FDI. There is evidence indicating a positive impact of FDI on growth in 
host countries (Lensink and Morrissey, 2006; Li and Liu, 2005; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 
2001; Neuhaus, 2005). This evidence is however not universally shown, as other studies have 
arrived at the conclusion that this relationship is not robust. For example, Carkovic and Levine 
(2005) find no support for the positive effect of FDI on growth after controlling for endogeneity 
bias. A similar conclusion is reached by Adam (2009) for a sample of 42 sub-Saharan African 
countries after controlling for country specific factors. Studies on the FDI-productivity nexus 
based on aggregate data share similar mixed findings. Amann and Virmani (2015) find that FDI 
enhances productivity growth in emerging economies and OECD countries. A similar conclusion 
is reached in other studies which reveal that there are productivity spillovers from FDI 
(Baltabaev, 2014; Woo, 2009). However, some studies have echoed the view that FDI will not 
accelerate productivity growth in the presence of low absorptive capacity, such as 
underdeveloped domestic financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004; 2009).  
 
At the level of the firm, the evidence on the technology spillovers from the presence of foreign 
firms in host countries is again mixed. While some studies have identified the presence of FDI 
spillovers in developed countries (e.g. Bitzer and Kerekes, 2008; Haskel et al., 2007; Javorcik, 
2004) and developing countries (Bwalya, 2006; Blalock and Gertler, 2008; Newman et al., 
2015), other studies suggest that foreign-firm presence has not generated productivity growth in 
local firms, as evident in the Moroccan manufacturing sector (Haddad and Harrison, 1993). The 
seminal paper by Aitken and Harris (1999) produce evidence suggesting that negative spillovers 
from foreign to domestic firms, is attributed to a market-stealing effect. This happens when 
foreign firms capture a greater share of the domestic market at the detriment of domestic firms.  
 
The apparent inconclusive evidence on the accelerating effects of FDI on productivity growth of 
domestic firms has given rise to different approaches to studying this relationship. The literature 
points to host-country heterogeneity as a plausible reason for the conflicting results (e.g. Jude 
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and Levieuge, 2015; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001). Three different approaches have been 
adopted in the empirical literature to address the problem of heterogeneity in order to determine 
whether FDI enhances productivity growth. The first approach relates to splitting the sample of 
countries into some homogeneous groups in line with some measures of absorptive capacity.  In 
their study of a sample of developed countries and least developed countries, Blonigen and 
Wang (2005) find no positive effect of FDI on growth using the pooled sample of these 
countries. Their work accounts for heterogeneity across countries through the linear interactions 
of FDI and schooling variables with a dummy variable for least developed countries. The results 
provide evidence indicating that developing countries should attain a threshold level of human 
capital for FDI to generate growth. In the same vein, Ghosh and Wang (2010) consider a group 
of 25 OECD countries over the period 1980-2004 and find positive effect of FDI on economic 
growth in these countries. In a similar manner, Karunaratne (2013) investigates a sample of 25 
OECD countries based on some threshold effects in determining whether FDI generates positive 
productivity growth effects. The study finds that FDI raises growth in total factor productivity in 
these countries.   
 
One problem with splitting the sample of countries into groups is that there may be considerable 
heterogeneity in absorptive capacity across countries within these groups. Such heterogeneity is 
confirmed by Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) in a panel of 24 developing countries. 
Allowing for heterogeneity effect of FDI across countries, through a mixed fixed and random 
coefficient approach, the study finds a positive impact of FDI on economic growth. Recognizing 
such heterogeneity across countries, another line of studies argue that productivity spillovers 
generated through FDI depend on the absorptive capacity of host countries such as human capital 
capacity (Borensztein et al., 1998) and domestic financial markets development (e.g. Alfaro et 
al., 2004; Hermes and Lensink, 2003). It can be inferred from this literature that differences in 
the capacity of host countries to absorb technology spillovers from FDI could explain the 
differences in the growth impact of FDI. For instance, the stock of human capital affects the 
capacity of countries to innovate and speeds up the technology “catch-up” with technology 
leading countries (Nelson and Phelps, 1996). Consistent with this view, Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994) identify two channels through which human capital increases productivity growth: via 
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improving domestic innovation and enhancing the capacity of countries to absorb foreign 
technology and knowledge. These channels facilitate the technological catch-up process.  
 
Similar view is echoed in Engelbrecht (1997), whose study recognizes the role of human capital 
in promoting growth through innovation and the absorption of international knowledge 
spillovers. By including an interaction term between FDI and human capital stock, the study by 
Borensztein et al. (1998) finds that developing countries need to attain a threshold of human 
capital in order to reap productivity gains from FDI. Other studies have shown that human 
capital enhances technology spillovers and hence the growth effect of FDI in host countries (see 
Lai et al., 2006; Li and Liu, 2005). Improving the human capital capacity allows countries to 
benefit from spillovers of knowledge and technology associated with the adoption of trade 
openness policies (see Keller, 1996; Lai et al., 2006; Miller and Upadhyay, 2000). A related 
body of studies supports the hypothesis that technology spillovers from the presence of foreign 
firm can accelerate productivity and growth, only when host countries have achieved a threshold 
level of financial markets development (Alfaro et al., 2004; 2009; Hermes and Lensink, 2003), 
quality of institutions (Brahim and Rachdi, 2014; Durham, 2004; Jude and Levieuge, 2015; 
Olofsdotter, 1998) and degree of openness (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996).   
 
The literature at the firm level suggests that the spillovers generated from FDI are conditional on 
the type of linkages generated in the host economy and the absorptive capacity of local firms 
(Bruno and Campos, 2013; Farole and Winkler, 2014). The absorptive capacity of local firms 
that allows the assimilation of technology and knowledge from FDI is measured by human 
capital capacity, investment in R&D activities and the technology gap between local and foreign 
firms (see Blalock and Gertler, 2009; Damijan et al., 2014). While there is evidence supporting 
the presence of positive spillovers from FDI, as noted above, studies that have explored intra-
industry (horizontal) productivity spillovers find that these spillover effects depend on the 
absorptive capacity of domestic firms (Damijan et al, 2014; Laio et al, 2012; Pfeiffer et al, 2014).     
 
One limitation in cross-country studies that have explored the linear interactions between FDI 
and measures of absorptive capacity arises from the implicit assumption of homogenous impact 
of FDI across countries over time. Because there is heterogeneity in developing countries in 
terms of the levels of absorptive capacity, one would expect the effect of FDI to be 
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heterogeneous and nonlinear, conditional on the threshold level of absorptive capacity. This view 
is confirmed by Kottaridi and Stengos (2010) who found nonlinear effect of FDI for a sample of 
OECD and non-OECD countries using non-parametric techniques. In contrast to most studies 
using linear interactions between human capital and FDI, where the effect of FDI is conditional 
on human capital capacity, Kottaridi and Stengos (2010) found that such effects do not depend 
on host countries achieving a minimum threshold of human capital. A second line of studies 
explores host country heterogeneity using the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) and 
returns evidence confirming the nonlinear effect of FDI on economic growth in developing 
countries, which depends upon attaining a minimum threshold level of institutional development 
(Brahim and Rachdi, 2014; Jude and Levieuge, 2015). By applying the same estimation strategy, 
Fracasso and Marzetti (2014) find that human capital increases total factor productivity by 
accelerating R&D spillovers generated in OECD countries. This study reports a minimum 
threshold level of 8.33 average years of schooling in order to absorb international R&D 
spillovers.  
 
In sum, the above literature review shows that there are differences in the level of absorptive 
capacity across countries, which could explain heterogeneity in the impact of FDI on 
productivity growth. The review reveals that human capital absorptive capacity matters for 
enhancing productivity spillovers of FDI in host countries. Thus, it would be interesting to allow 
for host country heterogeneity in human capital capacity to determine whether such differences 
will explain variation in the effect of FDI on productivity growth across countries.     
 
4.4. Methods and Data 
 
4.4.1 Methods  
 
A useful starting point of the empirical estimation is to consider a theoretical framework within 
the endogenous growth theory to explain how human capital stock increases productivity 
spillovers in host countries.  Borensztein et al. (1998) provide a framework for explaining the 
role of human capital stock in the absorption of technology from FDI through the interaction 
between human capital and FDI. This framework recognizes that technological progress occurs 
through a capital deepening process via the importation of capital goods by foreign firms. This 
   
117 
 
increases the number of varieties of capital goods in recipient countries. The production form 
takes the following form: 
 
                                                          
   
          (4.1) 
Where    is output,   denotes a vector of control and policy variables reflecting the host country 
environment,   is human capital and   represents physical capital. Physical capital is 
accumulated through increases in the number of capital goods‟ varieties in the local economy, 
which can be represented by: 





   
      (4.2)                                                                               
 
Where  (   is total capital representing a series of varieties of capital goods totaling N in the 
local economy. The production of capital goods through FDI can be split between domestic and 
foreign firms. Domestic firms are assumed to produce n varieties of capital goods, while foreign 
firms‟ varieties   . This yields the total number of varieties produced in the local economy as: 
 
                                                                                 (4.3)             
 
Capital goods are produced by specialized firms and they receive a rental rate  (   from final 
goods producers for use of the capital goods produced. Demand for capital goods is given by the 
optimality condition in perfectly competitive factor markets, that is, the marginal productivity of 
capital goods equals the rental rate. From equation (4.1), the marginal productivity of capital is 
derived as: 
                                                               
   
   
  (      
   
    (      
  (      (4.4)              
 
In order to produce new varieties of capital goods, firms need to adopt technology from 
technology leading countries. In doing so, the firms incur a fixed setup cost (F) of production, 
which is assumed to be inversely related to the ratio of the number of foreign firms in total firms 
in the host country(
  
 
 . Greater presence of foreign firms facilitates the transfer of knowledge to 
local firms which enhances domestic production of capital goods. In other words, FDI is an 
important vehicle for enhancing technological progress in host developing countries. It promotes 
local knowledge in the production of capital goods through the transfer of advanced technology. 
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This framework assumes a catch-up effect in technological progress, given that it is relatively 
less costly to imitate the capital goods already produced than engaging in the production of new 
goods.  Given the catch-up effect, the setup cost is assumed to be positively related to the 
number of varieties of capital goods produced in the local economy in relation to those produced 
in the advanced countries  . This assumption suggests that countries with lower (
 
  
) face a 
lower cost of adopting technology from FDI through imitation. The composition of the setup cost 
function can be represented as: 











   and 
  
 (   ⁄ )
     (4.5) 
 
In the production of capital goods, each firm also incurs a maintenance cost which is assumed to 
be constant over time. Intuitively, the marginal cost of producing   (   can be assumed to be 1 
with full depreciation of capital goods. Defining a constant steady state interest rate (r), the profit 
generated from producing a capital good j is specified as: 







 ⁄ )  ∫ [ (   (    (  ]
 
 
   (        (4.6) 
 
In solving the problem of the firm, the profit function in equation (4.6) is maximized subject to 
equation (4.4) which yields a level of capital good produced as: 
 
                                                     (       ⁄ (      ⁄      (4.7)                                                                    
If we consider a competitive market economy, the representative firm optimally produces capital 
goods when the marginal productivity of capital equals the rental rate  . To derive an expression 
for the rental rate of capital, equation (4.7) is substituted into the expression for the demand for 
capital goods (4.4). This gives: 
                                                                     (    (    ⁄      (4.8)                                                                   
In a competitive market, firms make zero profit and the associated rate of return   from 
maximizing the profit function presented in equation (4.6) is derived as: 
          ⁄   (   ⁄     ⁄        (4.9)                                  
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The framework further assumes that capital accumulation occurs through saving behavour of 
households, which is captured by an intertemporal utility function: 
                                                                    ∫
  
   
   
 
 
   (           (4.10) 
In solving the problem of the household, equation (4.10) is maximized subject to the household 
budget constraint, yielding the optimal consumption path as follows: 






(   )   (4.11) 
For an economy on a balanced growth path, output, consumption and capital will be growing at 
the same rate. This implies that productivity growth of the economy can be specified as: 
                                                                    
 
 
(   )     (4.12) 
Substituting the rental rate (4.9) into equation (4.12) gives an equation for productivity growth of 
the economy as: 
                                                                        
 
 
⌊   ⁄   (   ⁄     ⁄       ⌋   (4.13) 
Equation (4.13) establishes the theoretical framework explaining how human capital supports the 
growth effect of FDI in host countries. The effect of FDI on productivity growth is captured by 
fraction of goods produced domestically by foreign firms (   ⁄  .    ⁄  represents the catch-up 
effect, suggesting that countries with relatively lower level of production of capital goods benefit 
from lower costs of technology adoption and would tend to grow faster (Borensztein et al., 
1998).  From equation (4.13), the empirical model follows the model in Borensztein et al. (1998) 
which is specified as: 
                                                   (4.14) 
 
Where FDI denotes the share of inward FDI stock in GDP (proxy for    ⁄      is initial real 
GDP per capita as a proxy for catch-up effects (   ⁄   and   is a vector of control variables, 
such as the quality of institutions, level of financial markets development, trade openness, and 
growth in government consumption. The model specified in equation (4.14) suggests that there is 
a direct effect of FDI on productivity growth (   , which could arise through capital 
accumulation, and indirect impact via spillovers of foreign technology and knowledge enhanced 
through the accumulation of human capital. This specification shows how human capital 
capacity accelerates the growth effect of FDI through an interaction term between human capital 
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stock and FDI, thereby determining whether the growth-enhancing impact of FDI is conditional 
on the human capital stock of host countries.  
 
4.4.2 Data Description 
 
This study uses a balanced panel set of 25 African countries over the period 1996-2011. The 
choice of the sample of countries was driven by the availability of annual series on total factor 
productivity growth and human capital from the Penn World Tables (PWT 8.1) (Feenstra et al., 
2015). The study period 1996-2011 was chosen to determine whether FDI has supported 
productivity growth following the adoption of economic and structural reforms in the 1990s in 
most African countries. This period also captures the time span of the measures of the 
institutional quality of the World Bank, which are widely used in empirical research. Data on 
these indicators are available for most African countries since 1996, unlike other measures of 
institutional quality such as International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which, although provides 
a relatively longer time span, covers only a limited number of African countries. The quality of 
institutions is proxied by control of corruption, which is collected from the World Bank‟s 
governance indicators. This variable ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, indicating poor quality institutions 
to good quality institutions. 
 
Data on total factor productivity growth are obtained from PWT 8.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015), 
which are computed for each country   as:  
 
                                                                             
   
      
  
        
          
    (4.15) 
where      
  real GDP at constant national prices and       
  is an index of factor inputs 
(labour and capital) between period   and     for a given country. FDI is measured by the ratio 
of inward FDI stock to GDP. The data is taken from the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) database. Data on inward FDI stocks is used to analyze the effect 
of FDI on productivity growth, since it captures the medium-long term or sustaining growth 
effects of FDI compared to new FDI which mostly reflects the short-term effects of these 
investments (see Bitzer and Gorg, 2009). Additionally, new FDI inflows do not automatically 
translate into increased economic growth since some of the benefits of these investments, such as 
the transfer of ownership skills and management expertise, are not immediately absorbed in the 
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real sector of the economy (see Neuhaus, 2006). That said, stocks also reflect the effect of 
existing institutional environment or structural policies in host countries, which may encourage 
or inhibit the accumulation of FDI flows.  
 
Data on average human capital stock of countries is obtained from the Penn World Tables 8.1. 
The variable is computed based on the average years of schooling for the population aged 15 and 
older and an assumed rate of return to education as follows:  
                                                                              
 (         (4.16)                                                          
Where     average years of schooling; and according to Psacharopoulos (1994) and Hall and 
Jones (1999), the function  (     is piece-wise linear function based on the rates of return to 
schooling.
22
 The data on government consumption were collected from the PWT 8.1, which is 
measured by its growth rates (Thanh, 2015). Data on trade openness is taken from the World 
Bank‟s World Development Index (WDI). It is defined as the sum of exports and imports (as a 
share of GDP). Initial real GDP per capita figures are collected from the WDI and measured by 
the logarithm of real GDP per capita in the first year of each five-year sub-period (Jude and 
Levieuge, 2015). Domestic financial markets development is proxied by the ratio of domestic 
credit to the private sector to GDP (Alfaro et al., 2009). This is taken from the Global Financial 
Development database.   
 
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the repression. It shows 
considerable variation in total factor productivity growth, average human capital stock and the 
ratio of inward FDI stock in GDP across countries. With a standard deviation of 16.22, the share 
of inward FDI stock in GDP varies substantially across countries, which ranges from -6.08 
percent in Gabon in 2001 to 73.63 percent in Mauritania in 2005. Similarly, the average human 
capital varies significantly across countries, ranging from 1.136 in Mozambique in 1996 to 2.846 
in Botswana in 2011. Likewise, a standard deviation of 0.115 for productivity growth shows that 
there are large differences across countries, ranging from 0.66 percent in Sierra Leone in 1999 to 
1.78 percent in Zimbabwe in 1996.  
 
                                                          
22
 The function  (           if s    (                (      if         (           
             (     if    , where the return to one extra year of schooling for the first 4 years of education 
is 13.5%, 10.1% for the next 4 years of education and 6.8% beyond 8 years of education. 
   
122 
 
                            
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total factor productivity growth (%) 400 1.009 0.115 0.657 1.784 
Human capital index 400 1.934 0.411 1.136 2.846 
Ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP (%) 400 21.92 16.22 -6.084 73.63 
Initial real GDP per capita (US$) 400 1659 1920 143.3 7963 
Trade openness (%) 400 74.58 36.62 20.96 209.9 
Ratio of domestic credit to GDP (%) 400 28.15 28.55 1.620 160.1 
Control of corruption index 400 -0.435 0.585 -1.389 1.250 
Government spending growth rate (%) 375 1.557 14.14 -89.275 98.87 
 
Table 4.5 displays the correlation among the variables used in the analysis. There is no 
significant positive association between FDI and productivity growth and the interaction term 
between human capital and FDI does not show the expected positive association with TFP 
growth.  
 
Table 4.5: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. TFP growth rate 1         
2. Human capital 0.10* 1        
3. FDI stock in GDP -0.07 0.20* 1       
4. Interaction  -0.05 0.43* 0.96* 1      
5. Initial RGDPPC -0.06 0.71* 0.16* 0.31* 1     
6. Trade openness 0.03 0.45* 0.39* 0.45* 0.33* 1    
7. Domestic credit 0.05 0.50* 0.38* 0.50* 0.50* 0.09 1   
8. Corruption -0.06 0.46* 0.32* 0.42* 0.56* 0.38* 0.51* 1  
9. Consumption  growth  -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 1 
Note: „*‟ denotes significant at the 5 percent.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows how average total factor productivity growth and average share of inward FDI 
stock are compared over the period 1996-2011. The line is fitted by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
using average total factor productivity growth and inward FDI stock as a share of GDP. The plot 
shows no clear positive relationship between TFP productivity and inward FDI stock. It does not 
suggest that countries that have a greater average share of inward FDI stock have also 
experienced higher productivity growth. For example, on average Tunisia attracted the highest 
share of inward FDI stock, but experienced a relatively low productivity growth during the 
period. In contrast, Zimbabwe received moderate levels of inward FDI stock, but had the highest 
productivity growth during the review period. The graph shows a total of 15 countries out of 25 
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countries lying below the curve. This reveals that these countries experienced productivity 
growth rates below the average share of inward FDI stock received during the period.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of average inward FDI stock (% GDP) and TFP growth 
 
To further analyze whether human capital can potentially accelerate the growth effect of FDI, 
TFP growth is plotted against the interaction between human capital and FDI. Human capital 
stock at the beginning of each 5-year period is used instead of the average of this variable over 
time, for example, 1995 for the period 1996-2000, 2000 for 2001-2005, etc. As noted, human 
capital was computed based on 5-year average years of schooling of these countries. Figure 4.2 
shows how TFP growth is associated with FDI through human capital absorptive capacity. The 
graph is plotted using OLS of TFP growth on the interaction between average share of inward 
FDI and human capital stock. The plot does not show that human capital has enhanced the effect 
of FDI on productivity growth, as the plot is not upward sloping and suggests that the 


































0 20 40 60
Inward FDI stock ( % GDP )
Fitted values Average TFP growth
Source: Author's calculations based on Penn World Tables (PWTs) 8.1 & UNCTAD




Figure 4.2: Distribution of average TFP growth and FDI-human capital interaction 
 
One may be concerned about potential problems of outliers in the data, which can significantly 
influence the least squares estimates. As a first step in analyzing the underlying relationship, 
prior analysis is undertaken to tackle the problem of any outliers. The analysis here relies on 
evaluating the plot of leverage-versus-residual-squared, which describes the plot of leverage 
against the normalized residual squared. The plot is derived following the OLS estimation of 
TFP growth and FDI stock, using 5-year averages over the period 1996-2011 including 
observations for 2011. Figure 4.3 displays the plot of leverage against the residuals using TFP. It 
shows large residuals but low leverage for Zimbabwe (ZW), and high leverage but low residuals 
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which suggests that our estimates will not be influenced by problems of outliers.  A similar 
conclusion can be reached when one looks at the plot in figure 4.4 following the OLS regression 
of average TFP growth and human capital.  
 
 















Figure 4.4: TFP growth and human capital 
 
4.5 Empirical Analysis 
 
The correlation analysis above suggests that inward FDI stock is not significantly associated with 
TFP growth and the interaction term between FDI and human capital does not show the expected 
positive correlation. Similarly, the scatter plots do not show any clear relationship between FDI, 
human capital and productivity growth. The analysis, thus, evaluates empirically whether FDI 
has contributed to enhancing productivity growth or whether such effects depend on human 
capital stock of host countries. In analyzing this relationship, equation (4.14) is first estimated 
using OLS while allowing for the linear interaction between FDI and human capital to determine 
whether the growth effect of FDI is conditional on human capital. Table 4.6 presents the results 
of the baseline regression on the relationship between TFP growth, FDI and human capital using 
the pooled OLS estimation techniques. The OLS regression is run on the data averaged over a 5-
year period spanning 1996-2011 (i.e. 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010). To increase the 
sample size, additional observations on the series for 2011 are included in the regression since 
the stock of human capital in 2010 is the same as in 2011. Observations on human capital at the 
start of each 5-year period are used instead of the average of human capital over the respective 
periods e.g. human capital stock in 1995 is used for the period 1996-2000; 2000 for 2001-2005, 
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etc. This is so given that this variable was obtained based on the 5-year average years of 
schooling data (Barro and Lee, 2013).   
 
Table 4.6 presents the results on the relationship between TFP growth, FDI and human capital 
capacity. As shown in column (1), the coefficient on FDI stock shows a negative sign and not 
statistically significant. This suggests that FDI does not raise productivity growth in host 
countries. To determine whether the growth effect of FDI depends on human capital capacity of 
host countries, an interaction term between FDI and human capital is included in the baseline 
regression.  As noted, the human capital stock should enhance the growth impact of FDI through 
the assimilation and adoption of foreign technology and knowledge from these investments. 
      
Table 4.6: Pooled OLS estimation of baseline specification (1996-2011) 
   (1) (2) 
Variables   
Human capital 0.063 0.135* 
 (0.053) (0.072) 
Share of FDI stock in GDP -0.048 0.518** 
 (0.062) (0.260) 
Interaction between human capital & FDI  -0.310** 
  (0.139) 
Log initial real GDP per capita -0.038* -0.041* 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Trade openness  0.046 0.040 
 (0.033) (0.032) 
Private sector credit in GDP 0.060* 0.086** 
 (0.031) (0.034) 
Control of corruption -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Government consumption 0.025 0.101 
 (0.169) (0.159) 
Constant 1.096*** 0.979*** 
 (0.100) (0.107) 
Observations 100 100 
R-squared 0.079 0.106 




Column (2) of table 4.6 reports the regression results after adding a linear interaction term 
between FDI stock and human capital capacity. The coefficient on FDI turns out to be strongly 
positive, albeit the coefficient on the interaction term is negative. The negative coefficient for the 
interaction term could be due to potential nonlinearity between FDI and human capital, rather 
than the linear relationship assumed in the estimation. The total effect of FDI on productivity 
growth shows a positive impact, although the relationship is not statistically significant. This is 
obtained by combining the coefficient on FDI and the interaction term between FDI and human 
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capital, yielding a coefficient of 0.208 and probability value of 0.105.
23
 The result clearly 
indicates that FDI does not raise productivity growth directly, but the effect depends on human 
capital capacity (i.e. through its interaction effects with human capital). However, the negative 
coefficient on the interaction term is not consistent with previous studies which find a 
complementary effect of human capital and FDI on economic growth (e.g. Borensztein et al., 
1998; Li and Liu, 2005). These studies looked at the interaction effects of human capital and FDI 
on economic growth, but not productivity growth. Woo (2009) presents evidence suggesting that 
the effect of FDI on productivity growth is not conditional on human capital capacity of host 
countries, while Xu (2000) finds that host countries should achieve a minimum threshold of 
human capital to facilitate technology transfer from US MNEs and increase productivity growth. 
Nevertheless, our results are not directly comparable with these studies since a different measure 
of human capital is used. Our measure comprises schooling attainment and returns to schooling, 
while previous studies considered schooling attainment.   
 
One possible explanation for the statistically insignificant overall effect of FDI on productivity 
growth could be due to the presence on nonlinearities between FDI and productivity growth. As 
the descriptive analysis suggests, there are considerable differences in human capital stock across 
countries in Africa, ranging from 1.136 in Mozambique in 1996 to 2.846 in Botswana in 2010. 
This suggests that human capital capacity can reasonably explain host country heterogeneity in 
determining whether the effect of FDI on productivity growth is heterogeneous across countries.  
 
In order to analyze such heterogeneity, the empirical model (equation 4.14) is estimated using a 
Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) model. This approach allows us to determine the 
threshold level of human capital capacity above which FDI would increase productivity growth 
in host countries. The PSTR was developed by Gonzalez et al (2005) and Fok et al (2005) and 
represents a generalization of the Panel Transition Regression (PTR) proposed by Hansen 
(1999). One advantage of the PSTR relative to the PTR is that it allows for the coefficient on the 
variables to smoothly change between one regime (lower bound) to the next (upper bound), 
based on the different values of an observable variable known as transition function. In addition, 
since the PSTR model allows for time varying and heterogeneity in the parameters, it is also 
                                                          
23
 Equation 4.14 was also estimated using fixed effects model on the panel of 25 countries, but the coefficient on 
FDI was not statistically significant. 
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suitable for dealing with the problem of few outliers which can significantly distort the results 
from the estimation of linear interactions between human capital and FDI (see Gainelli et al., 
2015).   
 
In estimating the parameters of the PSTR, the first step involves testing for homogeneity 
between FDI and productivity growth against the PSTR model. This implies determining 
whether the underlying relationship is linear, which suggests that impact of FDI is homogenous 
across countries and time invariant. Considering a basic model with one threshold or two 
regimes, the PSTR model is specified as:  
 
                                   
      
 
 
     (           )           (4.17)                                
Where        , and           N and T denote cross-section units and time dimension of 
the panel respectively.    is the country fixed effects and     is an error term.     is total factor 
productivity growth and     is a vector of time varying explanatory variables, which comprises  
the share of FDI stock in GDP, initial real GDP per capita, trade openness, control of corruption 
index, ratio of private sector credit to GDP and growth in government consumption. To guard 
against potential endogeneity bias, all explanatory variables are lagged one period, except growth 
in government consumption. For instance, the share of inward FDI stock in GDP is a potentially 
endogenous variable. This arises from the fact that FDI is most likely to be attracted to countries 
with greater total factor productivity growth than their counterparts with relatively lower 
productivity. Greater productivity is driven by technology innovations in host countries which 
enhance the assimilation and adoption of technology from FDI, thereby attracting more of these 
investments.  Such potential endogeneity bias problem is however mitigated through estimation 
of the PSTR model, since it allows for time-varying effect of FDI on productivity growth at 
different levels of the transition variable (Jude and Levieuge, 2015). The function  
 (           ) is a continuous function of the threshold variable, human capital stock. This 
function is bounded between 0 and 1, with these extreme values associated with the regression 
parameters    and (      . The threshold variable is also lagged one period ((       ;   is a 
slope parameter, which determines the smoothness of the transition function and   is a location 
or threshold parameter. Following Gonzalez et al. (2005), the analysis uses a logistic transition 
function which is specified as:  
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                                          (           )  
 
(      (  ∏ (          )
 
   )
,        (4.18) 
 
 Where            and   (          is an m-dimensional vector of threshold 
parameters. With one threshold parameter (    , the logistic transition function takes the 
form: 
                                                 (           )  
 
(     (  (        )))
,       (4.19) 
In this case, there are two extreme regimes associated with low and high values of the threshold 
variable        with a single monotonic transformation of the coefficients from    to (       
as        increases. Note that from equation (4.18), when    , the transaction function 
 (           ) converges to an indicator function, depicting the Hansen (1999) PTR model. 
For   , the transition function reaches its minimum at (       ⁄  and is associated with a 
value of 1 at both low and high values of the threshold variable         (Gonzalez et al., 2005). As 
a result, when    , the model becomes a three-regime threshold model. In general, for any 
value of    the transaction function is constant when    , and the model can be estimated as a 
homogeneous or linear fixed effects panel regression.  
 
To estimate the parameters of the PSTR, the individual fixed effects    in equation (4.17) are 
eliminated by de-meaning the variables and nonlinear least squares estimation applied to the 
transformed model. In order to evaluate the presence of nonlinearities FDI and productivity 
growth, the null hypothesis of homogeneity,         or          , is tested against the 
alternative of the PSTR model from equation (4.17). However, the test statistics evaluating the 
null hypothesis are nonstandard and the PSTR has unidentified nuisance parameters. In order to 
conduct the test, an auxiliary regression is derived by replacing the transition function in 
equation (4.17) with a first-order Taylor expression around      as specified in equation (4.20) 
(Collettaz and Hurlin, 2006; Gonzalez et al., 2005; Jude, 2010; Thanh, 2015):  
 
                           
      
 
 
             
         
     
 
         
     
    (4.20)                            
Where the parameter vectors (  
     
   are multiples of   and    
        
    ,    is the 
reminder of the Taylor expansion. The test for linearity in equation (4.20) against the PSTR 
implies testing the null hypothesis            , using the Wald and Likelihood ratio 
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tests statistics. Non-rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity implies that the effect of FDI on 
productivity growth is homogenous and the model should be treated as the linear panel with 
fixed effects.  
 
To ensure that the nonlinearity between FDI and productivity growth is not driven by omitted 
variables, equation (4.17) captures not only the interaction between FDI and human capital but 
also the interaction terms between human capital and all the explanatory variables. These 
interactions can be justified from theoretical perspectives. For instance, literature suggests that 
the presence of good quality institutions encourages investment in physical and human capital 
and facilitates the efficient use of these factors to achieve greater level of income (Acemoglu et 
al, 2001). The inclusion of the interaction between control of corruption index, which is used as 
proxy for institutional quality, and human capital follows the argument that high level of 
corruption increases uncertainty and discourages talented people from engaging in productive 
activities (Rogers, 2008). Trade openness enhances the growth effect of human capital especially 
in poor countries. Inclusion of the interaction term between trade openness and human capital is 
in line with the argument that greater trade openness encourages competition, increases the 
demand for high-skilled labour, promotes learning by doing and associated use of modern 
technology (Miller and Upadhyay, 2000). Because improving human capital enhances the 
capacity of countries to absorb foreign technology, its interaction with initial real GDP per capita 
captures the catch-up effect.  
 
The test for nonlinearity involves testing a linear model (     against the PRST model with 
one threshold (        or two regimes. The results of the linearity test are reported in table 
4.7, which show strong rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity. All test statistics suggest the 
presence of nonlinear effect of FDI on productivity growth. This indicates that it is more helpful 
to explore host country heterogeneity through nonlinear estimation technique, to determine the 
role of human capital capacity in accelerating technology spillovers in host African countries, 
rather than relying on inferences based on the linear interactions between FDI and human capital 
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Table 4.7: Linearity tests 
Test Statistic P-value 
Wald Test (LM) 25.99 0.000 
Fisher Test (LMF) 4.270 0.000 
LRT Tests (LRT) 26.94 0.000 
 Note:     linear model (     vs     PSTR model with at least 1 threshold  (     
 
Having confirmed the presence of nonlinear effect of FDI on productivity growth, the second 
step in estimating the PSTR model is to determine whether there is no remaining heterogeneity 
in the data. In other words, this test is performed to ascertain whether the PSTR model with one 
threshold of human capital captures host country heterogeneity. It involves testing a single 
threshold model  (        or two regimes against a double threshold model  (        or 
three regimes. In the case of 2 transition functions or 3 regimes, the PSTR model is specified as:    
                                        
 
 
      (           )    
 
 
      (           )       (4.21)                            
 
To derive the auxiliary regression of the test, the second transition function is replaced by its 
first-order Taylor expansion around     as specified in equation (4.22):  
 
                                        
 
 
      (           )                     (4.22) 
 
The test for no remaining heterogeneity implies testing the linear constraints on the 
parameters      . The testing procedure is described as follows. Suppose that there is a 
PSTR with    transition functions. The hull hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity is specified 
as       
 against the alternative hypothesis      
   . The testing procedure ends when 
the null hypothesis is not rejected. Otherwise, the test is performed on the null       
    
against the alternative hypothesis       
     until all the test statistics fail to reject the null 
hypothesis.  
 
Results of the test for remaining nonlinearities are displayed in Table 4.8. All the test statistics 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no remaining heterogeneity. The test results indicate that 
heterogeneity in the effect of FDI on productivity growth is completely captured by estimating a 
PSTR with one threshold value or two regimes. On these grounds, it is appropriate to analyze the 
underlying relationship using a logistic function. As noted, the PSTR based on a logistic 
   
133 
 
specification is a regime-switching model that allows for two regimes which depict low and high 
levels of human capital capacity.  
 
Table 4.8: Test for remaining nonlinearity 
 
 Note:    PSTR with one threshold (      vs     PSTR with at least 2 thresholds (     
 
In the next step, the PSTR model in equation (4.17) is estimated using nonlinear least squares, 
which is further expanded as stated in equation (4.23): 
                              (           )          
 
       (           )        (4.23)                                                                                                 
 
Where          is one period lag of the share of inward FDI stock in GDP and      is a vector of 
control variables as defined above. The results of the estimated parameters from the PSTR model 
with one threshold of human capital capacity are presented in table 4.9. Like the case of the 
probit or logit models, the values of the parameters are not directly interpretable. It is therefore 
helpful to interpret the signs of the parameters, which reflect an increase or decrease in the value 
of the explanatory variables associated with an increase in human capital capacity. Considering 
FDI variable, a positive (negative) sign on this coefficient suggests that elasticity of TFP growth 
increases (decreases) respectively as human capital capacity is enhanced.  Table 4.9 reports the 
estimates of the PSTR for a sample of 25 countries over the period 1996-2011. The results 
clearly suggest a non-linear effect of FDI on TFP growth.  As can be seen from column (1) of 
table 4.9, the coefficient on FDI (0.069) has the expected positive sign but not statistically 
significant, suggesting that FDI does not significantly influence TFP growth at low levels of 
human capital capacity. The estimated parameter of FDI only becomes positive and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level when human capital exceeds the estimated threshold of average 
human capital stock of 2.31 (column 2). This is an indication that the effect of FDI on TFP 
growth depends on human capital capacity. Intuitively, host African countries will only 
experience an increase in productivity growth from FDI when they have attained this minimum 
threshold level of human capital capacity. The threshold level of human capital (2.31) is 
relatively close to the sample mean (1.93), ranging from 1.136 in Mozambique in 1996 to 2.85 in 
Botswana in 2010.  
Test Statistic P-value 
Wald Test (LM) 7.977 0.240 
Fisher Test (LMF) 1.203 0.304 
LRT Tests (LRT) 8.063 0.234 




Table 4.9: PSTR model estimation 
       
Location (threshold) parameter (                                          
2.31                                 
Slope parameter (                                          
63.82 








Lagged trade openness -0.099** 
(0.047)         
0.199*** 
(0.053) 
Lagged control of corruption  0.072***  
 (0.016)    
0.209 *** 
(0.048) 
Lagged private sector credit in GDP 0.177    
(0.096)     
-0.324*** 
(0.102) 
Growth in government consumption -0.047     
 (0.044)        
0.013 
 (0.071) 
Note: ***, **,* denote 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. Dependent variable-Productivity growth  
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
Contrary to previous studies that have assumed homogenous effect of FDI on economic growth 
through the linear interactions with human capital (Borenzstein et al., 1998; Li and Liu, 2005), 
our analysis reveals a heterogeneous and time-varying effect of FDI on productivity growth. This 
finding suggests that the assumption of homogeneity could be misleading and inferences on the 
threshold of human capital capacity, through such linear interaction between FDI and human 
capital stock, should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Given that test of no remaining nonlinearity establishes a single threshold value, it is important to 
analyze the elasticity of productivity growth with respect to FDI between the extreme regime of 
low human capital capacity and the upper extreme regime. Using the logistic function, analyzing 
TFP growth allows us to comprehensively evaluate the extent to which the effect of FDI on 
productivity growth varies across countries. This is defined in equation (4.24) and obtained from 
equation (4.23). The elasticity of TFP growth with respect to FDI ranges from   , that is, zero to 
(       as human capital increases from low to high capacity.
24
  
                                    
    
         
        (           )     (4.24)        
                             
                                                          
24
 The coefficient on FDI (    associated with low human capital (0.069) is not significantly different from zero. 
   
135 
 
 Literature suggests that when the estimated slope or smoothness parameter (   of the transition 
function is low, the speed of transition from low to high human capital regime will be relatively 
smooth. Under this condition, human capital enhancement will gradually support the growth 
effect of FDI in host countries. On the contrary, when the slope of the transition function   is 
relatively large, depicting relatively sharp slope, the transition from low to high regime tends to 
be rapid. In this case, host countries that exhibit human capital capacity just below the threshold 
can realize significant increases in the growth effect of FDI when such capacity is enhanced, 
while those far below the established threshold will experience productivity gains from FDI.  
 
To analyze such differences, a useful approach is to first establish more informative threshold of 
human capital in terms of average years of schooling, given that this variable is measured as a 
composite variable comprising average years of schooling and returns to education. This is 
calculated from the function in equation (4.25), since the average years of schooling (   was 
estimated at 5.23 years for sub-Saharan Africa in 2010 and 7.25 years for North Africa and 
Middle East countries. From this perspective, equation (4.25) is as follows:  
  
                                                                           
 (          (4.25)                                                            
where  (                (      if         and   is average years of schooling. 
Given the estimated threshold of human capital stock (    of 2.31, solving for   from equation 
(4.25) translates into 6.94 average years of schooling. This result indicates that FDI will 
accelerate productivity growth in host African countries that have achieved this threshold level. 
By the same token, host countries that exhibit human capital capacity very close to the threshold 
will experience a sharp increase in the growth effect of FDI when measures are undertaken to 
further enhance human capital. Conversely, countries with capacity far below this threshold level 
will not reap such productivity gains, unless human capital is enhanced closer to or at the 
threshold level. In other words, host African countries should attain a minimum of 6.94 average 
years of schooling in order to assimilate the knowledge and technology embedded in FDI and 
experience productivity gains from these investments. Using the PSTR model, Fracasso and 
Marzetti (2014) found a threshold of 8.33 average years of schooling for OECD countries to 
absorb spillovers from international R&D activities. Our analysis reveals a relatively lower 
threshold of 6.94 average years of schooling for African countries. This is expected since OECD 
economies have higher human capital capacity than African countries. The average years of total 
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schooling in the OECD was 11.30 years in 2010, compared to 5.23 years in sub-Saharan Africa 
and 7.25 years in the Middle East and North Africa countries. 
 
Given this threshold, it is important to analyze the variation in the effect of FDI on productivity 
growth across countries using the plot of the logistic function associated with the estimated slope 
parameter    (63.82). Figure 4.5 displays the plot of elasticity of TFP growth with respect to FDI 
conditional on human capital capacity across countries. This plot reveals a relatively sharp slope 
of TFP growth elasticity, given a relatively higher value of the slope parameter    of the 
transition function. As noted above, this slope of the logistic function suggests that countries 
with human capital capacity very close to the threshold of 6.94 average years of schooling will 
realize a sharp rise in the elasticity of productivity growth with respect to FDI from 0.00 to 
0.182, as efforts at further improving human capital capacity are intensified. For countries with 
human capital capacity some distance below this threshold, the elasticity of productivity growth 
with respect to FDI is not significant. This evidence suggests that there is heterogeneity in the 
effect of FDI on productivity growth, which is explained by the variation in human capital 




Figure 4.5: Elasticity of TFP growth with respect to FDI 
 
Looking at the average human capital capacity of countries in column (4) of table 4.10 suggests 
that out of the sample of 25 countries, only 7 countries had attained the threshold of 6.94 average 
years of schooling in 2010. These are South Africa, Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, 
Tunisia and Egypt. Interestingly, as can be seen from column (5) of table 4.10, these countries 
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were not major recipients of FDI at the initial stage.
25
 The exceptions are the two North African 
countries (Tunisia and Egypt). As discussed previously, countries such as Mauritius, Tunisia and 
South Africa are at the efficiency-driven stage of development, while Botswana and Egypt are in 
transition from factor-driven to efficiency-driven stage of development, and Zimbabwe is factor-
driven economy (Sala-I-Martin et al., 2010). Countries with human capital capacity below the 
threshold are mostly at the factor-driven stage of development, and include Burundi, Cameroon, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania. Few of 
the countries below the minimum human capital threshold are at the transition stage from factor-
driven to efficiency-driven development (e.g. Morocco), while Namibia is at the efficiency-
driven stage of development.  
 
Table 4.10: Human capital stock and initial FDI across countries 
Country Human capital 
stock (2011) 
Average human capital 
stock 1996-2011 
Average years of total 
schooling (2010) 
FDI stock (% GDP)  
in 1996 
Botswana  2.85 2.74 9.55 20.95 
South Africa 2.64 2.58 9.69 8.97 
Gabon 2.59 2.40 8.39 4.01 
Mauritius 2.53 2.36 8.86 6.55 
Zimbabwe 2.48 2.38 7.61 18.42 
Swaziland 2.48 2.36 5.06 26.94 
Tunisia 2.38 2.35 7.48 52.53 
Egypt 2.31 2.17 7.15 22.66 
Kenya 2.23 2.15 6.14 5.54 
Lesotho 2.23 2.14 5.85 24.31 
Cameroon 2.14 2.02 6.15 11.26 
Namibia 2.13 2.08 6.17 42.16 
Tanzania 2.05 1.91 5.81 7.65 
Togo 2.04 1.91 5.49 19.99 
Senegal 1.93 1.81 2.74 7.48 
Morocco 1.89 1.76 4.96 13.16 
Ivory Coast 1.82 1.72 4.65 14.71 
Mauritania 1.80 1.67 4.53 6.55 
Benin 1.77 1.60 4.43 2.64 
Rwanda 1.70 1.59 4.36 3.93 
Central African Republic  1.64 1.58 3.76 9.39 
Sierra Leone 1.58 1.49 4.23 17.66 
Burundi 1.57 1.46 3.35 3.16 
Niger 1.28 1.23 1.88 17.51 
Mozambique 1.27 1.19 1.93 11.86 
Source: Penn World Tables 8.1 (Feenstra et al, 2016); Barro and Lee (2013) and UNCTAD (2016). 
One may argue that the inclusion of the interaction term between human capital and FDI without 
the direct effect of human capital on TFP growth may not capture adequately the nonlinearity in 
                                                          
25
 The sample is restricted to only African countries with data on both productivity growth and human capital. Note also that the 
composition of FDI may partly explain the extent to which host African countries benefit from these investments. However, the 
ability of these countries to leverage FDI hinges on their absorptive capacity. Due to the absence of data on the sectoral 
composition of FDI, this thesis does not thoroughly discuss how such „composition effects‟ in the seven (7) countries may have 
contributed to explaining TFP gains over time.   
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the relationship between FDI and TFP growth (see Fauquau et al.l, 2008; Fracasso and Marzetti, 
2014). As noted, human capital directly affects TFP growth by enhancing the capacity of host 
countries to innovate new technologies and indirectly by facilitating technology diffusion 
through FDI. To address this concern, equation (4.17) is augmented by adding one period lag of 
human capital (        as an additional explanatory variable in addition to its interaction with 
FDI and other explanatory variables. This is specified in equation (4.26) as: 
            [  
             ]  [  
             ] (           )          (4.26)           
 
 Table 4.11 presents the results of the test for linearity of the relationship between FDI and 
productivity growth when the direct effects of human capital are included in the PSTR 
specification. All the test statistics suggest strong rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity. 
This confirms the preceding analysis that the relationship between FDI and productivity growth 
is nonlinear. The result suggests that the omission of the direct effects of human capital on TFP 
growth does not influence the nonlinear relationship between FDI and TFP growth.  
 
Given the existence of such a nonlinear relationship, a second step in the estimation of the PSTR 
is to determine whether there is no remaining heterogeneity in the data. The results of this test 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of a PRST model with one transition function or two regimes 
should be used. This is reported in table 4.11. Further tests for no remaining heterogeneity fail to 
reject the null of the presence of two transition functions. The existence of two transition 
functions with one threshold each or three-regime threshold model is in line with arguments in 
the literature that the presence of reciprocal externality between human capital and FDI can lead 
to multiple equilibria (see Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003).  
Table 4.11: Test for remaining nonlinearity 
Hypothesis Test Statistics P-value 
    (          (      Wald Test (LM) 43.19 0.000 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 6.378 0.000 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 45.886 0.000 
    (          (      Wald Test (LM) 19.778 0.006 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 2.617 0.012 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 20.318 0.005 
    (          (      Wald Test (LM) 8.091 0.325 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 1.014 0.421 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 8.179 0.317 
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The estimates of the parameters of the PSTR with two threshold values of human capital are 
reported in table 4.12. In this case, the interpretation of the direction of the effects of the 
explanatory variables is slightly different. An increase in human capital capacity of host 
countries can generate the same effect of FDI or other independent variables on productivity 
growth when the coefficients in columns     and     have the same sign. On the other hand, 
enhancing human capital will reveal the opposing effects of a variable on productivity growth 
when these coefficients in columns     and     have different signs.  
 
Table 4.12: PSTR model estimation 
          
Location (threshold) parameter (                                         2.30                       1.44 
Slope parameter (                                         
87.83 
                     307.37


















Lagged trade openness 0.508*** 





Lagged control of corruption -0.325***    





Lagged private sector credit in GDP    1.893*** 





Growth in government consumption 0.006 





Note: ***, **denote 1% and  5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity. Dependent 
variable-Productivity growth 
 
A look at the results of the PSTR reported in column (1) of table 4.12 shows that the coefficient 
on FDI on productivity growth is strongly negative at low level of human capital capacity. The 
result confirms the above analysis that FDI will not accelerate productivity growth when host 
countries have not attained a threshold of human capital capacity. As can be seen from column 
(2), the parameter turns out to be positive and statistically significant at 5 percent level, after the 
threshold of human capital capacity is achieved. In column (3), the parameter for FDI remains to 
be positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent. This reflects the nonlinear interaction 
between FDI and human capital capacity, revealing that FDI does not show any significant 
impact on productivity growth at low levels of human capacity and its contribution to 
productivity growth increases rapidly at higher levels of human capital capacity. It suggests that 
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improving human capital capacity enhances the impact of FDI on total factor productivity 
growth. The estimation with direct effects of human capital establishes a threshold of 2.30 
average human capital stock for the first transition function. This translates into 6.90 average 
years of schooling and slightly lower than the threshold estimated above. The results further 
support the above analysis that host countries will not maximize the benefits of FDI from FDI 
when human capital capacity is far below the threshold necessary to absorb technology 
spillovers. The estimated slope parameters of the first transition function (         is 
relatively sharp, indicating that FDI can significantly raise productivity growth in countries with 
human capital capacity closer to this threshold level once  efforts to further enhance such 
capacity are undertaken. As shown in table 4.12, the threshold value of human capital of the last 
regime (1.44) has very high smoothness parameter (         . This suggests that only few 
countries will reach this additional regime of human capital capacity.   
 
In determining the optimal threshold variable among the explanatory variables, the literature 
suggests that it is appropriate to choose the variable with the strongest rejection of the hypothesis 
of linearity (Gonzalez et al., 2005). In this study, the threshold variable (human capital) is chosen 
a priori given the objectives of study, and the PSTR models estimated differ depending on 
whether the direct effects of human capital are introduced or not. As shown in table 4.13, a 
comparison of the linearity test statistics for these PSTR specifications shows that both groups of 
test statistics reject the null hypothesis of linearity at 1 percent significance level. It can also be 
seen from this table that the introduction of direct effects of human capital on TFP growth results 
in relatively higher values of the test statistics. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 
estimation of PSTR model with either one transition function and one threshold or two transition 
functions with one threshold each  is sufficient to capture the commonly encountered types of 
variation in the parameters (Gonzalez et al., 2005). This is so because such specifications 
properly capture host country heterogeneity and time variability in the effect of FDI on 
productivity growth. On these grounds, our results can be analyzed using either the logistic 
function  which allows for two extreme regimes associated with low and high values of human 
capital, or the three-regime PSTR model, which allows for two threshold values of human 
capital.  If one considers the results of the later model as reported in table 4.12, the transition 
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function of TFP growth elasticity has its minimum at (           ⁄      , which is 
converted to 4.85 average years of schooling.  
 
Table 4.13: Test for linearity with and without direct effects of human capital 
Hypothesis Test Statistics P-value 
  Without With With Without 
    (          (     Wald Test (LM) 25.99 43.19 0.000 0.000 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 4.270 6.378 0.000 0.000 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 26.94 45.886 0.000 0.000 
 
 
One may also argue that nonlinearity in the relationship between FDI and productivity could be 
sensitive to the number of observations. To explore this issue, the test for nonlinearity is further 
conducted by dropping Zimbabwe from the sample, given the economic crisis that characterized 
the country during the period. The results of such tests as displayed in table 4.14 shows a 
remarkably consistent nonlinear relationship. 
  
Table 4.14: Test for linearity with direct effects of human capital (excluding Zimbabwe) 
Hypothesis Test Statistics P-value 
    (          (      Wald Test (LM) 31.31 0.000 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 4.48 0.000 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 32.75 0.000 
    (          (      Wald Test (LM) 27.52 0.006 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 3.72 0.001 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 28.63 0.000 
    (          (      Wald Test (LM) 6.44 0.489 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 0.80 0.587 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 6.49 0.483 
 
A useful extension of the analysis is to determine whether such a nonlinear relationship is 
sensitive to the measure of FDI used. Table 4.15 presents the results of such estimation, 













Table 4.15: Test for linearity without direct effects of human capital (including Zimbabwe) 
Hypothesis Test Statistics P-value 
    
    (          (      Wald Test (LM) 31.31 0.000 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 4.48 0.000 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 32.75 0.000 
    (          (      Wald Test (LM) 27.52 0.006 
 Fisher Test (LMF) 3.72 0.001 
 LRT Tests (LRT) 28.63 0.000 
    
Overall, the analysis supports the view that the effect of FDI on productivity growth is nonlinear 
and depends on human capital capacity of host countries. This evidence suggests that there is 
heterogeneity in the effect of FDI on productivity growth, which is explained by the variation in 
human capital capacity across African countries. The results demonstrate that enhancing human 




This study has explored the question of whether the effect of FDI on productivity growth varies 
across African countries depending on their human capital capacity. The empirical literature on 
the growth-enhancing effect of FDI, using linear estimation techniques has shown inconclusive 
results. In order to resolve these mixed findings, this study has exploited the variation in human 
capital capacity across African countries in investigating the nonlinear effect of FDI on 
productivity growth. In so doing, this study makes an important contribution to the empirical 
literature by determining whether the effect of FDI on productivity growth across is 
heterogeneous across host African countries. 
 
Recent country level data on total factor productivity growth and human capital stock were 
analyzed to comprehensively investigate these issues for a panel of 25 countries over the period 
1996-2011. Results of the linear model showed that the overall impact of FDI on productivity 
growth is positive, but not statistically significant. This is attributed to the presence of 
nonlinearity in the effect of FDI on productivity growth. Given this finding, the study allowed 
for nonlinearity using the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) model. Evidently, there is 
strong support for the existence of nonlinear relationship between FDI and productivity growth. 
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The study revealed that host countries should achieve a minimum threshold of 6.94 average 
years of schooling for FDI to accelerate productivity growth. Analyzing this threshold, the 
results revealed considerable heterogeneity in the effect of FDI on productivity growth across 
countries. The evidence suggests that countries with human capital capacity far below the 
threshold will not experience productivity gains from FDI, while those with human capital 
capacity very close to or above the threshold will realize an increase in productivity growth as 
efforts to improve human capital capacity are enhanced.  
 
On a policy perspective, the results clearly underscore the importance of human capital capacity 
in attracting FDI and absorbing technology spillovers. Thus, it would be helpful for countries 
with human capital capacity well below the threshold to consider such capacity enhancement as a 
prerequisite for the attraction of FDI in order to reap the benefits of such investments. On the 
other hand, countries with human capital very close or above the threshold should ensure that 
human capital enhancement is an important part of the overall policy framework to attract FDI. 
These countries can simultaneously embark on improving human capital capacity and the 
attraction of FDI. This finding corroborates the analysis in chapter three and suggests that 
African countries should enhance capacity in science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM) education and skills in order to absorb higher quality FDI. 
 
While this study has not focused on other measures of absorptive capacity (e.g. development of 
domestic financial markets and institutional quality), it is not clear from the empirical literature 
whether such capabilities could explain the heterogeneous effect of FDI on productivity growth. 
Such issues can be explored in future research to explain the variation in the effect of FDI on 
productivity growth across countries.  
  








5.1 Summary of Findings 
 
Over the past two decades, most countries in the African continent have successfully attracted 
increasing amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) from different source economies. While 
there is growing recognition that the determinants of FDI into host countries could vary across 
the different groups of investors, there is scarce empirical evidence on the factors encouraging 
FDI into African countries from the different source countries. There is also little empirical 
evidence on how foreign affiliates can be integrated in host countries to enhance productivity 
spillovers to local firms and whether such investments have contributed to increasing 
productivity growth in recipient countries. This thesis has attempted to provide answers to these 
questions in three chapters. Chapters two and three investigated the determinants of FDI activity 
in host African countries and chapter four explored the growth enhancing effect of FDI in these 
economies. In chapter two, emphasis was placed on identifying the drivers of FDI from the 
different source economies into resource and non-resource rich African countries. This chapter 
was complemented by chapter three in analyzing the determinants of FDI activity, by 
determining the sectors through which foreign affiliates are more likely to integrate local firms in 
FDI projects. Chapter four explored the question of whether FDI has contributed to promoting 
productivity growth in host African countries.  
 
Chapter two analyzed whether FDI from the different source economies, categorized into 
investments from intra-African economies, the OECD and non-OECD emerging markets 
economies, are driven by the size of host markets, presence of natural resources and lower labour 
costs considerations in resource-rich countries. In a similar manner, this chapter explored 
whether FDI from these different sources are also attracted by large markets and lower labour 
costs in non-resource rich countries. There are arguments pointing to potential heterogeneity in 
the factors determining FDI into host countries from the different groups of investors, which 
could be explained by differences in nationality of investors, levels of income and geographical 
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locations of the countries of origin.  From this perspective, chapter two contributes to the 
empirical literature on FDI determinants by providing evidence on the factors that specifically 
determine FDI from the different source economies into resource and non-resource rich 
economies. Chapter two further argued that the determinants of FDI could vary due to 
differences in income levels and resource wealth across host African countries. This chapter 
makes an important contribution to the empirical literature by providing evidence on the 
differences in the motivations and determinants of FDI among investors from the different 
source economies. 
 
The results in chapter two showed remarkable differences between groups of investors from 
intra-African economies and those from the OECD and non-OECD emerging markets 
economies. The size of markets matters for attracting FDI from the OECD and non-OECD 
emerging markets economies into resource and non-resource rich countries. Foreign investments 
from non-OECD emerging markets economies are also encouraged by the presence of lower 
labour costs in non-resource rich countries. Similarly, host African countries with large markets 
are major destinations of FDI from intra-African economies. These findings underline the 
importance of intra-African FDI as potential source of external finance to promote growth of 
African economies. Partly due to similarity in institutional environment in host countries, intra-
African investments can be readily integrated into host markets. This has the potential to boost 
productivity growth. Generally, while the presence of natural resources has a significant 
influence on FDI into resource-rich countries, the analysis showed that resource-seeking FDI 
into the extractive industries could undermine FDI into non-resource sectors of host countries.   
 
The heterogeneous nature of FDI is further confirmed by analyzing the differences in 
motivations and determinants of FDI among investors from the different source economies. The 
analysis revealed significant differences in FDI behaviour between groups of investors from 
intra-African and OECD economies in terms of their response to market size and the presence of 
natural resources. Additionally, there are significant differences between intra-African investors 
and those from the non-OECD emerging markets economies with respect to natural resources in 
host countries. The analysis was extended to investigate the question of whether FDI to South 
Africa is different from FDI to other African countries. When intra-African FDI were 
considered, the results showed significant differences between FDI to South Africa and other 
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African countries with respect to natural resources availability. Similarly, there are significant 
differences in market-seeking considerations between these countries for FDI from the OECD 
and natural resources availability for FDI from non-OECD emerging markets economies. These 
findings confirm the hypothesis that there is heterogeneity in the determinants of FDI in African 
countries. The results highlight the importance of differentiating the factors driving FDI among 
the different groups of investors for more informed decisions on engagement with these 
investors.  
 
Establishing such heterogeneity is an important step in understanding the extent to which host 
countries can maximize the benefits of these investments. This is so as the empirical evidence 
suggests that foreign investments driven by large markets (market-seeking) and availability of 
lower labour costs (efficiency-seeking) are more growth enhancing than resource-seeking FDI. 
Besides exploring the heterogeneous nature of FDI, chapter two has also brought to the fore the 
question of how well local firms can be integrated in FDI projects in order to facilitate 
knowledge and technology spillovers to local firms in host countries. Chapter three has furthered 
the debate on the determinants of FDI activity, providing evidence on the specific sectors 
through which foreign and domestic firms are most likely to undertake joint production in sub-
Saharan Africa. This is particularly relevant for a region that has received fewer spillovers from 
FDI and little attention in the empirical literature on the ownership decisions of these firms. The 
sub-Saharan African region has attracted significant investments in high technology sectors in 
recent years, which are capital-intensive in nature and were mostly undertaken by joint venture 
firms formed between local firms and TNCs. With this pattern of FDI in mind, chapter three 
investigated whether foreign affiliates are more likely to integrate local firms in capital-intensive 
than labour-intensive projects in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
In trying to answer this question, chapter three exploited a large firm level data on manufacturing 
and services firms for 19 countries, which has not been extensively used in the empirical 
literature. The results showed remarkably consistent finding that there is greater likelihood of 
integrating local firms in capital-intensive FDI than in labour-intensive investments. This is 
further confirmed by a sensitivity analysis that allowed for different estimation techniques and 
different measures of the relative input investment of foreign affiliates and local firms used to 
determine how these investments influence firms‟ decisions to integrate in FDI projects. The 
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findings are consistent with the hypothesis of the study, and suggest that there is greater potential 
for productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms to be enhanced through non-extractive 
capital-intensive sectors in host countries.   
 
Given the evidence presented in chapter three and the volume of investments attracted into host 
African countries in recent years, chapter four analyzed whether FDI has contributed to raising 
productivity growth of African countries. This chapter argued that the effect of FDI on 
productivity growth is not homogeneous, but varies across host African countries. Such 
heterogeneity in the impact of FDI is hypothesized to be explained by the differences in human 
capital capacity in absorbing foreign technology from FDI. This argument is premised on the 
view that the existence of reciprocal externality between FDI and human capital can explain the 
nonlinear interactions between these factors. From this perspective, it is expected that the effect 
of FDI on productivity growth could vary across countries depending on human capital capacity. 
A distinctive contribution of this chapter lies in consideration of host country heterogeneity in 
human capital capacity to determine whether the effect of FDI on productivity growth is 
conditional upon such capacity.  
 
Considering these differences, chapter four exploited the variation in human capital capacity 
across countries. This allowed us to resolve the problem of nonlinearity not tackled in previous 
studies. In doing so, the study provided a comprehensive analysis of the effect of FDI on 
productivity growth, determining the threshold of human capital that enhances such growth 
impact on African economies. Taking advantage of country level data on productivity growth 
and human capital stock on 25 African countries over the period 1996-2011, this analysis 
showed strong support for the nonlinearity between FDI and productivity growth.  The study 
revealed that FDI will not raise productivity growth unless host countries attain a threshold of 
6.94 average years of schooling. Analyzing this threshold, the analysis showed that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the growth effects of FDI. It revealed that host countries with 
human capital capacity well below this threshold will not experience productivity gains from 
FDI, unless human capital is enhanced to the threshold level. Conversely, those closer or above 
the threshold would realize significant productivity gains from these investments as further 
efforts are taken to enhance human capital. The results are in line with our hypothesis that there 
are differences in the impact of FDI on productivity growth across host countries, determined by 
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the variation in the human capital capacity of host African countries. The findings suggest that 
enhancing human capital capacity is vital to raise productivity spillovers from FDI in host 
African countries. Overall, the analysis revealed that only 7 out of a sample of 25 African 
countries used in the study-South Africa, Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Tunisia and 
Egypt-had attained the minimum threshold of 6.94 average years of schooling in 2010. This 
suggests that the effect of FDI on productivity growth will be stronger in these countries. 
  
5.2 Policy Implications 
 
There are important policy implications to be drawn from the findings of this thesis. The findings 
from chapter two indicate that there is heterogeneity in motivations and determinants of FDI 
between investors from African economies and the OECD and non-OECD emerging market 
economies. This outcome suggests that policies designed to attract FDI should take into account 
the specific characteristics of investors from these groups of economies. More sustainable FDI 
from the various sources can be encouraged through policies that promote market-seeking 
investments, possibly through targeted economic incentives to encourage investments in 
manufacturing and higher productivity services sectors. Such a policy can be accompanied by 
measures that enhance human capital capacity and tackle the specific technology requirements of 
these investors. The presence of low cost labour is also important to non-OECD emerging 
markets investors in non-resource rich countries. This finding points to the role of policy in 
encouraging more market-determined wages in host countries in order to attract these 
investments. By adopting different policy measures according to the specific characteristics of 
investors, host countries are more likely to be successful in attracting FDI from the different 
source economies into non-resource sectors and possibly offset the crowding-out impact of 
resource-seeking FDI into host African economies.   
 
As foreign affiliates are more likely to integrate local firms in FDI projects through capital 
intensive than labour intensive activities, this finding points to an important role of policy in 
encouraging joint ventures between these firms in capital-intensive sectors. Arguably, joint 
venture ownership can facilitate knowledge and technology transfers to domestic firms and boost 
productivity in the host economy. However, the evidence presented in chapter three does not 
suggest that labour intensive investments should not be simultaneously encouraged. Instead, it 
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points to the fact that host countries can potentially benefit from non-natural resource oriented 
capital-intensive investments, if local skills are enhanced to leverage the technology embedded 
in higher quality FDI undertaken in capital-intensive sectors.  
 
The composition of FDI attracted into host African countries matters for sustainable growth and 
development of these economies. For these countries to attract the appropriate form of FDI and 
adopt more sophisticated technology through joint ventures, licensing arrangements or direct 
purchase of such technologies, host countries need to enhance human capital capacity to absorb 
these technologies.  This underlines the importance of promoting STEM education and skills to 
enhance the capacity of African countries to absorb high-tech FDI.     
 
The benefit of human capital enhancement in attracting FDI and assimilating technology from 
these investments is reinforced in chapter four. The evidence suggests stronger effects of FDI on 
productivity growth for countries that have enhanced such capacity above the threshold of 6.94 
average years of schooling. It reveals that there is heterogeneity in the impact of FDI on African 
economies, with FDI positively affecting productivity growth in countries that have attained this 
threshold, while countries well below the threshold will not maximize the benefits from these 
investments. From this perspective, one would conclude that it would be extremely helpful for 
host countries that have not achieved this threshold to enhance their human capacity as a first 
step towards attracting these investments. For countries with human capacity levels that are 
closer to or above such threshold, policies can be designed to simultaneously attract FDI and 
enhance human capital capacity.  
 
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This thesis provides important directions for consideration in future research works. In chapter 
two, the analysis was based on bilateral FDI stock between source and host countries, given that 
sectoral data was not available at the time of the analysis. It would be useful in future research to 
explore the factors influencing FDI into the different sectors of host economies in order to 
determine whether there are differences in these determinants when such data is available.  
 
The analysis in chapter three is not without caveats. This paper hinges on the underlying 
assumption that joint ventures between foreign affiliates and local firms are more likely in 
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physical capital intensive sectors, such as manufacturing and less likely in labour-intensive 
sectors. However, with advancements in ICT and digital services, the manufacturing sector is 
gradually becoming less physical capital intensive as some investors in technologically advanced 
countries can now afford the costs of these services. Nonetheless, the theory sits well with the 
sub-Saharan African context where most countries are still lagging behind in terms of capacity to 
absorb technology. Additionally, this paper assumes that local firms contribute to FDI projects 
through human capital, as local managers have complete control over recruitment decisions in 
foreign affiliates. One needs to note that foreign affiliates operating in sub-Saharan Africa have 
contributed immensely to training of workers and managers in this region. There are also other 
channels through which local firms can benefit from superior technology, through licensing 
arrangements or direct purchase (see Nguyen et al, 2014), in addition to forming joint ventures 
with foreign affiliates.  
 
It is also worth noting that information on foreign equity ownership did not allow for 
categorization of ownership into backward and forward integrating decisions of firms. It would 
be interesting in future research to consider how input investments of foreign and local firms 
affect both backward and forward integration decisions of these firms. Another caveat of this 
analysis is dealing with endogeneity issues due to reverse causality between FDI and skill 
intensity of the local workforce. While this issue is mitigated through the inclusion of industry 
and country fixed effects in the estimations, a fruitful avenue for extension of future research will 
be to explore the dynamics in the relationship between ownership structure and firms‟ input 
investments while dealing with endogeneity issues using panel data. Additionally, as noted in 
chapter three, the analysis relied on the results of the fractional response models which 
accurately capture the different ownership decisions of firms. Attempts to analyze such decisions 
using the estimates of the multinomial logit model were not successful, since the assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) was not fulfilled. It is important to also note that the 
data did not allow the estimation of a multinomial nested logit model as an alternative approach 
to analyzing this relationship.  
 
Lastly, chapter four explored the role of human capital in explaining heterogeneity in the impact 
of FDI on productivity growth across African countries. Analyzing how other measures of 
absorptive capacity, such as the level of development of domestic financial markets and quality 
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of institutions, can explain the variation in the effect of FDI on productivity growth, will provide 
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 2 
 
 
Appendix A 2.1: Description of variables 
Variable Description Source 
FDI –Dependent  Bilateral Inward FDI stock to host economies from  source 
countries 
UNCTAD (2014) 
Real GDPs Gross domestic product (constant 2005 US$) World Bank (WDI) 
Relative factor 
endowments 
Difference in real GDP per capita between source and host 
countries. 
WDI 
Natural resources Sum of fuel (% of merchandise exports) and ores and metals (% 
of merchandise exports); sum of oil rents (% of GDP) & 
mineral rents (% of GDP). 
World Bank (WDI)  














sum of inverse-distance-weighted real GDP 
per capita of host countries in sample, excluding host country. 
WDI and CEPII 
 
Bilateral real exchange 
rate 
        ⁄
        ⁄
 
     





Standard deviation of bilateral real exchange rate Own calculations using WDI 
data 
Control of corruption Estimate- over the range -2.5 (weak) and 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance. 
World Bank (Kauffman)  
Trade cost Inverse of trade openness  Own calculations using WDI 
data 
Financial development  Domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP). Global Financial Development 
database 
Infrastructure  Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) index AfDB (2013) 
Agglomeration Share of total inward FDI stock in GDP (%) UNCTAD & WDI 
Distance  Distance between cities weighted by the share of principal 
cities‟ population in total population. 
CEPII  
BIT Dummy= 1 if bilateral investment treaty between source and 
host country entered into force, 0 otherwise. 
UNCTAD 
RTA Dummy=1 if free trade agreement between host and source 
entered in force, or host belong to a customs union or an 
economic integration agreement, 0 otherwise. 
WTO 
Landlocked Dummy=1 if host country is landlocked, 0 otherwise. CEPII 
Internal armed conflict Dummy=1 if armed conflict is internal, 0 otherwise. UCDP Dyadic Dataset 








Appendix A2.2: List of countries 
Source country sample 
OECD & other developed countries -Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and 
United States of America. 
Non-OECD Emerging Markets - Brazil, China, Cyprus, Hong Kong China, Croatia, India, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and United 
Arab Emirates. 
Intra-African Economies- Angola, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d‟lvoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,  Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Mozambique, Malawi, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Sudan, Senegal, Swaziland, Seychelles, Togo, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, South 
Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Host country sample 
Natural resource-rich -Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
Non-resource rich-Burundi, Cote d‟lvoire, Comoros, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
The Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Morocco, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Senegal, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland, Seychelles, Tunisia and Uganda. 
 
  




Appendix A2.3: Correlation matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. LogFDI 1 
                2. Log dist -0.02 1 
               3. RTA 0.20* -0.07* 1 
              4. BIT 0.26* -0.03* 0.11* 1 
             5. Trade -0.05* 0.06* -0.04* -0.09* 1 
            6. Log RER -0.001 -0.19* 0.22* -0.06* 0.11* 1 
           7. ICT 0.31* -0.06* 0.17* 0.19* 0.19* 0.27* 1 
          8. Log size 0.03* -0.49* 0.47* -0.02 -0.22* 0.39* 0.24* 1 
         9. Log sum GDP 0.27* 0.50* -0.40* 0.21* -0.03* -0.30* 0 -0.71* 1 
        10. REL -0.04* 0.30* -0.30* 0.08* -0.20* -0.47* -0.36* -0.40* 0.34* 1 
       11. NRES -0.04* -0.06* -0.08* 0.03* -0.22* 0.03* -0.08* 0.16* 0.12* -0.03* 1 
      11. SMP 0.11* 0.04* 0.04* -0.02 0.40* 0.16* 0.43* 0.11* 0.05* -0.41* 0.03* 1 
     12. Credit 0.31* 0.01 0.24* 0.17* -0.01 0.29* 0.55* 0.39* -0.01 -0.29* -0.19* 0.38* 1 
    13. Corruption 0.14* -0.04* 0.21* 0.03* 0.19* 0.32* 0.47* 0.20* -0.20* -0.28* -0.49* 0.29* 0.57* -0.02 1 
  14. Lag FDI -0.01 0.04* -0.05* -0.03* 0.25* 0.014 -0.15* -0.22* 0.06* 0.11* 0.11* -0.02 -0.08* -0.04* -0.09* 1 
 15. Conflict -0.01 -0.02 -0.07* 0.03* -0.17* -0.09* -0.15* -0.04* 0.10* 0.08* 0.15* -0.13* -0.16* 0.08* -0.24* 0 1 
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      Appendix A2.4: Differences between Intra-African and non-OECD FDI 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Resource rich  Non-resource rich 
Non-OECD emerging markets dummy -3.489 -2.895 
 (5.783) (2.444) 
Lagged log relative market size 1.092* 0.830 
 (0.618) (0.566) 
Interaction between non-OECD dummy & lagged log relative market size -0.366 0.482 
 (0.904) (0.653) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 4.861*** 2.648*** 
 (0.890) (0.788) 
Lagged oil and mineral rents  -0.096***  
 (0.034)  
Interaction between non-OECD dummy & lagged oil and mineral rents 0.042  
 (0.040)  
Lagged relative factor endowment 0.150 -0.029 
 (0.161) (0.264) 
Interaction between non-OECD dummy & lagged relative factor endowment -0.224 0.075 
 (0.164) (0.264) 
Lagged surrounding market potential -0.006 0.038** 
 (0.008) (0.018) 
Bilateral investment treaty dummy -1.010** 0.018 
 (0.495) (0.620) 
Lagged trade openness -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Lagged log bilateral real exchange rate 0.284** 0.351 
 (0.132) (0.262) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index -0.001** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Lagged domestic credit to the private sector to GDP -0.011 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.018) 
Lagged control of corruption index -1.115*** -0.928* 
 (0.243) (0.514) 
Internal armed conflict dummy 0.269 0.104 
 (0.180) (0.186) 
Landlocked dummy 1.638* 3.662* 
 (0.977) (1.999) 
Log distance -2.618 1.066 
 (4.890) (2.887) 
Constant -96.963*** -71.305** 
 (32.625) (31.362) 
Observations 1,536 788 
Number of country-pairs 191 127 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.63 0.08 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.              
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered around country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-Taylor 
model: Lagged log of relative market size, interaction between OECD dummy & lagged log of relative market size, lagged log sum real GDP, 
lagged oil and mineral rents, interaction between OECD dummy & lagged log oil and mineral rents, lagged relative factor endowments, 
interaction between non-OECD dummy and lagged relative factor endowment, lagged domestic credit to GDP, lagged control of corruption 
index, internal armed conflict and time dummies. Time-varying exogenous regressors: bilateral investment treaty, lagged log bilateral exchange 
rate, lagged trade openness, lagged surrounding market potential and lagged electricity infrastructure index. Time-invariant endogenous regressor 
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    Appendix A2.5: Differences between Intra-African and OECD FDI 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Resource rich  Non-resource rich 
OECD dummy 27.589* 5.273 
 (14.211) (7.982) 
Lagged log relative market size 1.018 -0.172 
 (0.624) (0.967) 
Interaction between OECD dummy & lagged log relative market size 0.466 1.321 
 (0.838) (1.315) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 1.796** 1.093 
 (0.792) (1.436) 
Lagged oil and mineral rents  -0.092***  
 (0.035)  
Interaction between OECD dummy & lagged oil and mineral rents 0.065*  
 (0.036)  
Lagged relative factor endowment 0.196 -0.125 
 (0.155) (0.277) 
Interaction between OECD dummy & lagged relative factor endowment -0.350** -0.001 
 (0.166) (0.272) 
Lagged surrounding market potential -0.010** 0.033* 
 (0.004) (0.020) 
Lagged trade openness -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Lagged log bilateral real exchange rate 0.031 -0.269 
 (0.182) (0.171) 
Lagged domestic credit to the private sector to GDP -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.004) (0.014) 
Bilateral investment treaty dummy 0.783*** -0.226 
 (0.304) (0.286) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Lagged control of corruption index -0.031 -0.559* 
 (0.220) (0.302) 
Internal armed conflict dummy 0.145 -0.041 
 (0.148) (0.199) 
Landlocked dummy 2.788 -0.097 
 (1.984) (0.846) 
Log distance  -18.402 1.560 
 (12.363) (6.514) 
Constant 98.002 -36.646 
 (90.474) (85.511) 
Observations 2,660 1,680 
Number of country-pairs 324 234 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.41 0.24 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.              
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered around country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-Taylor 
model: Lagged log of relative market size, interaction between OECD dummy & lagged log of relative market size, lagged oil and mineral rents, 
interaction between OECD dummy & lagged log oil and mineral rents, lagged relative factor endowments, interaction between OECD dummy 
and lagged relative factor endowment, lagged domestic credit to GDP, lagged control of corruption index, bilateral investment treaty, internal 
armed conflict and time dummies. Time-varying exogenous regressors: lagged log sum real GDP, lagged log bilateral exchange rate, lagged trade 
openness, lagged surrounding market potential and lagged electricity infrastructure index. Time-invariant endogenous regressor is log distance 
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Appendix A2.5: Differences between South Africa and other African Countries (Intra-African FDI) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Intra-Africa Non-OECD 
Emerging Markets 
OECD 
SA dummy -7.281 1.755 -9.817*** 
 (5.287) (4.122) (2.917) 
Lagged log relative market size 0.672 1.687*** 2.844*** 
 (0.754) (0.632) (0.462) 
Interaction between SA dummy & lagged log relative market size -0.590 -1.545 1.548 
 (0.824) (1.264) (1.379) 
Lagged log sum real GDP 4.029*** 4.954*** 3.464*** 
 (0.700) (0.504) (0.846) 
Lagged relative factor endowment 0.050 -0.013 -0.086*** 
 (0.225) (0.025) (0.025) 
Interaction between SA dummy & lagged relative factor endowment -0.083 -0.141*** 0.097* 
 (0.224) (0.045) (0.052) 
Lagged oil and mineral rents -0.085** -0.056** -0.035*** 
 (0.035) (0.022) (0.009) 
Interaction between SA dummy & lagged oil and mineral rents -0.298*** -0.185 -0.042 
 (0.102) (0.197) (0.082) 
Lagged surrounding market potential 0.020 -0.015 -0.017*** 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.005) 
Bilateral investment treaty dummy 0.189 -0.848 0.460* 
 (0.223) (0.555) (0.239) 
Lagged trade openness -0.007* -0.007 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Lagged electricity infrastructure index -0.001 -0.000 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Lagged log bilateral real exchange rate 0.305* -0.291 -0.512*** 
 (0.176) (0.323) (0.113) 
Lagged domestic credit to the private sector to GDP -0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) 
Lagged control of corruption index -0.707** -1.613*** -0.334 
 (0.340) (0.366) (0.229) 
Landlocked dummy 11.393 3.898 -0.417 
 (8.713) (2.691) (0.786) 
Log distance 19.624 -39.509*** 8.184*** 
 (15.776) (14.733) (2.078) 
Constant -249.122** 228.102* -150.425*** 
 (124.342) (129.135) (33.191) 
Observations 1,134 1,190 3,206 
Number of country-pairs 163 155 395 
Time fixed effects No No No 
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.60 0.15 0.13 
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral inward FDI stock. „*‟, „**‟, and „***‟ indicate significant parameters at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.              
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered around country-pairs. Time-varying endogenous regressors in Hausman-Taylor 
model: Lagged log of relative market size, interaction between OECD dummy & lagged log of relative market size, lagged oil and mineral rents, 
interaction between OECD dummy & lagged log oil and mineral rents, lagged relative factor endowments, interaction between OECD dummy 
and lagged relative factor endowment, lagged trade openness, lagged surrounding market potential, lagged domestic credit to GDP, lagged 
control of corruption index and internal armed conflict dummy. Time-varying exogenous regressors: lagged log sum real GDP, lagged log 
bilateral exchange rate, bilateral investment treaty and lagged electricity infrastructure index. Time-invariant endogenous regressors are log 
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Appendix A3.1: Foreign Ownership and Input Intensity of firms across sectors 
     





Skill intensity of 
local workforce (%) 
Kenya  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 39                        70,206  15 
Kenya  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 42                      127,877  13 
Kenya Manufacturing (High-tech) 47                      277,384  16 
Kenya Electricity, gas and water supply 42                   1,291,789  17 
Kenya Construction 30                      576,826  28 
Lesotho  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 56                          2,975  12 
Lesotho  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 60                          8,691  5 
Lesotho Manufacturing (High-tech) 42                          7,541  16 
Lesotho  Electricity, gas and water supply 100                        10,386  10 
Lesotho  Construction 18                          4,120  14 
Madagascar  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 43                        11,614  14 
Madagascar  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 48                        17,208  7 
Madagascar  Manufacturing (High-tech) 44                        24,482  22 
Madagascar  Electricity, gas and water supply 50                        62,810  33 
Madagascar  Construction 65                          6,042  17 
Malawi  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 13                        16,862  14 
Malawi  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 35                        63,060  18 
Malawi  Manufacturing (High-tech) 34                        39,624  25 
Malawi  Electricity, gas and water supply 0                     N/A 7 
Malawi  Construction 50                        58,892  9 
Mali  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 7                        23,280  14 
Mali  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 52                        33,953  19 
Mali  Manufacturing (High-tech) 50                        46,176  12 
Mali  Electricity, gas and water supply 29                   2,983,692  31 
Mali  Construction 21                        38,430  31 
Mozambique  Manufacturing (Low-tech) 36                          8,576  11 
Mozambique  Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 53                        12,610  13 
Mozambique  Manufacturing (High-tech) 44                        16,454  11 
Mozambique  Electricity, gas and water supply 0                        45,738  37 
Mozambique Construction 34                       6,657                           14 
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Appendix A3.1: Foreign Ownership and Input Intensity of firms across sectors (Continued) 
     





Skill intensity of 
local workforce (%) 
Niger 3. Manufacturing (Low-tech) 10                        22,997  18 
Niger 4. Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 22                        62,587  31 
Niger 5. Manufacturing (High-tech) 68                        11,724  7 
Niger 6. Electricity, gas and water supply 17                   3,201,063  39 
Niger 7. Construction 0                        25,938  61 
Nigeria 3. Manufacturing (Low-tech) 14                        38,568  16 
Nigeria 4. Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 20                        31,712  16 
Nigeria 5. Manufacturing (High-tech) 18                        80,747  21 
Nigeria 6. Electricity, gas and water supply 0                        36,140  38 
Nigeria 7. Construction 20                        43,516  39 
Rwanda 3. Manufacturing (Low-tech) 23                        25,260  17 
Rwanda 4. Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 41                        20,551  12 
Rwanda 5. Manufacturing (High-tech) 57                          6,946  19 
Rwanda 7. Construction 25                      162,795  21 
Senegal 3. Manufacturing (Low-tech) 21                        42,272  19 
Senegal 4. Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 26                      100,478  21 
Senegal 5. Manufacturing (High-tech) 37                      532,492  15 
Senegal 6. Electricity, gas and water supply 40                      190,283  8 
Senegal 7. Construction 34                        21,793  31 
Tanzania 3. Manufacturing (Low-tech) 25                      355,097  16 
Tanzania 4. Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 42                        21,379  12 
Tanzania 5. Manufacturing (High-tech) 24                        36,531  15 
Tanzania 6. Electricity, gas and water supply 0                        96,994  28 
Tanzania 7. Construction 8                        20,618  36 
Uganda 3. Manufacturing (Low-tech) 39                        74,321  20 
Uganda 4. Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 41                        29,434  16 
Uganda 5. Manufacturing (High-tech) 59                 28,500,000  12 
Uganda 6. Electricity, gas and water supply 100                        23,015  7 
Uganda 7. Construction 51                        42,283  22 
Zambia 3. Manufacturing (Low-tech) 23                        18,270  10 
Zambia 4. Manufacturing (Medium-tech) 33                        55,816  10 
Zambia 5. Manufacturing (High-tech) 29                        17,941  16 
Zambia 6. Electricity, gas and water supply 0                      443,344  89 
Zambia 7. Construction 33                        19,177  15 
Source: Own calculations based on UNIDO (2010) 
 
